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ABSTRACT

AUTHORITY AND PERSONALITY IN M.M. BAKHTIN‘S
―AUTHOR AND HERO IN AESTHETIC ACTIVITY‖

By
Joel S. Ward
December 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Calvin L. Troup.
M.M. Bakhtin‘s fundamental claim in his seminal essay ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic
Activity‖ situates verbal action as the most essential constituent of human personality. A careful
reading of this text reveals important truths about the relationship between free individual
personhood and the nature of the speech utterance. Bakhtin connects the human experience of
speech to the life and person of Jesus Christ emphasizing the incarnation and the Trinitarian view
of God as essential principles for understanding the creative power of the word and consequent
liabilities. Bakhtin develops these theological and philosophical coordinates around a discussion
of the author-hero relationship in the novel asserting that the verbal utterance is creatively
involved in building and sustaining the inner personhood of those it addresses. Bakhtin‘s critical
conclusion substantiates that from whom a word is received, and to whom the spoken word
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appeals has weighty influence on the type and character of human personality, and that
personality‘s relationship to authority.
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Chapter 1: Art and Life
―For it is certainly easier to create without answering for life, and easier to live without any
consideration for art.‖— Art and Answerability

Introduction
No art exists for its own sake. M. Mikhail Bakhtin claims in his essay ―Author
and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,‖ that the aesthetic act fundamentally constitutes human
personality; particularly that verbal art holds the key to understanding the mystery of
inner personhood. For Bakhtin, this means that in essence artistic action constitutes moral
action, a demonstration of existential intent. For this reason, Bakhtin argues that the study
of art analogously attempts to understand the original motive informing verbal action, the
speech utterance. More pointedly, Bakhtin argues that analyzing the artistry of the
contemporary novel remains the most generous yet reliable method of articulating the
fundamental principles of discursive human life. The intimate connection between art and
life lead Bakhtin to determine that art must respond to the constraints of human existence
because aesthetic attitudes inform all human action. Art must take account of individual
life as it occurs as well as consider the constraints of human interrelationship. According
to Bakhtin, art indifferent to human existence cannot mean. Indifferent art is meaningless
because it does not condescend into human life, is irresponsive and does not invite
understanding. Likewise, Bakhtin argues that human action must take account of artistic
creation, the ability of art to extend the boundaries of perception and unify the breadth
and depth of human uniqueness. Bakhtin believes we must not say ―That‘s art after all!
All we‘ve got is the humble prose of living‖ (A&A 1). The ―mutual liability to blame‖
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that art and life share brings them together in the life of a person and through this
unification the constraints of life and the freedom of art are reconciled. (A&A 2)
This project looks at fundamental themes in Bakhtin‘s essay ―Author and Hero in
Aesthetic Activity‖ with the purpose of reorienting theories of communication around
these original philosophical musings. Bakhtin‘s view of art and life contain significant
assumptions that ground his philosophy of communication but these are not the only
categories important for his thinking. In order to develop a thorough description of what
it means to be in dialogue, Bakhtin artfully articulates a triadic relationship between
existence, aesthetic form and human personality. Bakhtin‘s cosmological perspective and
his appropriation of fundamental tenants in the historic Christian faith are the means by
which he achieves an understanding of relationship between transgredient aesthetic form
and temporal human personality. In his discussion of the author-hero dynamic Bakhtin
carefully explains the importance of the author‘s role and his relationship with the hero.
He consistently defends an ―outside‖ viewpoint that unconstrained by the experiential
plane of human life. At the same time, Bakhtin resists the notion that outside authority
creates an insurmountable power distance between the author and his heroes.
Bakhtin discourages thinking that attempts to describe the author-hero
relationship cognitively or ethically. Instead he believes that ―aesthetic seeing‖
synthesizes the cognitive and ethical viewpoints. For this reason the nature of ―aesthetic
seeing‖ must be understood before developing a thoroughly systematic yet adequately
open theory of human communication. Christian theology in Bakhtin‘s thought centers on
his view of the Incarnation. This historical event understood as an aesthetic, ethical and
communicative act represents for Bakhtin the unification of art with life and the purity of
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truth with common human being. In order for Bakhtin‘s discussion of aesthetics, art and
dialogue to develop creatively and flexibly, scholars must acknowledge that the
Incarnation enters Bakhtin‘s thinking as more than myth or metaphor. The incarnate
celebration of the body and the descent from divinity to humanity buttresses Bakhtin‘s
confirmation of radically individual yet stable human personalities. The following pages
argue that Bakhtin‘s view of aesthetics is broader than a simple discussion of the novel
and demonstrate how Bakhtin‘s defends a ―transgredient‖ author as a necessary
constituent of the human personality essential for dialogic interaction.
Art and Life
Of Mikhail Bakhtin‘s essays, ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity‖ is studied
the least by scholars reading his work. Although it receives sufficient attention as his
effort to outline a research plan spanning forty years, few have attempted to interpret the
richness of this philosophical treatise or explain its connection to his later writing on
speech genres, literary criticism and dialogic communication.
In Bakhtin‘s first philosophic conversations in ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic
Activity‖ and Toward a Philosophy of the Act the relationship between the author and the
hero appears prominently in his thought. The author-hero relationship has generally been
interpreted as an exploration of the problem of authorship even though Ruth Coates has
argued that the author-hero relationship functions as Bakhtin‘s analogy for God‘s
relationship with mankind (23). Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson agree that
Bakhtin‘s ―prophetic tone verges on the theological‖ (61) but do not pursue the question
of God or Christ in Bakhtin‘s philosophy at any great length. Katerina Clark and Michael
Holquist prevaricate on the appearance of these themes in the entirety of Bakhtin‘s
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writings without positioning God or Jesus Christ as personalities essential to the
systematic coherency of Bakhtin‘s ideas, a wholeness that he sought in his substantial
criticism of ―unconstrained philosophy‖ (Bocharov 1019).
The importance of understanding the author-hero relationship for Bakhtin‘s
philosophy of communication introduces the significance of incarnation as a pivotal
principle in his understanding of personhood. Bakhtin scholar, Don Biaslostosky concurs
that Bakhtin‘s philosophical writings lay an important foundation for his later
explorations into literature, culture and verbal communication even though like many
others he neglects this early essay (6). The present discussion of the significant themes in
―Author and Hero‖ involves a careful reading of the essay in order to develop a thorough
understanding of Bakhtin‘s author-hero relationship. This study shows that the
implications of the author-hero relationship are broader than the disciplinary concerns of
literary criticism and philosophical aesthetics.
Bakhtin‘s insistence that ―for a proper understanding of the author‘s
architectonically stable and dynamic living relationship to the hero, we must take into
account…the essentially necessary foundation of that relationship‖ calls for a closer and
more persistent reading of the essay (A&H 4). Instead of a narrow relationship to a
particular work, we learn very quickly that Bakhtin has more in mind when he considers
the ―problem of the Author‘s relationship to the Hero‖ (A&H 4). Bakhtin‘s inquiry
purposefully peers beyond artistic creation extending the implications of the inquiry
further than an immanent view of aesthetic activity. Bakhtin‘s question involves more
than characters in a story whose life has already been textually determined. Bakhtin‘s
work becomes even more additive and meaningful for the study of human
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communication when considered in light of the fundamental philosophic and theological
presuppositions revealed in the author-hero relationship.
Wayne C. Booth has argued of Bakhtin‘s critical work on Dostoevsky that,
―Bakhtin‘s ultimate value is thus not to be addressed as just one more piece of ―literary
criticism‖; even less is it a study of fictional technique or form. It is a philosophical
inquiry into our limited ways of mirroring—and improving—our lives‖ (Booth xxv). This
project approaches ―Author and Hero‖ with this very same intent. Bakhtin‘s discussion of
the author- hero relationship implicates interpersonal interaction as a significant part of
his overall discussion. Utilizing the nature of discourse in interpersonal relationship to
emphasize and articulate his arguments Bakhtin sought evidence in everyday utterances
as demonstrated in his short essay ―Discourse in Life, Discourse in Art.‖ In a brief
discussion of the difference between a linguistic understanding of language and the
spoken utterance Bakhtin emphasizes the interpersonal nature of speech and its reliance
on relational context to generate meaning in language.1
Fully understanding Bakhtin‘s philosophy of communication means realizing the
essential correlation between Bakhtin‘s theory of aesthetic action and his vision of
interpersonal relationship. This correlation features saliently in Bakhtin‘s discussion of
the author-hero relationship even though not often foregrounded by Bakhtin scholars.
Bakhtin intentionally moves between art and life drawing parallels between the act of
creation in artistic production and the creative principle underlying human speech.
Bakhtin argues for a synthetic relationship between art and life because he believes that
1

Bakhtin also discusses in this essay the significance of the intonational metaphor in human
speech as a means of describing the ideal being expressed in everyday discourse. This metaphor functions
very much the same as the incarnation does in ―Author and Hero‖. Rich parallels could be drawn between
the language of intonation and its relation to incarnation both of which emphasize a move from purity of
idea and form into particular and specific expression, an idea echoed in Bakhtin‘s notion of the chronotope.
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creation (specifically in verbal art) principally informs human being and because a
phenomenological description of the contemplative act of viewing an artistic object is the
best means we have of understanding the way formal constituents result in whole and
stable human personalities. Bakhtin believes that by understanding this necessary
principle we can gain greater insight into the nature, purpose and tone of the author‘s
relationship with the hero as well as the hero‘s own creative activity.
Bakhtin establishes the relationship between art and life in his first published
essay entitled ―Art and Answerability.‖ In this essay Bakhtin asserts that art and life have
experienced an artificial separation, a separation that has degraded the ―aesthetics of
verbal art, especially in literary history‖ (A&H 8). This short treatise quite aptly serves as
a preface to a compilation of his early essays which include ―Author and Hero in
Aesthetic Activity‖ and ―The Problem of Content, Material and Form in Verbal Art‖ in a
volume edited by Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist. In this essay, Bakhtin very
briefly lays out a general critique of the separation of art and life stating that both need to
be ―answerable‖ for each other. In Bakhtin‘s own words, ―It is not only mutual
answerability that art and life must assume but also mutual liability to blame‖ (A&A 1).
This statement contains the kernel of the question Bakhtin would continue to pursue
throughout his life. By claiming quite robustly that art as an ―outside‖ point of view
provides both meaning and freedom to constrained life Bakhtin shows that understanding
the author-hero relationship is crucial for both art and life to exist. The outside purview of
art and the practice of life must be brought together because only through their synthesis
can we understand the nature and direction of responsible human action.
The Author and the Hero
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Bakhtin‘s interest in the shared liability of art and life discloses his greater
concern with the enigma of human personality, a question intertwined with the study of
aesthetics and verbal communication. Bakhtin asks, ―What guarantees the inner
connection of the constituent elements of a person?‖ (A&A 1). The proposal of this
question supports the premise that Bakhtin‘s attention directed away from formal aspects
of aesthetics and towards the particular generation of human personality.
Bakhtin‘s concentrated gaze on the ―inner connection of the constituent elements
of a person‖ appears to situate his inquiry psychologically, but he insists that this is not
the case. By introducing the problem of personality, Bakhtin lays out very clear purpose
guiding his entire inquiry into language and sociality. Here, the primary revelation is
Bakhtin‘s commitment to conceptualizing the boundaries of human existence. More
specifically, Bakhtin believes that life and art act as constraints on each other and that this
mutual binding becomes formally constituent of the author-hero relationship. In the
particular case of human personality, Bakhtin highlights two ways in which these
constraints are related to the sense of sight. Bakhtin‘s use of sensory organs in his
argumentation reveals his bias for the body, situating his discussion literally and
metaphorically around the temporal boundaries of human being.
Physically it is impossible to see inside a person‘s mind, to view and understand
their thoughts, schematize aspects of their unique personality from the outside in.
Likewise, we are physically unable to see our own physical form from the outside. We
cannot view our body from an outside perspective, see what others see in the way our
bodies move and interact with the world. Bakhtin emphasizes the outside viewpoint
because he believes this is an integral part of general aesthetic theory as well as important
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for the particularity of personality development. In fact, according to Bakhtin, individual
self-consciousness depends on others for a complete and stable view, very much like
achieving a valid image of one‘s body relies on the eyesight of others. Bakhtin writes,
For self-consciousness, this integral image is dispersed in life and enters the field
of seeing the external world only in the form of fortuitous fragments. And what is
lacking, moreover, is precisely the external unity and continuity; a human being
experiencing life in the category of his own I is incapable of gathering himself by
himself into an outward whole that would be even relatively finished (A&H 35).
In other words, a person‘s self-conscious life happens on the inside of their body
and cannot with any real efficiency gain perspective of their body as it is situated in front
of others. Bakhtin critiques attempts to achieve an outside perspective through mirrors,
film, photographs etc. coming to the conclusion that these are soulless modes of seeing
oneself from the outside. Not only are these reflections incomplete from the perspectival
standpoint, the appearances that do present themselves are ghosts and apparitions that
deceive us into thinking we have seen a complete view of our bodies from the outside.
These attitudinal abstractions, momentary snapshots of how we appear from the outside,
have no immediate connection to the life that is lived inwardly in self-consciousness.
This does not necessarily mean that in some ways theoretical psychology cannot give us
glimpses of what our inner life signifies in the world as perceived by others. However,
Bakhtin believes that attempts by psychology, like momentary mirrored reflections, are
largely based on abstractions and hardly capable of providing the encompassing and
consummating viewpoint he believes is crucial and necessary for bringing together the
inner constituents of a human personality.
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Bakhtin explicitly differentiates his own project by opposing a fundamental
assumption of theoretical psychology; he does not presuppose autonomous selfhood.
Bakhtin regards the viewpoints of others as necessary constituents of personhood, which
place definitive constraints on the possibility of observing an essential self. 2 Bakhtin
argues that the perspectives of analytic psychology create outside viewpoints by relying
on abstraction. This abstraction finalizes the constituent elements of personality by taking
a deterministic perspective towards the whole of a person attributing human action and
creativity to simplistic or singular impulses. 3 Citing these constraints Bakhtin turns to
aesthetics as a more elegant system or method of representing the event of interpersonal
personality in communication. He writes:
We meet with it only to the extent to which it precipitates itself in a work of art.
That is, we have to do with the ideal history of this process, its history on the
plane of meaning, and with the ideal, meaning related laws governing this history.
What the temporal causes of such a process may have been or how it may have
proceeded psychologically is entirely a matter of conjecture, but in any case this
does not concern aesthetics. (A&H 6)
Bakhtin continuously reminds us as readers that his own study is not an
explication of the author and hero relationship ―in its pure form‖ but instead posed in

2

In his discussions of empathy or the ability to see from another‘s point of view, Bakhtin does
admits the possibility, in some limited way, of putting oneself in another‘s place but does not pursue this
phenomenon very far. His focus on the outside point of view leads him to remark that ―It is enough for our
purposes that this projection of myself into him is possible and in what form—we shall not consider the
psychological problem of such projection—we shall not consider here‖ (A&H 25). Bakhtin later clarifies
this situation by stating that this projection is not part of the aesthetic event and not until ―we return to
ourselves, to our own place outside the suffering person‖ that aesthetic activity begins.
3
Although Bakhtin does not openly critique the ideas of Freud, Bakhtin Morson and Emerson in
Rethinking Bakhtin (p. 10) have identified this general critique of psychology as an inferential critique of
Freud‘s methodology, specifically his propensity for identifying sexual undertones as a singular motive for
all human social activity.
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principle (A&H 11). Most importantly Bakhtin wants to direct our attention towards a
―creative principle in the author‘s relationship to the hero,‖ a principle that he believes, if
properly understood, will enable a fuller conception of human action and verbal
communication in practice (A&H 10). Bakhtin believes that like good art, our
explanation of human relationships in the world must be productive, allowing for
sustained and free action rather than foreclosing the meaningful potential possible in any
human relationship.
Bakhtin‘s purpose clarifies the nature of this relationship as it occurs on the
―plane of meaning.‖ The ―plane of meaning,‖ according to Bakhtin, is the plane of human
life. A plane inhabited by people, and therefore subject to the constraints of human life.
On the plane of meaning the intersection between the author‘s aesthetic view and the
lived life of the hero occurs. This means that the author‘s vision penetrates the plane of
meaning introducing a dynamic tension into the relationship between an outside author
and a constrained hero. According to Bakhtin, the author as another consciousness truly
―consummates‖ the hero, making him complete and providing him with a stable and
individual identity (A&H 12). According to Bakhtin, only from the author‘s viewpoint is
the creation of the hero possible. The hero‘s point of view and that of the author‘s do not
originate on the same plane even if the author‘s vision penetrates the hero‘s plane of
experience and influences the hero or heroes that inhabit his work.
For Bakhtin, the author‘s point of view must be outside, or ‗transgredient‖ to the
plane on which his hero lives. Only from this vantage point can the author wholly see his
hero and position him in his world. The author‘s seeing from the outside perceives
excessively, seeing beyond or further than just the hero, taking him in simultaneously
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from all sides and from all moments in the hero‘s life. The author‘s viewpoint exists as a
distinctly outside perspective that is necessary and important for the development of the
hero‘s character.
Although the author is the only one who can see ―the whole picture‖ the author is
not the only person with an outside viewpoint. Heroes within a work can take an
authoritative perspective and see others from the outside. However, their view is a limited
in scope both by time and position. Without being able to achieve complete ―outsideness‖
other heroes can only provide perspectival viewpoints for the hero, and because they see
partially, cannot fully stabilize or create the formally complete image of a person. A
hero‘s dependency on the author‘s seeing is, for Bakhtin, both a reality of personhood as
well as a necessity for the discipline of aesthetics. In fact, Bakhtin‘s chief critique of
disciplinary aesthetics turns on the unacknowledged necessity of this viewpoint in order
to ground a systematic development for theories of art, especially in the verbal arts.
Aesthetics needs a complete or ―consummating‖ viewpoint in order for it to
function as a means of understanding and naming value. Aesthetics both as a discipline
and as a viewpoint relies on an view from outside, not just an outside viewpoint but a
perspective that can see also see all sides of the artistic object or the hero and through this
gaze understand and consummate the object wholly and completely. Aesthetics as the
discipline and system in which material receives form and content happens similarly to
the outside view that consummates the image of a person. Although a good artist can
―see‖ his artistic production prior to its completion, this does not mean that the object
produced will cease to mean in its finishing. A truly artistic object will continue to mean,
for others as well as the artist, long after the consummation of the artistic act. For
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Bakhtin, just as aesthetics needs a way to describe the nature of this continued meaning
that is ―transgredient‖ to the author‘s specific act, so also our understanding of human
personhood needs a measure by which we understand the continual development of a
human being while also having a sense of a person‘s completeness, the wholeness of their
personality beyond the constituent moments of physical maturity and biographical life.
Although interaction between heroes within a work places restrictions on what
they can see in and around themselves, Bakhtin qualifies the ―sight‖ or ―aesthetic seeing‖
of the author as completing a person without foreclosing the meaning of their existence.
Bakhtin characterization of the author‘s viewpoint as ―transgredient‖ does not suggest,
however, that his vision ―transcends‖ human life. In the background of his discussion
Bakhtin never forgets the human body as an important point of reference when he says
―the problem of the body as value can be located only on the ethical plane, on the
aesthetic plane and to some extent on the religious plane.‖ (A&H 47)
Incarnation
The value of the body as a marker of human individuality is most poignantly
presented on the religious plane by Bakhtin‘s description of incarnation (A&H 10). The
integration of incarnation is a significant move for Bakhtin because from the very
beginning it indicates his reliance on the idea of the religious historical event as critical
for developing his philosophy of aesthetics, human personality and communicative
action.
Bakhtin‘s integration of aesthetic description with Jesus Christ—as both God and
man—in the historical event to save humanity from its sin, positions the incarnation as an
essential idea for his view of aesthetics and human communication (A&H 56-57).
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Bakhtin sees an important correlation between the event of the incarnation and the speech
act when he says ―the author puts his own ideas directly into the mouth of the hero from
the standpoint of their theoretical and ethical (political, social) validity, in order to
convince us of their truth and in order to propagandize them‖ (A&H 10). It is important
to consider that Bakhtin does not critique this event as the diminution of the hero since he
compares this particular case, with similar language, to that of the ideal principal
relationship between the author and the hero.
The question of whether or not the author can create truly independent
personalities in art does not often prompt too much general concern since literary
characters live fictional lives. However, Bakhtin‘s scenario of the author‘s ideas being
put directly into the mouth of his heroes as living people raises different apprehensions if
we consider the implications of this viewpoint for the lives of actual people inhabiting
and acting in the world. This is why Bakhtin‘s introduction of the incarnation as a way to
conceptualize the nature of relationship and the author‘s word as incarnate are so very
important. Incarnation is not simply a will repudiating possession of the hero‘s body with
the will of the author. Evidenced in Bakhtin‘s discussion of Rabelais, Bakhtin imagines
the incarnation as an honoring of the particular, temporal, independent person; an
elevation of the body‘s significance and a celebration of its distinct and specific existence
(Coates 133). Elsewhere Bakhtin will introduce Jesus Christ as the personification of
unity, a material unification of both the aesthetic viewpoint and an inwardly lived life
giving clear indication that this event, and the person of Christ stand as significant for the
systematic unity of Bakhtin‘s position (A&H 56).4 Bakhtin‘s reliance on the incarnation

4

Chapter four further pursues this theme. Bakhtin follows the work of St. Augustine and the
significance of the Incarnation in Augustine‘s thought. A detailed exposition of how this theme functions
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to describe the transition from the formal to the material is a significant move, and acts as
the pivotal piece in his description of the dialectic between the boundaries of the body
and the encompassing and consummating viewpoint of the author. The person of Jesus
Christ allows Bakhtin to see a simultaneous unity and diversity in human life and
language, ―a synthesis of unique depth‖ (A&H 56).
According to Bakhtin, understanding this event and the mystery of the
outside/earthly relationship is quite impossible from a theoretical point of view. 5 Bakhtin
does not think it is conceivable to truly describe the nature of incarnation as an event
occurring in a person‘s inward life. Instead Bakhtin turns to the literature to describe the
nature of this relationship, and it is the novel‘s depiction of ―unfinalized‖ dialogic
personalities that makes it suitable for Bakhtin‘s task6. In this way Bakhtin implicates art
as something more than the individual expression of the author, possessing much more
profundity than mere ―inspiration‖ (A&A 2). An aesthetic act can be understood as truth
descending to become liable for the various circumstances of human experience.
Similarly, the incarnation is a single event that aesthetically addresses the individual
liability of each sinner. Bakhtin believes that art and life should be brought together
through this same liability because only the recognition of this ―liability to blame‖ can
instill a ―unity of answerability to human action‖ (A&A 1-2).
When the spheres of art and life are brought together in the human speech act, the
fruitful product of understanding answerable interpersonal relationship matures. Good

rhetorically in Augustine‘s Confessions can be found in Calvin Troup‘s Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom:
The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions, specifically pages 4-5.
5
In fact one might even say that Bakhtin‘s attempts to identify a creative principle that creates a
systematic understanding of aesthetics, verbal communication and human action found in a person.
6
Most demonstrably found in Fyodor Dostoevsky‘s novels.
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authors acknowledge, grapple with, and ―surmount‖ the constraints of real life (A&H
193). In the author-hero relationship Bakhtin identifies the situated human body as a
significant primary and formal constraint. According to Bakhtin, the author‘s
surmounting of this constraint is characteristic of his relationship to the hero.
The author not only sees and knows everything seen and known by each hero
individually and by all heroes collectively, but he also sees and knows more than
they do; more-over, he sees and knows something that is in principle inaccessible
to them. And it is precisely in this invariably determinate stable excess of the
author‘s seeing and knowing in relation to each hero that we find all those
moments that bring about the consummation of the whole—the whole of each
hero as well as the whole of the event which constitutes their life and in which
they jointly participate.‖ (12)
Through Bakhtin‘s language of excess and participation we begin to get a better
glimpse of the incarnational dynamic situated at the center of Bakhtin‘s work in ―Author
and Hero.‖ On one hand, the constraints of the hero‘s human body with his limited
perspective and his inability to conceive of himself as a whole person is coupled with the
―encompassing‖(10) viewpoint of the author that consummates and completes the heroes.
The author sees more or beyond what the hero can see in his own life. The sight lines of
the author are not however a strict determination of a hero‘s personhood or action. In
Bakhtin‘s utilization of incarnation as the exemplary event in which ―the idea that has a
purely theoretical validity for the author‖ is ―modified‖ in its ―direction,‖ he introduces
real participation within the author‘s encompassing and consummating seeing excess
(A&H 10).
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Bakhtin‘s idea of participation (elsewhere called co-experiencing) is a crucial
theme in ―Author and Hero.‖ First, however, it is important to highlight the evident
difference in personhood between the author and hero as conceptualized by Bakhtin;
specifically how the outside viewpoint gives the author inwardly persuasive authority
towards the heroes of his creation. Bakhtin‘s view of authority in ―Author and Hero‖ is
one distinctly informed by his discussion of the author-hero relationship in the novel and
substantially different from his description of the ―authoritative word‖ in a later essay
entitled ―Discourse in the Novel,‖ even if this notion of authority contains negative
overtones which are often conflated with domination and power (DI 342). The
implications of Bakhtin‘s discussion are not specific to the novel genre but extend into
interpersonal and societal relationships principally fostering a functional understanding of
human relationship eschewing assumptions regarding their ―pure form.‖
The Author
Advancing an understanding of the author-hero relationship points out an
important distinction found at the basis of Bakhtin‘s discussion regarding the crisis in the
aesthetics of verbal art; specifically, how the principle of aesthetics, when properly
understood resolves the many arguments that obfuscate the terms of the crisis. First
Bakhtin critiques ―confounding the author-creator with the author-person‖ (A&H 10). In
Bakhtin‘s view, an important and crucial distinction between an author-person—an
author that is part of this world and therefore constrained by it—and the author-creator
who similarly constitutes the work, subsists on the position taken outside of a work.
Bakhtin does not always openly distinguish when he is speaking of the author-person or
the author-creator except when specifying the difference in quality between these two
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roles as they relate to the ―whole of the work and a hero‖ (A&H 10). The author-creator
situates on the boundary able to see the entire artistic event. The author –person inhabits
the work, a ―constituent of the ethical social event of life‖ living both inside the work,
and inwardly as a self-conscious participant (A&H 10).
In contrast to the author-person, the author-creator as distinctly outside both
encompasses and consummates the object of his contemplation. As Bakhtin develops a
more vivid picture of the author-creator he offers a few more qualities that give us
insight, not only into the personhood of the author but also the kind of disposition the
author takes towards his heroes in preparing a space for aesthetic activity. In his initial
descriptions of the author-hero relationship Bakhtin provides a ―very general definition‖
of the author (A&H 12). He writes:
The author is the bearer and sustainer of the intently active unity of a
consummated whole (the whole of the hero and the whole of a work) which is
transgredient to each and every one of its particular moments and constituent
features. As a whole which consummates the hero, this whole is in principle
incapable of being given to us from within the hero, in so far as we ―identify‖
ourselves with the hero and experience his life from within him…the authors
consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness, that is, a consciousness that
encompasses the consciousness and the world of the hero—a consciousness that
encompasses and consummates the consciousness of a hero by supplying those
moments which are in principle transgredient to the hero‘s consciousness and
which, if rendered immanent, would falsify this consciousness. (12)
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Bakhtin‘s description of the author‘s position towards the hero includes a number of
significant claims about the author, which provoke questions regarding the possibility of
demarcation between the author and hero. If we consider Bakhtin‘s proclivity to
analogously substitute author for the person of God, this general definition introduces
some very important claims regarding the author as God, his relationship with human
beings as well the meaning in the aesthetic event of dialogue. This is an important theme
that Bakhtin pursues at the end of ―Author and Hero‖ describing the authors role as the
―bearer and sustainer‖ of heroes rather than heroes being the generating force of their
own ―wholeness‖ (A&H 12). In very real terms Bakhtin indicates that the ―particular
moments and constituent features‖ provided by heroes in the activity of their lived life
can only be understood, or more radically put, can only mean anything in view of the
author‘s position outside, a position that is ―in principle transgredient to the hero‘s
consciousness‖ (A&H 12).
Bakhtin‘s definition clearly establishes the author as the only person who can
completely bring together the cognitive and ethical aspects of a person‘s life. Bakhtin
does not show interest in explaining the epistemological implications of this view of
authorship as it may apply to theories of cognition. Instead he utilizes the aesthetic
viewpoint as a means of synthesizing the cognitive, ethical, and psychological aspects of
human experience. In the aesthetic purview we move beyond the problem of independent
thought (the activity of the inner person) to his proposal for creative human action
(outward bodily expression in the verbal arts) in light of the all-encompassing,
consummating consciousness. 7 The author not only poses as the primary source of human

7

In the last pages of the essay Bakhtin will make mention of memory as being an ―aesthetic victory over
death‖ and the way that a ―lived out life is saved, justified and consummated in eternal memory‖ (A&H
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consciousness, he alone is equipped with the vision necessary for this task. According to
Bakhtin no inner self serves as the seed for conscious awareness and attempts by the hero
to establish this reality (i.e. establish self-consciousness as a totally immanent
phenomenon) results in falsely conceiving the object of personhood and or personality
(A&H 51).
Bakhtin‘s emphasis on the author‘s consciousness encompassing and
consummating the consciousness of the hero also demonstrates two very important ideas
regarding the author in his relationship with his heroes. First, the existence of heroes, not
only bodily but also consciously, is conceived and sustained by the presence of the author
and second, the moments and features that give form and value to a hero‘s life must
originate outside of the hero as well as be ―transgredient‖ to the hero‘s own
consciousness. Bakhtin appears to use transgredience and outsideness interchangeably to
signify the connection between atemporal value and eternity. Both of these terms
represent that the formal principles and values of a hero‘s life cannot originate from
inside or even from the same experiential plane of the hero himself.
Bakhtin critiques both the philosophy of the mind and psychological theory
because these systems generate theoretical versions of personality resulting in
deterministic systems of human action. Theories of this kind often assume that the formal
and value constituents of human life are generated solely from within a person which are
then generalized corporately into universally acknowledged values or vice versa. Even
the simplest example of artistic production gives us insight into Bakhtin‘s thinking.
131). This correlation of memory with the encompassing and consummating consciousness of the author
demonstrates that this consciousness is not a determining viewpoint but is instead a saving view, a
viewpoint that overcomes the finality and inevitability of death. Memory in this sense acts aesthetically,
just as the author of a novel continues to live in the meaning of his work, so also the ―eternal memory‖ of a
person saves them from death, from becoming material without form or content.
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Bakhtin finds it implausible to expect a piece of granite to shape itself from the inside
out, establishing its final form through inner activity made manifest in its exterior
appearance. Bakhtin turns to the fundamental principle of aesthetics because through
novel art he can argue that only the outside viewpoint can provide, not just meaning for
the particular and momentary constituents of a human life, but a perspective that can see
them unified into a distinct whole.
Bakhtin links aesthetics with an authorial view from outside, a view that can
conceptualize both the outer boundaries of the hero as well as see into the inner life, the
uniqueness of a human personality. The outside viewpoint is not a constraint on the
author but a willful distancing of the author from his hero to open a space for his hero to
act freely. The outside position taken by the author, transgredient to the hero and his life,
isn‘t a necessary position, which defines the author but is instead an action taken by the
author because of a special disposition towards his heroes. According to Bakhtin, this
position appears as ―loving removal‖ in which the author withdraws ―himself from the
field of hero‘s life, his clearing of the whole field of life for the hero and his existence,
and – the compassionate and consummation of the event of the hero‘s life in terms of real
cognition and ethical action by a detached, unparticipating beholder‖ (A&H 14).
In withdrawal the author takes an outside position thereby maintaining his
―aesthetically productive relationship‖ with them (A&H 14). We see a similar kind of
distancing posited later in Bakhtin‘s development of dialogic speech. Bakhtin repeatedly
and diligently defends the individual position of a person as an essential part of dialogic
action, and a similar sentiment underlies his description of the author‘s purposeful
distancing from the hero.
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The position of outside otherness is prerequisite for aesthetic activity, as Bakhtin
notes ―if there is only one unitary and unique participant, there can be no aesthetic event‖
(A&H 22). Bakhtin‘s emphasis on outsideness does not preference distance for the
protection of solitary individuality. He is making two very important points that have as
much to do with the role of the author, as they relate to the nature of the hero. The author
must, because of his encompassing and consummating role in the hero‘s life, withdraw in
order to open space for the hero to act cognitively and ethically. The hero‘s ―fate‖ must
remain open so that he may choose his own direction instead of being determined (A&H
176). However, a hero cannot in from his own volition exist or live without an outside
viewpoint, without anything ―transgredient to itself‖ (A&H 22). If the hero cannot be
conceived as a whole by an outside consciousness then he cannot be known or
understood aesthetically. This means that the formal stability available in the constituent
moments of the hero‘s life must be realized in the author‘s outside point of view, an
aesthetic viewpoint that collects the particular moments and traits of the hero‘s
personhood without delimiting the potential for creative and individuating action.
Bakhtin defends outside aesthetic vision as the only type of sight that can both
encompass and consummate the constituent moments of the hero‘s life without closing
off or denying a space for answerable action. Bakhtin‘s concern that art and life both
have a ―liability to blame‖ rings true. Blame vitally marks the hero‘s life because
individual and responsible action constitutes the development of his personality. Bakhtin
distinguishes aesthetic vision as synthesizing differing ethical theories of human action
because this perspective encompasses particular acts in an evaluative frame. According to
Bakhtin, there are no transgredient constituents within the ethical event because reduces

21

the position of the author to the same experiential plane of the hero. In purely cognitive
theories of human personhood ―there is no hero at all, not even in the potential form.‖
(A&H 22)
The distancing of the author from the hero‘s life provides a space for the aesthetic
event mediated by ―expression in verbal art‖ (A&H 188). In Bakhtin‘s view an author
possesses the power to relate instrumentally towards his heroes, but can choose
otherwise. In several examples Bakhtin demonstrates the character of such author types
resulting in degenerate or subpar forms of the novel where the author creates his heroes
solely for the purpose of disseminating a monologic view of the world. These forms stand
in contrast to the characterization that Bakhtin presents in his own description of the
author relating to his heroes.
Following his definitional introduction of the author, Bakhtin turns his attention
towards ―man as the organizing form-and-content center of artistic vision‖ returning to
the ―problem of the author‖ only at the end of the essay (A&H 187). Bakhtin understands
the author‘s role and relationship as a transgredient principle for the basic interpersonal
differentiation of the I and other. Having established the parameters of the I/other
relationship, Bakhtin pursues the artistic material through which the author‘s vision of his
heroes translates from an outside situation to the plane of each hero‘s existence.
According to Bakhtin, the authors ―aesthetic vision finds expression in art—in verbal art‖
(A&H 188). At this point in Bakhtin‘s discussion of the author‘s manner it becomes
difficult to separate the author form the hero as a separate entity because the two persons
are inextricably linked as participants in an event of aesthetic character. Bakhtin‘s tone
takes on a palpable feeling of insistence when he writes:
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It is precisely as such an event that we must understand and know the work of
art—we must understand its very principles of its value-governed life, in its living
participants, and not as something that has been first put to death and reduced to
bare empirical givenness as a verbal whole (it is not the author‘s relationship to
the material that constitutes the event and has the validity and force of an event,
but—the author‘s relationship to the hero (A&H 189).
Like in his later works, Bakhtin argues that language must be understood and
studied as utterances (the word intoned by a particular person) rather than as static
symbols. Bakhtin focuses attention on the event of relating that occurs between the author
and hero in order to establish the aesthetic tone that surrounds their interaction. This
relational tone ―determines the author‘s position as well—the position of the bearer of the
act of the artistic vision and creation in the event of being‖ (A&H 190). Bakhtin relies on
this relational event to describe the author‘s disposition towards the hero, as well as his
relationship to the ―world‘s values‖ (A&H 190).
Although Bakhtin stylistically avoids polemical arguments, his description of the
author does not leave much room for prevarication and in some ways prompts more
questions than clarity. Having already asserted that the author is the ―bearer and
sustainer‖ of the hero‘s consciousness he writes that ―the aesthetically creative
relationship to the hero and his world is a relationship to him as one who is going to die‖
(A&H 190). This statement is indicative of the author‘s role towards the hero in what
Bakhtin interchangeably calls the ―artistic event‖ and the ―event of being‖ (A&H 190).
The author must live outside of the determined nature of this world, a world in which all
things die. Hearkening back to his discussion of the body as a value point in the world,
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Bakhtin adds the conclusion of death to the list of constraints that act as constituent parts
of the hero‘s life.
We would be wrong to think that Bakhtin is attempting to correct the problems of
abstract individualism with a double portion of morbidity. Instead he describes the author
as one who cares for the hero, who sets ―a saving consummation over him, over against
his own directedness in meaning‖ (A&H 190). The author approaches heroes as those
who are going to die in order to save them from death. To preserve this power the author
must actually exist outside the plane of lived life, beyond human experience and
determinateness. Bakhtin writes:
The artist is in fact someone who knows how to be active outside of lived life,
someone who not only partakes in life from within, (practical, social, political,
moral, religious life) and understands it from within, but someone who also loves
it from without—loves life where it does not exist for itself, where it is turned
outside itself and is in need of self-activity that is located outside it and is active
independently of meaning (A&H 190-91).
The disposition of the author towards the hero, from the outside, is one of loving
participation in the hero‘s life. From this purposefully outside position the author is able
to look over the hero‘s life and to give it a meaning that is whole, provide a completeness
unachievable if the author were subject to death, and undo what threatens to close heroes
off from eternal meaning.
The love of the author for his heroes is expressed in his activity towards them. He
―collects the world scattered in meaning and condenses it into a finished and contained
image‖ (A&H 190). The outside position of the author encompassing, consummating,
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collecting and condensing the hero and the world that he lives in are the necessary
constituents of the aesthetic event of being. Bakhtin describes this event artistically in the
author-hero relationship to correct what he perceives as sufficient lack of systematic
thought in disciplinary aesthetics. Here, the support for Bakhtin‘s analysis having
significance in the study of interpersonal relationship and verbal communication is hard
to ignore.
Bakhtin‘s fluid movement between descriptions of art and life make reading his
text, at times, precarious. Bakhtin commitment to aesthetics is unmistakable, but it‘s his
description of the author-hero relationship that clearly reaches beyond disciplinary
aesthetics quickly becoming a synthetic description of common human experience. This
synthesis happens through an ―aesthetic seeing‖ because it is only from this
―transgredient‖ position that the constituent planes of human experience can be
understood holistically. In Bakhtin‘s own words ―all the constituents of an axiological
consummation (spatial, temporal, and those of meaning) are axiologically transgredient to
an active self-consciousness, that is, are not located along the line of one‘s own
axiological relationship to oneself‖ (A&H 188).
When Bakhtin speaks of art, he is also speaking about life. We are introduced to
this initial conviction in his statement that art and life must be brought together in their
mutual ―liability to blame‖ and that this unification can only occur in the ―unity of my
answerability‖ in the actual experience of a lived life (A&A 1). Artificially separating art
and life, for Bakhtin, indicates other problematic dualisms critiqued in his proposal for a
renewed aesthetics answerable for life. Bakhtin generates his viewpoint from the
principal idea of incarnation, which as an event of subjection signifies the lowering of the
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ideal to the material in order for the human body to inform the content of life. This model
provides Bakhtin with his test for the validity of his own claims. The act of sympathy 8
qualified by ―aesthetic seeing‖ intends answerably towards another while preserving the
individual personalities of both participants in the event (A&H 228).
Empathy and Aesthetic Action
Bakhtin carefully scrutinizes the boundaries between formal and material
constituents of life, the aesthetic values that inform an answerable existence. The
dilemma that Bakhtin confronts in aesthetics and ethics is their separation by analytic
philosophy and theoretical psychology. This separation creates significant problems for
explaining the answerable act of human empathy. In his early essay Toward a Philosophy
of the Act, Bakhtin demonstrates the complications in the separation of ethics and
aesthetics by focusing on empathy as an essential moment in the act of ―aesthetic
contemplation‖ (TPA 12). How theories treat empathy is Bakhtin‘s test of their validity
because the body as an interpersonal border and boundary between inward life and
outside appearance is both substantial and delicate (A&H 228). The description of how
one person should approach another (along with the interaction‘s outcome) reveals the
fundamental value giving a theory its coherence and applicability. Bakhtin finds fault

8

In the introduction to their 1989 book Rethinking Bakhtin Morson and Emerson make a
distinction between empathy and vzhivanie, which they translate as ―live entering‖ or ―living into.‖
Although this may in fact be a more literal translation of the Russian, empathy is the word of choice used in
the same author‘s 1990 translation of ―Author and Hero.‖ For this reason empathy is used here in the text to
describe what Bakhtin means when he discusses our attempts to understand the position of another person
(i.e. suffering) qualified with his notion of ―aesthetic seeing‖ and his assertion that in an empathic act ―this
projection of myself into him is possible and in what form—the psychological problem of such a
projection—we shall not consider here. It is enough for our purposes that such a projection within certain
limits is possible in fact‖ (A&H 25). Later in the text Bakhtin switches from empathy to his own term
―sympathetic co-experiencing‖ which better captures the concept that he is trying to describe. This term
avoids some of the philosophical legacy that complicates his discussion and better demonstrates how
Bakhtin understands the action.
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with theories that attempt to forcefully surmount the body as a boundary without
accounting for the unique experience of personhood. He writes:
A theory needs to brought into communion not with theoretical constructions and
conceived life, but with the actually occurring event of moral being-with practical
reason, and this is answerably accomplished by everyone who cognizes, insofar as
the act of cognition as my deed is included, along with all its content, in the unity
of my answerability, in which and by virtue of which I actually live—performed
deeds. All attempts to force one‘s way from inside the theoretical world and into
actual Being-as-event are quite hopeless (TPA 12).
Bakhtin‘s critique of theoretical forcefulness offers insight into the nature of
aesthetic seeing. Aesthetic seeing is an outside perspective provided by another person
perceiving the particular aspects of human experience while contributing transgredient
constituents to the event.9 Theoreticized viewpoints, whether cognitive, ethical or
aesthetic undermine empathy by placing a person outside themselves, in a ―role‖ and not
within their own answerable life. The inside answerable position remains essential for the
aesthetic event even when ―the moments of empathizing and objectifying interpenetrate
each other‖ (TPA 15). One must act inside in order to be outside of another person. It is
only from this position that one can productively contemplate the plight of another. 10

9

In very few places does Bakhtin mention the persuasive character of the aesthetic viewpoint so
this incidence is important not only for the present argument but also for Bakhtin‘s project overall. In other
places Bakhtin critiques the rhetorical tradition for its ―judicial tone‖ arguing that it is ill suited to approach
the particularity of common speech genres. This qualifying statement points to the nature of the dialogic
interaction between the two people, and that an aesthetic viewpoint is best equipped to both see a person in
their particularity while also consummate their person from the outside with constituent qualities that
complete them, bringing together dispersive events of their ethical and cognitive life into an understandable
and stable whole.
10
It is clear that Bakhtin understands ―productivity‖ as being an act that creates, that does not
foreclose or generalize that character of the person seen but allows for continued growth and development.
This is terminologically tied to his notion of consummation that is heuristically bordering the notion of
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Emerson and Morson appropriately link Bakhtin‘s notion of empathy to the life of
Christ and highlight his use of the Russian word vzhivanie, which they translate as ―living
into‖ (―Rethinking‖ 12). Quoting Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Morson and Emerson
concede that the incarnate Christ functions as an import demonstration of Bakhtin‘s view
of empathy writing, ―Christ did not empathize with people; he became one of them while
maintaining his outsideness. What Christ offered was neither theoretical truth nor an
example of aesthetic doubling but a ―living into‖ the world that left it a fundamentally
different place‖ (Morson & Emerson, ―Rethinking‖ 12).
These preliminary themes in Towards a Philosophy of the Act preface Bakhtin‘s
argument in ―Author and Hero‖ where he continues to assert that the essential validity of
an aesthetic viewpoint is its outside position. Bakhtin‘s critique of theoretical aesthetics is
that they are problematically committed to positions of either exterior objectivity
(impressive) or inner authenticity (expressive). In his survey of late nineteenth to early
twentieth century11 philosophical aesthetics Bakhtin‘s demonstrates how each position
has significant deficiencies in its ability to describe the relationship between the
constituents of the inner person and formal quality of transgredient value.
Bakhtin primarily critiques our naïve acceptance of expressivist or impressionist
viewpoints without any systematic attempt to synthesize or explain the meeting of the
inner person with an outside viewpoint. Bakhtin admits that ―that the world of modern
philosophy, the theoretical and theoreticized world of culture, is in a certain sense actual,
that it possesses validity‖ but finds that modern philosophy and theoretical aesthetics
reproduction and the ―productivity‖ of this creative act. In the birth of a new person, a new unique
personality is created that is the results of creative act that in itself concludes and has formal boundaries
while at the same time an example of empathic interpenetration. These themes emerge more explicitly in
his work with Rabelais and are often misunderstood because of Bakhtin‘s emphasis on the grotesque.
11
Bakhtin identifies this period as the source of his survey on page 61 of ―Author and Hero.‖
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cannot see ―the once-occurrent world in which I live and in which I answerably perform
my deeds. These two worlds do not intercommunicate; there is no principle12 for
including and actively involving the valid world of theory and of theoreticized culture in
the once-occurrent Being-event of life‖ (TPA 20). The deficiency of the theoretical world
is that it cannot find its way into the world of inner life, once inside the theoretical world
one is in fact ―outside‖ oneself and cannot act from within one‘s life.
The attempt to conceptualize inner life from an outside yet theoretically abstract
position is the fundamental problem addressed by Bakhtin‘s advocacy for empathy as
―aesthetic contemplation‖ (A&H 24). Bakhtin believes that it is only from within one‘s
own lived life that a person provides the appropriately outside viewpoint that can
―objectify‖ another person, synthesizing the momentary aspects of their life into
something whole and meaningful. Bakhtin grants that cognitive and psychological
features of the empathic moment are in a sense a projection of oneself into the position of
another person but this is merely a constituent of an event that is primarily aesthetic
(outside) in character. The moments of inner projection and aesthetic objectification do
not correlate causally or sequentially but are necessary components simultaneously
occurring within the act of aesthetic contemplation.
Sympathy, through the act of ―aesthetic objectification‖ is a way for a person‘s
life experience to be given meaning, not only for a person empathizing and for the one
contemplated but for others as well. Bakhtin notes, ―the person suffering does not
experience the fullness of his own outward expressedness in being; he experiences his
expressedness only partially, and then in the language of his inner sensations of himself‖

12

Emphasis added
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(A&H 25). In this case, aesthetic action is only for others and as another, not for myself
or as myself.
The objectification of another and their suffering is an aesthetic objectification,
which is different from a ―cognitive or ethical objectivity‖ (A&H 13). Cognitivist and
ethical objectivity assume impartiality and are not intoned towards a particular person.
Aesthetic objectivity on the other hand is directed towards a specific person, ―the whole
of the hero‖ and his life (A&H 13). Aesthetic objectivity does not replace the cognitive
and ethical notions of objectivity but encompasses them within its special purview, a
viewpoint able to see the whole hero and the whole of his life. This does not mean that in
scope the aesthetic viewpoint is non-evaluative or that it does not have particular
intonation. Much like ―aesthetic objectification‖ justifies the life experience of one who
is seen empathically, the vision of an author is a perspective that establishes the value of
heroes justifying and consummating them ―independently of meaning, achievements, the
outcome and success of the hero‘s own self-directed life‖ (A&H 14).
Bakhtin‘s description of the author‘s evaluative stance repeatedly emphasizes that
the author‘s perspective is completely outside the plane of meaning, outside the plane of
the hero‘s experience. From this non-contingent position and author is able to sustain,
support and stabilize the life of the hero as a whole, himself unlimited by the constraints
of human life. Bakhtin writes, ―The author experiences the hero‘s life in value-categories
that are completely different from those in which he experiences his own life and the life
of other people living together with him (the actual participants in the unitary and open
ethical event of being); he determines the sense of the hero‘s life in a value context that is
completely different‖ (A&H 15).
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Bakhtin articulates the crisis in aesthetics as a confusion of the author‘s position
and a misunderstanding of the importance in different planes of experience and
evaluation. Bakhtin outlines three ways in which this outside [author‘s] position is
compromised, and how in each case there is a destabilization of the hero and his life, a
personal and inward instability, instability of the hero‘s background and/or an
unacknowledged instability where the hero himself embodies a naïve authority limited in
scope to establish a holistic meaning for life, blind to the dependent and tenuous nature of
his or her own position. All of these positions are impoverished because of their primary
deficiency, the collapsing of two positions into one. According to Bakhtin the aesthetic
event is dependent on the existence of at least two persons, ―if there is only one unitary
and unique participant, there can be no aesthetic event‖ and therefore no possibility for
sympathy (A&H 22). When the conditions for the aesthetic event are discarded Bakhtin
concludes that the remainder—ethical and cognitive theories of human interaction—
perform a reduction on the relationship between the author and the hero weakening the
active and participative nature of the aesthetic event (A&H 88-89). This crisis in
aesthetics is therefore also a crisis of authorship. Bakhtin believes that this crisis
estranges art from life as well as the hero from the author. In the impoverishment of these
relationships the possibility of well-ordered and properly valued interpersonal interaction
is stunted and turns to poorer modes of mediation (cognitive and ethical) to preserve the
meaning of a person‘s place in the world, in life and in relationships with other people.
Bakhtin articulates the outcome of this crisis by looking at the act of
contemplating a piece of art, understanding it as a whole by imputing value transgredient
to its parts. Bakhtin‘s poses Leonardo DaVinci‘s The Last Supper as an example. He
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asks, ―in what possible way can I experience the aesthetic whole of the work‖ (A&H 65)?
One can empathize with each character individually but each attempts a distinctly inward
position or inwardly experienced perspective towards the work itself. In this case each
hero as a ―participant is intensely individual‖ and not representative of the whole of the
painting‘s aesthetic value (A&H 65). Bakhtin argues that in order to overcome this
dilemma expressive aesthetics turns to the author‘s perspective as a holistic point of
orientation for understanding the value of the work. For Bakhtin this move is equally
problematic because first, the author‘s viewpoint like the heroes of the work is ―intensely
individual‖ and therefore unique in its own right and second, because the ―result of
involving the author in this way is that he is placed on a par with his own heroes (A&H
65). In other words, options for interpretation in expressive ethics either psychologize the
author, or theoretically objectify him.
Bakhtin‘s critique of empathy explained by expressive theories of aesthetics
centers on the presumption that within an artistic object essential qualities are expressed
and that in order to understand the work one must coincide with the essential expressive
part of an artistic object. Bakhtin writes of the expressive aesthetic; ― value is actualized
at the moment when the contemplator abides within the contemplated object; at the
moment of experiencing the objects life from the object itself, the contemplator and the
object contemplated—ultimately—coincide‖ (A&H 63).
The coincidence of the person who contemplates an artistic object with either the
object itself or its author‘s viewpoint is what Bakhtin finds most impoverishing about
expressive aesthetics. By collapsing the author‘s relationship with the hero (in
fundamental terms the distinction between me and another) the potential for aesthetic
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activity and the necessary constituents for empathic moments are abolished. At no point
in the event or moment of ―sympathetic co-experiencing‖ should two consciousnesses
completely coincide or be unified in vision. According to Bakhtin ―aesthetic creation
cannot be explained or made intelligible as something immanent to a single
consciousness‖ (A&H 86).
Participation as Sympathetic Co-Experiencing
As an author, Bakhtin must have imagined that his own work would be subject to
the same errors that he exposed. He would quite certainly affirm that the problems he
identified in aesthetics were systemic, affecting all artistic production and even academic
writing. One wonders why scholars have not clearly heard his call to ―renounce our
monologic habits so that we might feel at home in the new artistic sphere which
Dostoevsky discovered‖ (PDP 272). Bakhtin‘s critique of the expressive aesthetic can be
similarly applied to the critical practice of reading. Any attempt to explain the
significance of a work by psychologizing the author or by applying an abstract theoretical
lens result in monologic interpretations because both result in a collapse of either the
authors, or the reader‘s position outside of the work. In typical fashion Bakhtin
questioned the legitimacy of his works calling literary criticism a ―parasitic profession
upon which nothing serious could be based or built‖ (Emerson, ―Next Hundred‖ 12).
The dialogic truth of Bakhtin‘s work has so far been overlooked by scholars who
engage in generic forms of literary criticism objectifying Bakhtin‘s artistry with forms of
evaluation that impoverish the rich learning possible in honest conversation with his
texts. If his philosophical arguments attest to his own view, Bakhtin would have us think
alongside him, and in this conversation add our own voice to the richer meaning that
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continues to emerge from the questions he pursued. This means that we must take his
artistic contribution as seriously as we take life. Bakhtin did not consider his own work as
different from the work of interpersonal relationship but attempted to describe, in detail,
relating to others as itself an artistic act.
Bakhtin‘s defense of an outside aesthetic position that sees the whole of an artistic
object (whether a painting or a person) prompts significant questions for current modes of
theoretical inquiry and give us insight into Bakhtin‘s own approach to authorship. The
ideal that he incarnated was the author who did not attempt to possess his own work.
Bakhtin‘s was remarkably charitable with his own artistic efforts publishing essays and
books under the names of his friends and his colleagues (Bocharov 1012). Bakhtin‘s
disposition illustrates not only an approach to scholarship, but also a way to relate and
respond to others and their work.
The evaluative components of the aesthetic disposition are gratuitous because the
scope of the event encompasses all aspects of the hero along with the possibilities of his
or her life. In the excess of aesthetic seeing a lived life receives formal value and validity.
The actions of life ―can be infinitely varied‖ but ―the excess of my self activity is
invariable present in them all, at all times, under all circumstances‖ (A&H 24).
According to Bakhtin, the particularity of life and its dispersion must be understood from
a holistic viewpoint, not simply as a collection of the biographical moments in a person‘s
life. Bakhtin‘s primary criticism against theoreticized versions of aesthetics as well as
cognitive and ethical explanations of human interactivity all suffer from abstraction or a
naiveté in their description of human action. The forceful insertion of these viewpoints
into life has no principled means of mediating the gap between theory and active life.
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Bakhtin identifies attempts to bridge this gap in ―philosophies of life‖ which he
characterizes as ―an aesthetics of empathy, aesthetics of inner imitation, and the
aesthetics of play and illusion‖ but none of these carefully preserve the position of an
immediately sympathetic yet distinctly outside viewpoint (A&H 62).
Bakhtin renews hope in the practice of working dialogically with texts. Acting
responsively in our aesthetic acts we contribute to the significant work of forming and
extending meaning in the world. The author-hero relationship is not only a theoretical
ratio but a testimonial, articulating a vision of the world promoting freedom and
embracing the diversity in human individuality. Seeing in excess can provide for a
context for others in which they can better understand the world and themselves. In
Bakhtin‘s words, ―the excess of my seeing is the bud in which slumbers form, and
whence form unfolds like a blossom‖ (A&H 25).
Conclusion
Bakhtin, showing how art and life operate in concert, also reveals the necessary
situation of responsible action. His achievement offsets the false polemics within the
existential condition of temporality by situating human personhood as the essential
mediator of any conversation. The tension between art and life also discloses the essential
association between transgredient value and particular acts. In turn, this tension
demonstrates the import of understanding how human action, verbal or otherwise, is the
material by which a person is given substance and boundary. These are the essential
attributes of individual personality more fully developed by Bakhtin‘s ―Author and Hero‖
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Chapter 2: Aesthetic Consciousness
M. M. Bakhtin comfortably wears the titles of poet, teacher, literary theorist, and
philosopher. These given designations outline the scope of disciplinary influence his
work has had since his first published essay in 1919. However broad in scope, Bakhtin‘s
thinking was by no means digressive. He often argued against unsystematic thinking,
even though his own style was at times esoteric and equivocal. Select scholars have
indicated that this style constitutes an explicit challenge to structural authority
specifically found in his terminology of ―carnival‖, ―heteroglossia‖, and ―polyphony‖,
Bakhtin‘s descriptors of the infinite multiplicity in human speech and languages. This
viewpoint is not totally imprecise because Bakhtin does amply critique the monologic
nature of the authoritative word (DiN 342). However, comparative linguistic scholars
concede that Bakhtin‘s works are better understood as an attempt to describe ―the
meaning of borders‖ (Holquist, ―Introduction‖ xix). Morson and Emerson in their book
Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of Prosaics, call Bakhtin an ―an apostle of constraints‖
juxtaposing their reading with a larger body of critical cultural scholarship inclined to
deconstruct boundaries that Bakhtin himself carefully protected (43). Emerson has most
recently argued that North American Bakhtin scholarship is thankfully reaching a stage of
maturity tempering more discrete appropriations of Bakhtin‘s work in the late 1980‘s and
earlier 1990‘s.
The previous discussion of ―Author and Hero‘s‖ important themes shows that
Bakhtin focused his attention on important and necessary boundaries. In particular, the
unique loneliness of self-experience, our essential dependence on an outside perspective,
and the physical limitations of the human body. Thus far sustained attention to Bakhtin‘s
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articulation of these phenomenologically common aspects of human existence in the
secondary scholarship is uncommon. To this point, scholars have primarily emphasized
differentiation and the upsetting of socio-cultural constraints in Bakhtin‘s work on
Francois Rabelais and his later essays on the novel collected in the book, Dialogic
Imagination (Morson & Emerson 43). Without acknowledging the correlation between
individual speech and the eternal word as the substance of freedom in Bakhtin‘s work,
scholars have instead concentrated on the restrictive socio-political context of the former
Soviet Union or the Universalist tendencies in Neo-Kantianism as the effectual context
for Bakhtin‘s more unrestrained ideas. For traditional textual critique socio-historical
circumstance is by no means inconsequential for Bakhtin‘s work. However, to reduce the
import of Bakhtin‘s writing as merely responsive to his material life circumstances limits
the interpretive scope and potential influence his writing can have on the study of
communication This hermeneutic emphasis neglects essential themes that permeate and
enliven Bakhtin‘s philosophy. Bakhtin‘s work is much more than a coy political critique
of communist totalitarianism or a simple intellectual rejoinder to Neo Kantian and
Formalist contemporaries. His interests moved around and through the immanent
contexts of the political, academic, and cultural. In truth, the lens of Bakhtin‘s historical
situation provides only a glimpse into the substance of his work and fails to mine the
depth of the problems he critiqued even if those problems are as revelatory of his life
experience as they were affective for his thought.
A more concentrated look at Bakhtin‘s early essay ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic
Activity‖ provides important and necessary additions to contemporary communication
scholarship inspired by Bakhtin‘s thought. Most scholars are inattentive to Bakhtin‘s
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earlier works when addressing the important threads of personality and authorship
missing how they form supportive scaffolding for Bakhtin‘s larger corpus. Sustained
attention on the author-hero relationship as an essential constituent of Bakhtin‘s thought
has yet to happen. The faithfulness with which Bakhtin considered the author-hero
relationship is confirmed in notes he took immediately prior to his death in 1972. The
content of these notes support the claim that Bakhtin‘s philosophical interest neither
wavered from this problem, nor did he question its primary importance as a foundational
principle for aesthetics, personality, and verbal communication. 13
Bakhtin has long been an asset to scholars working in rhetoric and composition
studies because of his attentiveness to the historical elements and formal components of
the novel. The development and practice of novel writing are themes more significant for
Bakhtin‘s later work (post 1930‘s) perhaps answering the question of why composition
scholars have not yet attempted an interpretation of his more philosophically and
theologically focused works. Literature and linguistics scholars most commonly discuss
the author-hero relationship associated with Bakhtin‘s concern regarding the disciplinary
crisis in authorship (A&H 202-203).
In ―Author and Hero‖ Bakhtin defines the authorship crisis as primarily a
confusing of the author with his work. Instead of the author maintaining independence
from his heroes, he is absorbed narratively or psychologically. According to Bakhtin,
misunderstanding the fundamental character of the author-hero relationship not only
creates a crisis in authoring but also generates problems for articulating ethical human
action, incapacitates our understanding of creativity, and stifles abilities to distinguish

13

These notes are found included as a supplement in Bakhtin‘s book Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics edited and translated by Caryl Emerson.
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unique personhood from the influence and circumstance of material contexts (A&H 195196). Because Bakhtin considers authorship a broader problem than its impact on textual
analysis, the aesthetic implications of the authorship crisis resonate with Bakhtin‘s vision
of the author-hero relationship as analogous to God‘s relationship with mankind. This
salient feature of Bakhtin‘s view when articulating the author-hero relationship raises the
stakes of his project and deepens the significance of his work for the philosophy of
communication.
The author-hero relationship attends openly to the problem of human
consciousness, how a person distinguishes between those acts which are merely
responsive to ―material-literary context‖ and those which are additive, contributing
unique self-experience (A&H 195). The author-hero dynamic is a principal component of
self-conscious human experience because it represents the basic tension between the acts
demarcating unique personhood while simultaneously indicative of relational
differentiation. To discard the author-hero relationship as a principal characteristic of
conscious human action undermines the potential for true artistic production. As Bakhtin
describes, ―meaningful identification cannot occur outside of contextualizing
relationships because ―form cannot be referred to oneself, for when we try to refer to
ourselves we become other than what we were for ourselves, we cease to be ourselves,
we cease to live from within ourselves: we become possessed‖ (A&H 200).
Art is profoundly intertwined with the personal, moral and responsible aspects of
life. For Bakhtin, the artistic product of our creative activity represents the principal
analogy for understanding meaningful interpersonal interaction, without relying on the
supposed stability of tradition or normative forms. Bakhtin repeatedly confirms the
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importance of this principle by stressing that understanding relational context, principally
conceived as the author-hero relationship, is directly tied to living responsibly in a
tangible reality. Disregarding the author-hero relationship makes answering the question
of whether or not real and actual consciousness exists impossible. In Bakhtin‘s own
words, ―the withdrawal of one of the participants destroys the artistic event, and we are
left with nothing but a misleading illusion of an artistic event—with a counterfeit: the
artistic event is unreal, it has not really taken place‖ (A&H 200).
Bakhtin furthers this compelling claim by demonstrating that the absence of the
author-hero relationship as a supporting context for distinguishing individual
consciousness promotes the hubris of hyper individualism. Any person situated outside
this context of ―artistic kindness,‖ by which he feels supported through an ―other who
axiologically stands‖ opposite, is alone (A&H 200). This solitude creates a person fearful
of boundaries, afraid that they may not surpass or surmount the traditions of a cultural
heritage or withstand the influence of interpersonal relationship. Rather than acting in
concert this person ―strives to act and create directly in the unitary event of being as its
sole participant; one is unable to humble oneself to the status of toiler, unable to
determine one‘s place in the event of being through others, to place oneself on par with
others‖ (A&H 203).
We are reintroduced here to two important themes that reinforce the importance
of the authorship crisis as integral to our study. First, Bakhtin‘s comment regarding
humility and being able to ―place oneself on par with others‖ resonates clearly with the
Incarnation as an important principle in his thought. The direction of incarnate action is
always a descent from the ideal to the material in order to be with others, to place oneself
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on par with others and depend on and support their position in the world. Second, in the
background of Bakhtin‘s discussion remains religious faith. He recurrently makes
indirect but substantial connections, both implicit and explicit, about the impact of
aesthetics on human perspectives of the soul and God. In an author‘s note14 Bakhtin
distinguishes the hubris of individualistic solitude from ―religious confidence or faith‖
which finds its certitude in ―the fact that life is not solitary, that it is intent and does not
proceed from within itself in an axiological void‖ (A&H 202 n. dd)
Individualistic solitude dismisses the position of the author as an outside
consciousness and instead ―contests the author‘s right to be situated outside of life and to
consummate it‖ (A&H 203). This is not only a crisis in authorship. It is also a general
crisis in a person‘s relationship with authority. As these aesthetic attitudes bleed into life
they have significant effects on all other forms of relationship. Bakhtin describes how the
crisis of authorship manifests itself as a ―deep distrust of any outsideness,‖ and in religion
it means ―the ―immanentization‖ of God, the ―psychologization‖ of both God and
religion, with the inability to understand the church as an outward institution, and with a
general revaluation of everything that is inward-from-within‖ (A&H 203).
Suspicion and fear toward religion is not uncommon, and Bakhtin quite astutely
identifies this broader social sentiment not only in sociocultural histories but also in
modern art movements of Western societies. The suspicion that Bakhtin identifies is
associated with the fear of self-conscious solitude, always searching for a power
differential that would compromise one‘s own position, ―is afraid of boundaries, strives
to dissolve them, for it has no faith in the essentialness and kindness of the power that
gives form from outside; any viewpoint from outside is refused‖ (A&H 203).
14

pp. 202 in ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity‖
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Bakhtin‘s discussion of the crisis in authorship is the major bridge between his
work in ―Author and Hero‖ and contemporary communication scholarship. Bakhtin‘s
thought enters the conversation in narrative studies in which the position of the author
relative to a text is a salient theme. Although historically narratology is primarily an
inquiry into the structure of literary form, contemporary types involve most mediums of
storytelling. The God-man relationship as analogous to the author hero dynamic is a
significant part of this discussion and one that Barbara Olson believes is still important
for understanding the act of authoring (Olson 340).
Authoring and Authority
Olson explores the authorship issue with breadth in Authorial Divinity in the
Twentieth Century: Omniscient Narration in Woolf, Hemingway and Others kindly
summarizing the current scholarly conversation. The issue of ―omniscient narration‖
impels Olson‘s argument as she follows the history of theoretical discussion around the
question, situating the debate between the poles of the omniscient versus decentered
authoring (Olson, Divinity 11). Olson confronts a trajectory of criticism that takes issue
with the conception of a god-like narrator, a narrator who knows every character
intimately as well as the end of the story. Instead of confirming this perspective, Olson
problematizes ideologies that under emphasize the creative and contributive position of
the author. The fact that the analogy of God as an omniscient creator surfaces in many
author‘s honest reflections regarding the act of hero creating is, for Olson, sufficient
evidence for defending the author-hero relationship as a fundamental constituent of
creative activity. Olson identifies Bakhtin as an advocate for authorial omniscience who
also preserves the tension between freedom and limitations implicated by this position.
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Olson‘s suggests that Bakhtin attempts to moderate or reconcile this relationship
theoretically and situates his work soundly in the middle of the conversation regarding
the author and hero. Olson‘s attention to Bakhtin is rare. Few scholars address this
important question originating in Bakhtin‘s ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity‖ with
persistence.
Don Bialostosky, in his essay ―Bakhtin‘s Rough Draft: Toward a Philosophy of
the Act, Ethics and Composition Studies‖ offers preliminary explorations of the authorhero relationship in Bakhtin‘s early work. Bialostosky‘s interpretation, similar to others,
connects authorship to interpersonal ethics and dialogue. Bialostosky follows Bakhtin‘s
assertions regarding authoring and ethics in Toward a Philosophy of the Act but does not
distinguish rich differences between authoring and the ―authoritative word‖ critiqued by
Bakhtin‘s later work on the novel (17). Bialostosky does explicate connections between
authorship and action locating the kernel of these ideas in the philosophical ethics of
Toward a Philosophy of the Act unfolding as artistic action and answerability in ―Author
and Hero.‖ Bialostosky correctly reads authoring as synonymous with true action adeptly
outlining Bakhtin‘s description of the crisis in creativity through theories of speech
communication. Bialostosky does not specifically address the pairing of the author with
the hero focusing instead on the author‘s role as he interacts with a socio-cultural context.
Highlighting the ―authoritative‖ tone of academic knowledge Bialostosky perceives a
possible threat to the individual and creative intonation of scholars. Deanne Bogdan, in
an essay entitled ―Situating the Sensibilities and the Need for Coherence: Musical
Experience Reconsidered,‖ exemplifies this possibility through her reticence to introduce
to her students music that might transgress social and cultural constraints (126). Bogdan‘s

43

personal account describes a crisis of authorial action and her discussion of these
personal constraints resonate clearly authoritative nature of socialized knowledge that
Bialostosky believes Bakhtin questions (Greene154).
Both Bialostosky‘s and Bogdan‘s accounts express a sentiment signifying the
principal nature of the author-hero relationship because as authors they both realize no
one can escape their situated dependence on the context of relationship as an active
constraint of aesthetic action. 15 Bialostosky and Bogdan‘s foci are professional but this
context does not undermine the interpersonal nature of their experience. Both are
interested in creating or at least envisioning a dialogic event in which an individual voice
does not lack support from a larger chorus. As Bakhtin notes, for a dialogue to occur
there must be at least two people present, (and perhaps even three). Every person, in a
sense, acts as in authority towards other people, affirming their action, changing their
course, showing them sympathy and love, and providing outside perspective. The
inability to see one‘s self from the outside is a fundamental constraint for Bakhtin. He
affirms the fact that we experience life inwardly, not in an egotistical way, but that within
our body we approach the world with a limited scope of vision. Only others can tell us
how we carry ourselves, how we wear our attitudinal expressions both bodily and in
speech.

15

Both Bialostosky and Bogdan along with Emerson situate the question of authorship in
pedagogical practice, pondering how an individual voice can contribute to a larger conversation without
being misunderstood or ignored. Emerson points to Bakhtin‘s own teaching style to resolve the question of
how authority and personality function in his own work which resonates well with Bakhtin‘s own reliance
on Christ, a teacher, to ground his own understanding of the simultaneous unifying and differentiating
function of the spoken word even if it works contrary to his argument. Emerson rightly identifies an
author‘s personality, his bodily circumstance, and the way that he intones his words as a common
hermeneutic entrance into understanding a larger body of written work. This is the same for Bakhtin
because the context of the utterance as a binding thread while also a method of articulation functions in
human history to enable unique personality to occur without promoting an abstract relativity for defending
human freedom. The exception, or difference is in the choice of author to open a text.
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For Bakhtin, autonomous self-directed personality is a lie. Instead he posits a
radically dependent self, relying on constant external authority to achieve whole and
stable personality. Caryl Emerson visits this dynamic with her discussion of
contemporary classrooms asking: how can teachers truly connect with students through
content? She laments a common pedagogical perspective that ―eschews authority and
promotes an ―open classroom‖ inherently displacing the authority of both the teacher and
course content (Emerson ―Next Hundred‖ 24). Emerson identifies genuine deficiencies in
this approach saying that this ―too often results in frustration, boredom, Babel, a sense of
going nowhere or silence‖ (Emerson ―Next Hundred‖ 24). Emerson‘s commentary on
popular pedagogy is revealing of the problems Bakhtin himself outlines in the authorship
crisis. Emerson‘s description of a classroom inhabited by impotent, passive, confused and
mute people are as Bakhtin suggests, the characteristics of those who fail to realize the
importance of the outside viewpoint, the position of the author revealed in discourse.
To reground pedagogical practice Emerson cites Bakhtin‘s teaching style, a style
that was reportedly both authoritative and grand (Bocharov 1011). For Emerson, the
character of Bakhtin‘s teaching practice gives insight into his ideas regarding authority
and authority‘s relationship to stable and creative personalities. Emerson finds in Bakhtin
an advocate for ―increasing the number of authoritative models‖ one associates with
(Emerson ―Next Hundred‖ 24). Furthermore, these associations with authority are not
simple role-play but intimate and influential connections. The difference between
―authoritative word‖ and interpersonal authority occurs in the ability to ―internalize the
word,‖ a task which requires a ―great deal of time and an immense amount of discipline‖
(Emerson, ―Next Hundred‖ 25).
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Emerson‘s deft explanation of the correspondence between authority and the
development of individual personality clarifies the essential character of the author-hero
relationship. Instead of inhibiting the growth and development of an individual, authority
becomes a tremendously vital constituent of its occurrence. Emerson argues that authority
is featured prominently in Bakhtin‘s ―Author and Hero‖ because he believes the primary
creative principle of the author-hero relationship must be understood before the discovery
of its implications. As such, ―Author and Hero‖ lays the foundation for Bakhtin‘s later
focus in dialogue (Coates 50). Bakhtin‘s analysis of the author-hero relationship reveals
the fundamental principle informing the development of individual personality, the
movement of the authoritative word inward through dialogic interaction.
Ruth Coates, one of the few scholars willing to address the explicitly religious
intonation of Bakhtin‘s work, demonstrates her conversant understanding of Bakhtin‘s
work giving special attention to ―Author and Hero‖. Coates notes the puzzling avoidance
of Bakhtin‘s more explicitly faith informed texts by the secondary literature finding very
few interlocutors in her analysis of ―Author and Hero‖ (Coates 38)16. Coates considers
―Author and Hero‖ integral for understanding Bakhtin‘s turn to Christian theology for
mediating his discussion of authoritative speech. Coates is quick to point out that
authority in Bakhtin does not prefer authoritative discourse or the author over against the
hero but rather that a ―hero is not free to refuse to play his role, not because of
authoritarian strictures of the author/other but by virtue of the hero‘s very nature‖ (52).
16

Alexander Mihailovic‘s Corporeal Words: Bakhtin’s Theology of Discourse released shortly
after Coate‘s book went to press does address some of the same themes that she discusses in her own book
which she makes note of on page 177 of her own text. Each authors approach is significantly different
Mihailovic‘s text and could be properly grouped in with other books that Coates mentions. She writes
―Where the impact of religious philosophy and Christian (Orthodox) tradition on Bakhtin in his early years
has been taken seriously and carefully described, it has been in general terms and with only very limited
reference to the text(s) in which these religious influences are actually reflected (38).
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This aspect of the hero‘s nature is, according to Coates, closely tied to Bakhtin‘s reliance
on the Christianity identifying God as creator and human beings as created. The hero‘s
dependence on the author is not characterized by domination because Christianity
harmonizes the tenor of the God-man relationship with the doctrine of incarnation. The
event of Christ‘s earthly descent restores God‘s relationship with fallen man and is
evidence that God desires to meet humankind in Edenic communion and conversation.
The Incarnation, according to Coates, is representative of overarching significance of
love in Bakhtin‘s description of the author-hero relationship making love ―the most
important motif in ―Author and Hero‖‖ (Coates 53). The author, like a teacher, loves his
student and therefore speaks as if to influence him.
Alexander Mihailovic follows a similar question but intones his interrogation of
Bakhtin‘s texts much differently. Coates argues that Bakhtin‘s religious perspective is
integral. Mihailovic emphatically rejects this interpretation of Bakhtin‘s work positioning
Bakhtin in contrast to a T.S. Eliot-esque petition for a religiously regulated society
(Mihailovic 80). Mihailovic positively discounts the possibility of Bakhtin‘s theological
language, the doctrines of the incarnation and the person of Christ as representative of
Bakhtin‘s belief in their reality. Although Mihailovic admits the importance of Christ and
the notion of the incarnate Word as essential for reading Bakhtin‘s collected works he
consistently argues that ―Christ represents a sociological principle which, as important as
it is, most pointedly does not constitute a confessional frame of reference‖ (Mihailovic
80). This may be the reason for Mihailovic failing to discuss the role of ―Author and
Hero‖ in Bakhtin‘s larger corpus beyond necessary historical and textual commentary.
That this essay does not truly pique Mihailovic‘s interest is hard to figure since it is
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considered by others to be the most theological of Bakhtin‘s writings (Coates 52,
Emerson ―First Hundred‖, 225). Mihailovic‘s choice of interpretive lens constitutes a
discouraging omission in his book Corporeal Words: Bakhtin’s Theology of Discourse,
which is currently the definitive discussion of the ecclesial subtext running through
Bakhtin‘s work. Though his perspective limits the depth to which Mihailovic can delve
into this essay, it does not prevent him from making important connections between
―Author and Hero‖ and other Bakhtinian texts.
Mihailovic bookends Bakhtin‘s entire body of work by focusing on the
consistency between Toward a Philosophy of the Act and his last thoughts in ―Toward a
Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book‖ drawing insightful connections between the earliest
surviving text and Bakhtin‘s final notes. The most important observation that Mihailovic
makes is the connection between Bakhtin‘s interest in ―personality as a viable category‖
and its relationship to ―real ethical obligation‖ (Mihailovic 215). The transition that
Mihailovic identifies in Bakhtin‘s last notes is Bakhtin‘s attempt to ―link up personality
to a poetics of dialogue‖ (Mihailovic 215). This means for Mihailovic that in Bakhtin‘s
last work there is a distinct move towards dialogue becoming the ―crucible for the
formation for personality‖ (Mihailovic 215).
These are important points that must be considered in our discussion of the
author-hero relationship, and Mihailovic himself, albeit with a measure of academic
distance, reckons with them when discovering these important connections. The living
word and personhood are deeply intertwined not only in ―Author and Hero‖ but in the
whole of Bakhtin‘s thought demonstrating an ―internal unity‖ reinforced by the
Christological motifs which situate Christ as the pivotal position around which Bakhtin‘s
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theory of dialogue revolves (Mihailovic 15). Mihailovic even goes so far as to
acknowledge that Bakhtin‘s final description of the dialogic event includes not only one
person with another, but a third person author ―whose arrival on the structural scene of
the novel is essential for the triumph of an ethical state among consciousness‖
(Mihailovic 216).
Mihailovic‘s discussion remains primarily concerned with Bakhtin‘s critique of
the novel but his conclusions about Bakhtin‘ analysis of novelistic art overflow into the
existential reality of interpersonal interaction. A second and essential discovery that
Mihailovic makes is Bakhtin‘s transition from plot to author-person as the animator of
novelistic discourse. Mihailovic traces in Bakhtin‘s later notes on the Dostoevsky book a
definitive turn away from plot driven discourse in which the ―author himself replaces the
plot‖ and the ―author very clearly becomes at this point in Bakhtin‘s writing a third
presence that is indispensible to the full realization of dialogue‖ (Mihailovic 217).
In spite of Mihailovic‘s reluctance about Bakhtin believing the theological truths
that enhanced and buttressed his thinking, he has a penetrating view of the theological
subtext on the whole ignored in Bakhtinian scholarship. Mihailovic consistently argues
that the theological elements of Bakhtin‘s thinking are only aspects of a persuasive
intellectual climate. Mihailovic meticulously traces the themes of Bakhtin‘s work to the
451 Council of Chalcedon and to the writings of St. Augustine and to Chrysostom but
doesn‘t venture to posit that Bakhtin may have reached his conclusions by reading the
Scriptures themselves. Mihailovic‘s disregard of real religious faith as a constituent of
Bakhtin‘s thought means that he engages Bakhtin‘s texts only as objects of literary
criticism, not as a to way understand and wield the discreet yet powerful word.
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Mihailovic concludes his argument with general appreciation for Bakhtin‘s reuniting of
philosophy and theology ruling this move a timely method for tempering the polemics of
ideological conflict (Mihailovic 234).
The outcome of Bakhtin‘s claim that personality is born of dialogic encounter has
significantly different implications dependent on what voices are a part of the
conversation. If the voices are immanent and temporal versus divine and eternal,
individual personality and the interpenetration of the psyche by the spoken word are
colored in markedly different ways. The divine ―third presence‖ that Mihailovic locates
in Bakhtin‘s thought fades into the background when he juxtaposes Bakhtin‘s criticisms
and analyses against the socio- political and intellectual contest of Marxist Russian and
Bakhtin‘s contemporaries. If Bakhtin‘s claims are true, the importance of immanent
versus eternal voice becomes vital for how we understand and engage in the activity of
personality and relationship development.
Perhaps the most important contribution Mihailovic makes is his argument for the
systematic unity of Bakhtin‘s thought and its dependency on Christological motifs. This
admission supports the premise that Bakhtin‘s description of dialogue in the creative
event of personhood is not special to ―Author and Hero‖ or Toward a Philosophy of the
Act but a constituent, to greater or lesser degree, of all of Bakhtin‘s works. This means
that, at very least, we can courageously confront the theological elements in Bakhtin‘s
thought. Discussions of Bakhtin‘s work on the novel and human discourse need to
recognize these important elements in order to avoid flattening and impoverishing the
depth of insight that Bakhtin‘s philosophy can provide for the study of communication.
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Leslie Baxter‘s book, Voicing Relationships: A Dialogic Perspective17 holds a
similar tension between purely theoretical discussions of Bakhtin‘s ideas versus
perspectives engaging his theological intonations. Baxter‘s appropriation of Bakhtin
centers on her interest in developing a communication theory imaging the inherent
tension in a spoken utterance. Baxter credits Bakhtin‘s work as the stimulus for
developing her own Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT) with special interest in
Bakhtin‘s attention to the word in relational context and his dynamic description of the
centripetal/centrifugal movements of an utterance. Building important bridges between
Bakhtin‘s thought and contemporary communication scholarship Baxter emphasizes the
dialogic personality of Bakhtin‘s work. RDT posits that within every relationship and
relational context there are competing forces of interpersonal influence.
Baxter‘s affinity for dialectics puts her at odds with Bakhtin‘s own understanding
of dialogue. This contradiction is not the product of Baxter‘s naiveté. She acknowledges
‗dialectics‘ is not a term that Bakhtin would have considered useful in describing the
spoken word among people and attempts a redefinition of the dialectics itself,
emphasizing conflicting dynamics rather than dyads (Baxter ―Voicing‖ 45). To her credit
Baxter is quite honest about the difficulty of building her own theory of dialectics upon a
philosophy that fundamentally rejects dualisms for their limited interpretive scope. In his
earliest discussions of ethics Bakhtin repeatedly critiques dialectical theories for their
failure to engage the problem of human action axiologically.
17

In Baxter‘s earlier book Relating: Dialogues and Dialectics coauthored with Barbara
Montgomery she initiates her conversation with Bakhtin stressing more heavily the idea of dialectics as a
method of evaluating and understanding interpersonal communication events. In her more recent book cited
here she develops a softer version of this theory, ―RDT 2.0‖ which begins to stress Bakhtin‘s own
preference for dialogue as a central concept in his philosophy of communication. Because Baxter does not
actually do interpretive work with Bakhtin‘s texts I have not included a review of this earlier text finding
Baxter‘s more recent efforts a sufficient summary of her theory and her best attempt at thinking alongside
Bakhtin as she develops her own position.
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In spite of this complication, Baxter contributes much as the first contemporary
communication scholar attempting to actually build upon Bakhtin‘s thought. Baxter
demonstrates a thorough knowledge of the popular scholarly conversations regarding
Bakhtin‘s writings (i.e. authorship debates) but does not spend a considerable amount of
time explicating any specific text, instead invoking general qualities in Bakhtin‘s thought.
Baxter seriously considers Bakhtin‘s assertion that ―internal dialogism has enormous
power to shape style‖18 and uses similar statements as rationale for her own inquiries into
the nature of the utterance as informing meaning in interpersonal relationship and
personhood. Baxter follows Bakhtin‘s description of the word as mediatory in negotiating
different influences on relationship and personality making power issues a central aspect
of her theory of relational dialectics (Baxter ―Voicing‖ 13).
Baxter views the concept of ―authoring others‖ as only a period of development in
Bakhtin‘s work finding his thinking on this point ―vague‖ without ―concrete methods for
how this actually occurs in practice‖ (Baxter ―Voicing‖ 26). This gloss prevents Baxter
from engaging more earnestly the importance of responsible speech as a theme rarely
absent from Bakhtin‘s more technical discussions of the novel. Baxter‘s own project
traces the ethical nature of relational discourse and how normative meanings diminish
marginal voices failing to making connections to Bakhtin‘s descriptions of answerable
action and discourses that silence ―alien‖ voices (DiN 281).

18

―Style‖ in Bakhtin‘s sense is a person‘s particular way of speaking, not a general form adapted
to a context or of a larger group. Style infers a particular individual speaking, and that this style is
demonstrative, representative and impactful on the personhood of the individual speaking. The shaping of
style in this sense is the shaping of a person, because the only way a person is both created and revealed is
through the vocalizing of word, both one‘s own and those words that have touched and shaped that person
inwardly. For additional reference see Bakhtin‘s discussion of Makar Devushkin in ―Discourse in the
Novel‖ pp. 207 in which he explains how style and tone in speech is representative of an entire person‘s
world view and character.
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Baxter‘s work is a prime example of the current tone in communication
scholarship that appropriates Bakhtin‘s work. Baxter‘s RDT reveals significant modes in
normative speech and her modeling is certainly enhanced by her engagement with
Bakhtin‘s thought. However, Baxter‘s ideas orbit rather than integrate Bakhtin‘s more
systematic attempts at a unified philosophy of communication. She does show the
potential Bakhtin‘s work has for enriching contemporary communication theory that
might overcome the deficiencies in modernist models19 of interpersonal communication
(Baxter ―Voicing 8-14). However, her limited lens prevents the depth of engagement
Bakhtin‘s thinking reveals in the tensions of human communication. Baxter erroneously
aligns Bakhtin with social constructionist models claiming that truth, beauty and genuine
relationship are values determined by a society‘s normative discourse. This misstep in
Baxter‘s read of how Bakhtin views truth within the polyglot of human language makes
her appropriation of his work incomplete.
Bakhtin‘s work can make deeply philosophical and unified contributions to our
thinking about the relationship between authority and subjectivity for communication
scholarship. Baxter‘s inattention to the themes of authority and personality, even though
quite important for her work, weaken the contributions Bakhtin‘s thought can make to
RDT. This is evident when Baxter tentatively critiques the debilitating nature of

*19 Baxter identifies five frameworks that she wishes to rework; frameworks that hinder
communication theory from being able to truly describe the dynamics of human communication. These
structural assumptions are informed by modernist presuppositions about communication modeling
involving a more linear conceptualization of speech. The five that Baxter sees as problematic which are
corrected by her reading of Bakhtin are: a false binary between public and private, bias against uncertainty,
illusion of the monadic actor, an inattention to power, and a conceptualization of relationships as containers
of meaning. All of these she elaborates on her book Voicing Relationships primarily juxtaposing her own
Relational Dialectics Theory from previous communication theories suffering from one or more of these
problematic assumptions.
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normative discourse, which casts the unordinary20 family and interpersonal relationships
in a strange or abnormal light (Baxter ―Voicing‖ 179). Instead of making strong and
purposeful statements she waxes aesthetic lacking the sufficient ground to assert her
position.
Baxter‘s argument seems to be with normative discourse that represents
unquestionable authority in the discursive atmosphere of culture. She questions the
family categories of ―nuclear‖ or ―normal‖ as helpful in establishing the value of
adoption as a legitimate form of family building. In light of the positive results of
adoption, few could criticize the intention of Baxter‘s argument. However, underlying
this critique of norms is a familiar suspicion towards the authority in discourse because of
its function in culture. Much like Bogdan‘s personal inhibitions or Bialostosky‘s wariness
of an academic canon, Baxter takes a position that is regrettably unstable and lacking the
generative power needed for explaining the possible contexts that might support coherent
personality.
Baxter‘s hesitance, although unsatisfying, is not unreasonable. Bakhtin is an
appropriate companion for those wary of authoritative discourse. His life history well
demonstrates the destructive potential of certain forms of normative discourse that
diminish and destroy the ―alien‖ voice. Even so Emerson reminds us that Bakhtin did not
20

Even here as I attempt to articulate the difference Baxter articulates in her critique, the notion
that there are ordinary and unordinary forms of family and interpersonal relationship would be considered
problematic. This introduces another dilemma in the compatibility between Baxter‘s own project and
Bakhtin‘s own thought. The reasons Bakhtin gives in ―Author and Hero‖ for his development of this
principle relationship is so a theory of dialogue can be developed. According to Bakhtin, without a rich
description of the subject, an understanding of a person‘s bodily perspective and a unifying theory of
interconnection in language, descriptions of communication will adopt a problematic rigidity either through
false conceptualization of subjectivity or through an inconsistent application of aesthetics. This is where
Baxter finds herself in difficulty. Her critiques, however thorough and correct prevent her from
prescription. Likewise, her critique of discursive categories undermines any sense of a stable subject or
personality. It is difficult to see how much can be built on such a foundation. In fact, her desire to
problematize all normative discourse makes one wonder how speech, in Baxter‘s view, can help overcome
the ―life from within‖ that Bakhtin describes as type of ―insanity‖‖ (A&H 128).
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only critique authority but instead warned against the monologic nature of authoritative
discourse that was irresponsive to life. Without a clearer understanding of the author-hero
relationship interpretations like these are likely to remain salient and uncorrected in
contemporary Bakhtin scholarship.
Authority and “Authoritative Discourse”
Bakhtin‘s discussion of authoritative discourse in his essay ―Discourse in the
Novel‖ establishes an insightful differentiation between authority and authoritative
discourse. Bakhtin‘s view of the word between people and its exertion of influence
interpersonally and culturally creates important clarifications. Bakhtin‘s notion of
―everyday verbal transmission‖ is highly stylized. His idea of the utterance never
divorces language and meaning from the stylistic nature of personal intonation.
He writes:
When we attempt to understand and make assessments in everyday life we do not
separate discourse from the personality speaking it (as we can in the ideological
realm), because the personality is so materially present to us. And the entire
speaking situation is very important: who is present during it, with what
expression or mimicry is it uttered, with what shades of intonation? (DiN 341)
Bakhtin problematizes the simple evaluation of a person‘s speech separated from
context. Each voice present in the event of an utterance lends, as it were, a different pitch
to the way a person intones their words. The gleaning of intent from an utterance without
presence reduces the potential feeling created by the concrete and material weight that
personality has on intonation. It also means that the relationship between two people in
conversation essentially constitutes the utterance not only as a framing circumstance, but
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also as a feature of the utterance‘s tone. Contextual and relational circumstances provide
both the internal and external form of a person‘s utterance demonstrating the significance
of other‘s utterances for understanding the way speech originates and is verbalized. This
distinction separates what Bakhtin considers ―authoritative discourse‖ from ―internally
persuasive discourse‖ (DiN 342).
The distinction is not, however, simplistic. Authoritative discourse and internally
persuasive discourse can become ―united in a single word—one that is simultaneously
authoritative and internally persuasive—despite the profound differences between these
two categories of alien discourse‖ (Din 342). Bakhtin, it seems, is preparing us for the
difficulty he sees in being able to truly demarcate an individual‘s utterance from the
social world of words he describes. Authoritative discourse that is not internally
persuasive is a word that is separate from relational context and lacks presence. Although
the ―authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, it‘s demands are made from the
outside, and are not fused with our own discourse as part of our own intonation, a doublevoiced or hybrid word.‖21
The problem of being able to properly distinguish an authoritative word, one that
imposes itself, has to do with an inability to recognize a discursive authority that is part
of the subjective world. According to Bakhtin, the difference between a word ―conjoined
with authority‖ and ―authoritative discourse‖ is dependent on the listener‘s disposition
towards that authority, ―whether the authority is recognized by us or not— is what
determines its specific demarcation and individuation in discourse; it requires a distance
21

―Double voiced‖ or ―hybridized‖ forms of the speech are utterances joined together with the
words of others. Of course, from Bakhtin‘s point of view, a word is never completely our own because it is
influenced by the words of others, the historical intonation attached to the word, and the person to which
the word is directed. Here Bakhtin is touching on the delicate nature of trying to distinguish between the
general tone of a social discourse and the individual intonation of a person‘s utterance.
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vis-à-vis itself (this distance may be valorized as positive of negative, just as our attitude
toward it may be sympathetic of hostile)‖ (DiN 343).
Authoritative discourse remains ―sharply demarcated‖ because it is not
assimilated, and requires ―unconditional allegiance‖ regardless of the listener‘s
disposition (DiN 343). Bakhtin posits as example ―a distant descendent‖ that cannot be
argued with (DiN 344). The idea of the ―distant descendent‖ who must not be questioned
calcifies the free word, literally objecting the circumstances of a contemporary moment.
Instead of a responsive discourse intoned for the present authoritative speech transmits,
but does not translate into contemporary circumstance. Bakhtin‘s final critique of
authoritative discourse links to his overall understanding of verbal creation and its reproductivity. A speech utterance shares freely and relationally in multiple voices past and
present. Unenclosed in familiar flesh, authoritative discourse cannot relate or be relative,
nor consider the relationship into which it is spoken. For this reason authoritative
discourse generally debilitates the potential of personhood. Inattention to temporality and
the condition of relational life ―renders the artistic representation of authoritative
discourse impossible… It is by its very nature incapable of being double voiced; it cannot
enter into hybrid constructions‖ (DiN 344).
The conditions of temporality in Bakhtin‘s description of discourse function
notably in the event of the utterance. Time, particularly the rhythm of human experience,
is an essential constituent of the speech utterance. Bakhtin‘s critique of authoritative
discourse centers on an inattention to history and irresponsiveness to the living person.
Even internally persuasive discourse can become authoritative if it makes claims to rise
above and transcend living discourse. Bakhtin‘s conclusions indicate that speaking freely
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requires that authoritative discourse become personified, become a personality. In fact,
Bakhtin suggests that the possibility of forgotten or ―calcified‖ authoritative discourse
being resurrected and intoning contemporary utterances is quite common. Michael
Holquist characterizes Bakhtin as ―a meditator on the meaning of borders‖ and here we
clearly see Bakhtin attempting to articulate the threadbare trip line between free speech
and its more common constraints (Holquist ―Introduction xix).
Time is the border crossed by the word, which by coupling past and present
prompts the rebirth of novel meaning. Distancing oneself from the border of temporality,
the boundary connecting both persons to the present is the authoritative claim to possess a
timeless truth, truth not subject to the relativity and relationship in utterances. Bakhtin‘s
view of time is most clearly articulated in ―Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the
Novel‖ where he cites Einstein‘s Theory of Relativity as parallel to time and space in the
novel. Bakhtin‘s description of discursive time resonates well with the contemporary
conversation regarding the importance of historicity22 in our understanding of discursive
practice. J. D. Peters describes this interaction wonderfully writing, ―the present becomes
intelligible as it is aligned with a past moment with which it has a secret affinity. There is
a simultaneity not only across space, but across time as well‖ (Peters 3). The distinction
between authoritative discourse and internally persuasive discourse is made in meetings
on the borders of time. This boundary subjects authoritative discourse to vocal intonation,
it becomes personal ―ideological discourse‖ and persuasive towards the inner person. In
other words, for any discourse to be internally persuasive rather than authoritative it must
be spoken in temporal relationship. Authoritative discourse becomes a voice of authority

22

For further reading see Thomas B. Farrell‘s ―Narrative in Natural Discourse: On Conversation
and Rhetoric‖ in Homo Narrans 35.4 1985 pp. 109-127.
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speaking into a person and responding to questions posed by existential and relational
positioning. For Bakhtin, ―this discourse is of decisive significance in the evolution of
individual consciousness: consciousness awakens to independent ideological life
precisely in a world of alien discourses surrounding it, and from which it cannot initially
separate itself‖ (DiN 345).
What Bakhtin‘s reveals in the transition from ―authoritative discourse‖ to an
internally persuasive voice of authority is integrally important for the development of a
person‘s self consciousness and personality. Once an ―externally authoritative‖ word
becomes internally persuasive it converts from a word imposition, an inert dominating
objective discourse, to one that is creatively productive, awakening ―new and
independent words‖ (DiN 345). This element of Bakhtin‘s discussion is of particular
importance to Baxter as she examines the dialectic between individual voice and the
competing narratives of culture. The tension in Baxter‘s work relies on Bakhtin‘s
description of the dynamic event in which a person attempts to distinguish their own
thoughts from the opinions of others, their own voice from other voices active on the
boundaries of their personhood. This means that the development of individual
personality is experienced phenomenologically as an ―intense struggle‖ (DiN 346).
Bakhtin‘s most troubling conclusion qualifies the struggle to establish one‘s own
individuality as without temporal resolution. The fluidity of inner experience represents
the infinite word permutations experienced by any speaking subject. The essential
element of ―internally persuasive discourse‖ is that it remains open to change. According
to Bakhtin ―the semantic structure of internally persuasive discourse in not finite, it is
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open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever
newer ways to mean‖ (DiN 345-346).
Reading Bakhtin‘s discussion of authoritative discourse as only critique isn‘t
without reason because his classifications of authoritative discourse sound much like his
later criticisms of monologic discourse, irresponsive voices coldly objective towards their
respondents. However, reading more fixedly we discover that Bakhtin is not framing a
blanket critique but attempting to illumine a complex communication event. As the word
penetrates the temporal sphere it becomes the voice of conversation, an integral and
important constituent of personality development. Bakhtin confirms this reality stating,
―the importance of struggling with another‘s discourse, its influence in the history of an
individual‘s coming to ideological consciousness, is enormous‖ (DiN 348).
Bakhtin‘s position is different from claims that present authoritative discourse as
stifling and inhibiting the growth of individuality and personal self-consciousness.
Internally persuasive voices, even if they originate as authoritative and contrary can
become essential supports for personal identity. In fact, Bakhtin notes that ―in the history
of literary of language, there is a struggle constantly being waged to overcome the
official line with its tendency to distance itself from the zone of contact, a struggle
against various kinds and degrees of authority‖ (DiN 345). Distancing authoritative
discourse from the permeable borders of personhood means a diminishment in the
productive capacity of verbal discourse. The further withdrawn from this boundary the
less artistic speech becomes. For language this means ―a weakening and degradation of
capacity to generate metaphors, and discourse becomes more reified, more concrete,
more filled with everyday elements and so forth‖ (DiN 345).
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The fertile ground of discursive vitality from which unique personalities emerge
can only be found on the borders of time and space, in association with potentially
persuasive authoritative discourse. Of course, the spatial nature of the body must be
continually recalled to understand the important influence the relational context has on an
utterance and its construction. The boundaries of time tested in the event of a speech
utterance must remain tensile in order to offer sufficient support. Favoring the past or
present more severely than the present has noteworthy impacts on the flexibility of
human discourse. Favoring the future or the past over the present in speech generation
generates authoritative discourse which encourages imposition rather responsiveness. The
spatial character of bodily existence operates as a conscious reminder that the spoken
word moves discursively, and that the boundaries in play are axiological as well as
temporal.
Whenever Bakhtin‘s own assertions verge on an authoritative concretization of
temporal and axiological boundaries he resorts to the more elastic categories of
aesthetics. Bakhtin‘s discussion exposes the delicateness of his subject matter and the
importance of tenderness in addressivity. Any person having experienced objectification
by the rigid nature of authoritative discourse would understandably express reservation
about residing in proximity to its influence. Bakhtin establishes the temporal boundary as
the liminal situation in which individuality is developed and unique personhood formed.
Without these voices that invade and argue we are left to argue with ourselves, generating
doubles that simultaneously justify and condemn us. Inward dialectical tension produces
a pathology that Bakhtin characterizes as self-possession. The person who rejects the
outside position, the one that provides necessary support whether sympathetic or
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antagonistic, becomes possessed, possessed with their own personality and possessed
with voices which are generated only from the inside becoming like the man of
Dostoevsky‘s The Double, whose internal interlocutor eerily resembles a demon.
Viewing Bakhtin‘s discussion of authoritative discourse in light of his arguments
in ―Author and Hero‖ provides weight to the relationship he is struggling to articulate.
The relationship between individuality and authority is contentious and tenuous. There
are too many historical examples of authoritative ideology inhibiting the development of
personalities and muting voices to make accepting Bakhtin‘s position easy. Historically,
the spectrum of abuse in the deviant application of authority makes one question whether
we can truly admit that it is best for a person to remain on the boundary of authoritative
discourses that attempt to impose on those remaining in proximity both bodily and
consciously. This is the recurring I/other dichotomy both internally and interpersonally.
How can a person confront a voice of difference without fear of abuse? Likewise, how
can a person prevail against the self-possession that Bakhtin warns is the inevitable
consequence of attempts at self-authoring? According to Bakhtin, the answer lies in the
immediate loving mediation of Christ‘s incarnate divinity.
Bakhtin‘s mediation of the self-other(s) dialectic with the Christian view of the
Word as love may for some scholars complicate rather than clarify the transfer of his
broader aesthetic claims into ethical and communicative recommendations. Integrating
―Author and Hero‖ into current conversations regarding Bakhtin‘s aesthetics has the
potential to explain the nature of this mediation. Bakhtin addresses any major objections
systematically asserting that theoretical descriptions of this relationship can only occur in
principle, qualifying his reliance on novel art to examine the idiosyncrasy of the God man
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relationship. Bakhtin makes it clear why he eschews definitive statements about the
personal character of the relationship and the importance of situating his position within
aesthetics. He remains respectfully evasive when considering questions of the soul
because the full mystery of divinity and humanity should not be understood intellectually
but interpersonally (PDP 251-2).
Because it‘s vitality and is too various to theorize, even in his discussions of the
novel Bakhtin avoids unqualified prescription as he surveys the dynamics of human
personality. Describing how the author, acting on and in his creation, and the hero acts in
something created, Bakhtin with esoteric elegance shows how the relationship, in
principle, unfolds in reality. Bakhtin‘s critique of modern aesthetics makes it clear that
the problems troubling the study of speech and language stem from a confusion of the
author with the hero. The result of this misunderstanding is catastrophic, not only for
aesthetics but for all human action. Without ―outsideness,‖ or an outside view there is no
confidence in naming value, no measure between action and motion and no satisfying
distinction between human will and social force. These are the boundaries Bakhtin
tenaciously articulates in his entire body of work, boundaries established foundationally
in ―Author and Hero‖ Caryl Emerson argues along similar lines by framing Bakhtin‘s
project with an account of his diseased body (Emerson ― Next Hundred‖ 17). Emerson‘s
conscious reflection on the correlation between Bakhtin‘s work and his own suffering
represents an affinity with Bakhtin‘s discussion in its attempt to reconcile the dialectic
between Bakhtin‘s authorship and her own.
Bakhtin first writings were attempts to articulate the relationship between the
artist and his hero(s) as a first step towards understanding this complicated kind of
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communication. However, against the thematic background of the body he develops an
interpretive context delving deeper than the prudent concerns of disciplinary ethics.
Bakhtin‘s original questions were primarily philosophical in nature and he pursued a
problem that had long troubled thinkers, the difference between the ―given,‖ and original
action (Emerson, ―Next Hundred‖ 17). Even Emerson, one of Bakhtin‘s more astute
readers demonstrates that to establish her own hermeneutic position with Bakhtin‘s text
requires interpersonal mediation. Emerson‘s reconstitution of Bakhtin‘s ailing persona
with descriptions of his life, provide her with the ―outside‖ ethic whereby her
authoritative claims are justified as original and additive.
In ethics, the matter of personality and authority begins with this distinction
between the ―given‖ and what one can define as a freely willed act. For Bakhtin this is
primarily an aesthetic question with ethical implications. Bakhtin‘s original essay Toward
a Philosophy of the Act is where the ethical implications of his later projects are best
understood. In these first efforts Bakhtin attempts to correlate a pure unified truth with
individuated human action (Walters 9). In the following work ―Author and Hero in
Aesthetic Activity‖ Bakhtin advocates ―aesthetic seeing‖ as the way to ―consummate‖ or
visualize the outward and inward constraints on personal action but before he can explain
―aesthetic seeing‖ he confronts his philosophical contemporaries on the problem of
―aesthetic reason‖ (TPA 18). Even in his earliest work Bakhtin turns to aesthetics to
remedy the problems generated by coupling authority with ideology rather than
personality.
Bakhtin shows in Toward a Philosophy of the Act an early concern with the
perception of truth and the ethical nature of human action. Bakhtin‘s critique of ―content
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ethics‖ and ―formal ethics‖ points to a problem manifest in both types. Bakhtin faults
formal ethics with erroneous descriptions of the ethical event in which the evidence
provided for the possibility of human action takes little account of the real performative
validity of an act and assumes the existence of an autonomous, non-contingent will. He
explains:
The will-as-deed produces the law to which it submits, i.e., it dies, as an
individual will in its own product. The will describes a circle; it shuts itself in,
excluding the actual-individual and historical-self activity of the performed act.
We are dealing here with the same illusion as in the case of theoretical
philosophy: in the latter we have a self-activity of reason, which my historical and
individually answerable self-activity has nothing in common, and for which this
categorical self-activity is passively obligatory, while in the former the same
happens with the will. All this distorts, at root, the actual moral ought, and does
not provide any approach to the actuality of the act performed. (TPA 26)
Bakhtin‘s concern centers around a persistent focus on inner thought and the theoretical,
an interest in what occurs inwardly during an ethical act rather than the particular person
interacting. For Bakhtin, ―thinking theoretically, contemplating aesthetically‖ is the
aspect the ethical event which cannot truly be perceived from the outside (TPA 28). The
real lack of insight means that inward particularity must be abstracted and generalized. In
this objective abstraction and generalization the individual ethicality of a human being is
falsely consolidated. Even Kant‘s categorical imperative, attempting to establish a
universal norm by identifying patterns of cognitive particularity, deemphasizes the
outward and particular nature of an act‘s constitutive contingencies.

65

Inordinate emphasis on the inner nature of the act separates the ought from
responsibility and attempts to create an active unity with transcendent truth which is then
authoritatively re-imposed on a person. Bakhtin‘s is not a simple objection to perceived
obligation, but to the disagreement between imposition from the outside and a personal
compliance without agreement construed as true action. Bakhtin shows significant
concern for the potential of human action for several reasons. Bakhtin opposes theoretical
strategies first, because they ignore the important constraint of outward perception for
evaluating the inner person and second, they do not take into account the multiplicity of
voices present in every ethical event. Of course, Bakhtin asserts that this attempt by
philosophy to generalize the inner person creates a false impression of the outside person
furthering the pretense of singular determination in the ethical act.
How Bakhtin believed the ethical nature of an act could be determined remains
positively ambiguous. In fact, there is little evidence in his writing that Bakhtin believed
philosophical ethics sufficient for the task. For this reason, it is important to draw
attention to Bakhtin‘s critique of the philosophical history of ethical theories. Bakhtin
finds insufficient support for his own thinking in the philosophical tradition of ethics. He
believed this tradition possessed significant deficiencies stating: ―We have identified as
unfounded and as essentially hopeless all attempts to orient a first philosophy in relation
to the content/sense aspect or the objectified product taken in abstraction from the onceoccurrent actual act/deed and its author‖ (TPA 27). In this statement we see Bakhtin turn
from the traditional categories and language of the western philosophical tradition. In his
effort to demonstrate the peculiarity of the ethical act Bakhtin finds that the approach
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most commonly adopted in philosophical ethics does not provide the necessary language
or context and is rather ―hopeless‖ (TPA 27).
The hopelessness Bakhtin discovers in theoretical philosophy reappears as the
impetus for his turn to aesthetics in ―Author and Hero‖. A consideration of ethics within
the dynamic personality and authority has promise, whereas authority coupled with
ideology promotes human purposelessness and fosters cultural tyranny. In either case,
explanations for establishing the ought of the human act are terribly impecunious.
According to Bakhtin, ―formal ethics provides no approach to a living act performed in
the real world‖ and instead is the attempt to establish practically ―one theoretical domain
over all the others, and that only because it is a domain of the emptiest and least
productive form of what is universal‖ (TPA 27). Bakhtin, in his turn to aesthetics is
creating a different world for the emergence of self-conscious action, even if that world
requires that the personality be contested as the immutable constituent of personhood.
Bakhtin posits that it is only aesthetically permeable understanding of personhood makes
possible the ―once occurent actual act/deed‖ (TPA 28). The relationship between the act
and whole personhood can only be understood within the author-hero relationship, only
in the vocal presence of authority. For Bakhtin ―the author intonates every particular and
every trait of his hero, every event of his life, ever action he performs‖ (A&H 4).
Bakhtin‘s essay ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity‖ is a powerful response
to the problems identified in many theoretical postulations about the nature of the human
act and the possibility of human individuality. According to Bakhtin, our understanding
of the former necessarily follows our view of the latter. Without a clear view of what
constitutes authority, the potential for vivid and robust personality is fragile. The first
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sentences of Bakhtin‘s ―Author and Hero‖ state, ―For a proper understanding of the
author‘s architectonically stable and dynamically living relationship to the hero we must
take into account both the essentially necessary foundation of that relationship and the
individual characteristics that it assumes in particular authors‖ (A&H 4). Bakhtin‘s
original claim betrays his commitment to the particularity of human action and the
uniqueness of individual experience. And yet, it is the author‘s relationship that captures
his attention as that stable yet dynamic gaze which contains both the answer to the
stifling structures of authoritative discourse and the freedom of unique human
personality.
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Chapter 3: Incarnate Activity
Understanding Bakhtin‘s vision of authority in interpersonal interaction warrants
a more detailed look at the personal nature of the author-hero relationship. Bakhtin
accomplishes his inquiry in parallel with a discussion of aesthetics in the novel thus
circumventing the calcifying exactitude accompanying theoretical explanation. Bakhtin
thought art and life should be brought together into a relationship of ―mutual liability,‖ a
theme evident in ―Author and Hero‖ as well as in his other works (A&A 2). For Bakhtin,
meaningful life must account for theories of art, and art must account for the humble
ways of living. Bakhtin‘s original call for uniting art and life reminds us that when he
writes about art, he is speaking about life. Likewise, when he speaks about the authorhero relationship, he is describing a real interpersonal interaction. As we study the
author-hero relationship, we must consider the weightiness of this association integrating
this perspective into our reading of Bakhtin‘s work.
Interpreting ―Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity‖ as a serious consideration of
reality means that the religious aspects of Bakhtin‘s theological tones, currently
interpreted as only metaphoric, must be brought into focus as a true and purposeful
description existence. Just as Bakhtin utilizes art to buttress his discussion of life, we
must conclude that his integration of Christian theological elements theoretically
intertwine with his artistic musings, reflecting his ideas regarding the reality of human
discourse. This means that contemporary interpretations of Bakhtin‘s writing should take
into account how this reality is transformed through the theological intonations of the
Incarnation, Christ, and an eternal Word. Bakhtin‘s sustained interest in understanding
ideological consciousness as Word incarnate, and his dependence on the Incarnation to
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explain the temporal constraints of the human body as a symbolic value means that these
tenants of Christian theology should be considered integral for discussions of Bakhtin‘s
theory of novelistic discourse and human dialogue. These features of his thought are
correspondingly crucial for understanding Bakhtin‘s notions of carnival, polyphony,
heteroglossia, and the authoritative word (DiN pp. 331-366). Bakhtin supports his
proposition with these points of orientation, which in our relationship with an
authoritative word, enables the active distinction of an innerly persuasive word and
enables unique ideological consciousness to emerge. 23 This position may prompt
reservation when considering the implications of remaining potentially susceptible to an
authoritative word that might silence individual voice. However, this reservation should
not lead us to suspicion but should instead pique our curiosity. We must ask why Bakhtin
dedicates so much of his discussion of the novel to articulating the character of the
author-hero relationship, describing it both as a relationship of sovereignty and one in
which the utterances of the hero‘s individual ideological consciousness are both
distinguished and encouraged.
Bakhtin discovers in the novel not only the language for articulating the authorhero relationship, but also an art form that can seriously, yet freely, consider God‘s

23

In his essay ―Discourse in the Novel‖(pp.345) Bakhtin writes of the general propensity for
contemporary voices to free themselves from what would be considered an ―authoritative‖ voice, its
authority stemming from its historical quality as a voice of tradition, previous generations, cultural customs
etc. Although this promotes a type of freedom in expression, it also means a ―weakening and degradation of
the capacity to generate metaphors‖ which means that discourse becomes ―more reified, more concrete and
more filled with everyday elements‖ (DiN 345). What is important to note is that Bakhtin does not consider
the authoritative words as inherently threatening to individual voice but instead is characterized by that
―other‖ position that necessarily exists for the emergence of ideological consciousness. In ―Author and
Hero,‖ we ―lack an emotional volitional approach to this outward image that could vivify it and include or
incorporate it axiologically within the outward unity of the plastic-pictorial world‖ A&H 31). Of course
one can emerge from the heteroglossic atmosphere of the social context but again, for this to be formulated
into a personal voice with which a person can contend and disagree with, it must be concretized in the
image of a person who is in many ways, an author, or at very least someone with ―outside‖ authority (A&H
36, DiN 336).
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relationship to humankind as well as the complex and dynamic character of interpersonal
communication. In ―Author and Hero‖ Bakhtin strives to reveal the ―essentially necessary
foundation of the author-hero relationship‖ (A&H 4). He claims that only by
understanding this ―necessary foundation‖ can better conceptualizations be made of the
author-hero relationship manifest in particular relational types. In other words, in order to
understand how authoring is done particularly, we must first establish a concrete and
unified view of general aesthetics. Bakhtin‘s preliminary introduction to the problem of
general aesthetics responds to a reality in which a person can never be completely
sympathize with another person. Any such attempts ―stand in another person‘s shoes‖
illuminates the constraints of embodied perspective even as it reveals refracted facets of
an individual‘s personality. Bakhtin states quite obviously that we are unable to relate to
each other as whole human beings, and are rather selectively concerned with ―those
particular actions, which we are compelled to deal with in living our life and which are,
in one way or another of special interest to us‖ (A&H 5). These real perceptual
limitations of common interpersonal interaction are what Bakhtin attends to in his
description of an aesthetic perspective that can see a person in their entirety, their outer
appearance and the complexity of their inner person. An aesthetic perspective means
reacting to ― the whole of a hero as a human being, a reaction that assembles all of the
cognitive-ethical determinations and valuations of the hero and consummates them in the
form of a unitary and unique whole that is a concrete, intuitable whole, but also a whole
of meaning‖ (A&H 5).
Bakhtin‘s concern with seeing a person as a distinct meaningful whole
demonstrates his conviction that the actual standpoint required to view someone this way
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is impossible for ordinary human beings. In fact, it is only in art, as the author of a work
that humans can nominally see both the inward and outward aspects of another person
(hero) as well as the entirety of their historical life, each particular moment that
represents both the complete person and its meaning for their personality. 24 This is a
complicating premise in light of Bakhtin‘s previous calls for authors to unite the interests
of art and life, consider their necessary relationship, and live out the implications of this
liability. If Bakhtin‘s understanding of the author‘s true aesthetic perspective means
being outside of life, it would seem he is describing a fictional situation, one that cannot
actually be achieved except in artistic composition. This quandary reveals an important
aspect of Bakhtin‘s development of the author-hero relationship. By directing his
attention towards this interpersonal interaction, Bakhtin wishes to personalize aesthetic
action but not as an activity that presumes timelessness or a sort of aesthetic
transcendence. Timelessness and transcendence are only possible through abstraction, in
leaving bodily experience through imagination and theory. To be truly liable and
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Here Bakhtin touches on the conundrum that he faces in much of ―Author and Hero,‖‖ which
does not confute his premise that the author-hero relationship offers us a substantive analogy for
understanding the relationship between God and mankind. We have so far seen that the hero‘s existence is
wholly dependent on the author, and in fact this in art this is also true in art. But for the creative efforts of
an author, characters cannot spring to life. Yet, the human author cannot fully know all of the constituent
parts of a hero, what makes him or her whole as a person. An author in this sense must be divine if he is to
truly be able to see all of his heroes as whole human beings, conceptualize them at every age, in every
mood and their present age, at every moment simultaneously. and see all of their thoughts in reference to
the whole of their life. This kind of sight, however, creates a chasm between the author and his heroes.
How can the author relate to his heroes if he sees them all at once, not as they experience life as it moves
fluidly yet momentarily in time? It would seem that this is an unresolved distance, and in one sense the
religious experience of many throughout history testifies to it. Of course, through Bakhtin‘s use of the
Incarnation, we see a totally different scenario in which God descends to earth and adopts a totally new
kind of distance by accepting the limitation of bodily life. One in which a human is not separated by his
superiority of being, but by the fact that he now has a body that separates him from all other humans as
they are separated from each other. This example, as presented in ―Author and Hero,‖‖ is an author who,
out of love for his heroes, limits himself, depending not on his omniscience to resolve the difference
between human shortcoming and divine perfection but on the mediatory nature of the spoken, or in other
words, vocalized word (Christ). This word can cross the boundary and resolve the polarity of bodily
position while simultaneously reconciling and preserving divine/ and human positions in a new made
harmony.
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answerable one must unify art with life through answerable action, action modeled after
the aesthetic interaction of the author with his hero. Instead of encouraging an ideal
outside authorial stance, Bakhtin calls authors to incarnate action, to unify one‘s living of
life with an eternal aesthetic viewpoint capable of being wholly outside yet intimately
realized. This infinite aesthetic viewpoint is not an ideal position; it must be understood
as an imitation of the ideal person represented in Bakhtin‘s description of Christ (A&H
56).
Bakhtin‘s reliance on Christ‘s cosmological position in his discussion of
aesthetics shows he is particularly interested in the nature of original action as it occurs in
the sight of a living and sovereign God. Bakhtin carefully distinguishes religious
experience from aesthetic experience, and yet we see the role of Christ in Bakhtin‘s
writing advance both the aesthetic and religious dimensions simultaneously (A&H 22,
146-149). Engaging the person of Christ in Bakhtin‘s thought answers important
questions about his theory without foreclosing alternative readings that indirectly address
the religious intonations of his work. The incarnate Christ appears in ―Author and Hero‖
as a crucial figure, not only as a person who resolves the dilemma of ethical solipsism,
but also one that mediates the distance between a truly outside (eternal, omniscient)
aesthetic and the inner experience of personhood (A&H 56, 111). With this as our focus,
the pressing question becomes: how does the author-hero relationship act as a principal
for understanding the dialogic nature of interpersonal communication?
The parallels in Bakhtin‘s commentary on general aesthetics and the nature of real
interpersonal relationships brought together in the theological intonations of Bakhtin‘s
thought, exemplified in the person of Christ (A&H 115-16, 145). In fact, to read
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Bakhtin‘s text otherwise requires us to question his sincerity, imbuing an intellectual
naiveté to his demonstrably genuine concern for the position of the hero in the text.
Bakhtin is speaking of true realities when he describes humanity‘s loss of the necessary
creative principal both concealed yet also revealed in the author-hero relationship.
According to Bakhtin, the loss of this guiding principal results in an existential instability
where ―we ourselves fall under the domination of the contingent, with the result that we
lose ourselves and we lose the stable determinateness of the world as well‖ (A&H 5). It is
in this realm of instability where acknowledging tone and character of the author‘s
relationship to the hero becomes both essential and necessary.
The author-hero relationship as Bakhtin‘s primary point of entry refutes the
tendency towards an ―authoritative word‖ critiquing any position that scorns descent into
the murkiness of human speech. Bakhtin may sound post-modern by characterizing
humanity‘s existential crisis as inherently unstable, but he is not breaking theoretical
ground for constructing a communicative ethic. Instead, Bakhtin eschews ethics to more
aptly position himself as a voice of authority with whom we must reckon.
The Hero
Bakhtin‘s pursuit of the principle appeal in the author-hero relationship illustrates
that his questions regarding meaning correlate directly with the act of human being
(A&H 115). Bakhtin argues that aesthetic events require a situation of hierarchy, or least
an author[ity] relating to a hero.25 The hero as meaningful subject does not exist without
the creative contemplation of an author, nor is the author-hero relationship possible
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David Patterson recognizes a similar truth in his study of the ―spirit of literature‖ by attempting
to ―establish a dialogical presence answering not only to these thinkers but to the witness that stands above
all human encounter‖ (Patterson ix). According to Patterson, the ―spirit‖ in literature gives aesthetic form to
the artistic event of human dialogue.
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without this ―noncoinciding‖ interaction (A&H 22). Bakhtin carefully differentiates the
religious experience from the aesthetic distinguishing them by identifying the possibly
present participants in each communicative event. In religious speech (prayer, worship,
ritual), the human consciousness is encompassed in God. In the aesthetic, there are a
minimum of two interactive consciousnesses, which Bakhtin defines as the author and the
hero. If, as Bakhtin says, these two consciousnesses become ―coincidental,‖ the event
takes on an ethical tone rather than an aesthetic one. When the relationship becomes a
task set forward for the person‘s interacting, the aesthetic is reduced to an ethic. Without
excluding the possibility of other types of interactivity, Bakhtin always specifies between
the aesthetic and other types of human interrelationship. Bakhtin articulates the difference
in how human relationships and their resulting dialogues become intoned by the presence
and nature of the participants involved. The aesthetic event does not exclude events of an
ethical or theoretical nature, but rather encompasses them. The aesthetic event contains
both the freedom of theory and the liability of the ethical ought. The aesthetic event is the
only kind of event in which the participants are viewed and related to as whole persons,
people of unique character each incarnating distinct and valuable perspectives. This union
of the aesthetic with the ought is accomplished through Bakhtin‘s integration of Christ‘s
incarnation.
Bakhtin achieves a defense of answerable action related to his theological
proposition through his discussion of personality in the novel. We must presume that
Bakhtin‘s interest in art is not an attempt to bypass the practical tensions of the spiritual,
theological, and ethical, but rather to accomplishment both projects simultaneously, to
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show how both God and art, when actively brought down into human life, illuminate the
mystery and deity implicated in the dialogical Word.
Bakhtin‘s suggestion is provocative because it means that his description of the
author-hero relationship is not simply literary criticism. In principle, the author-hero
relationship articulates how God, as an omniscient and omnipotent author, can descend
into his work(s) as a non-coincidental personality that simultaneously encourages
independent heroes to participate in that work. The tone of this claim may in fact ―verge
on the theological‖ but only insofar as Bakhtin‘s discussions extend beyond immanent
explanations of meaning and liability in human action (Morson & Emerson 61). This is
the essential question of Bakhtin‘s ―Author and Hero.‖ His deep concern for individual,
aesthetic, and answerable action as well as the fragility of human personality means he
must avoid both the propositional language of philosophy and the linguistic formalism so
characteristic of the academic spheres he often inhabits (Emerson 87). Bakhtin argues for
the Word understood as infinite and eternal, thereby rendering theoretical methods of
analysis ineffectual (PDP 300). Only in the merciful sphere of art can he defend both the
importance of answerable action and the free and eternal movement of a divine Word.
Although Sergei Bocharov describes a failing Bakhtin as regretful of his
prevarications regarding the existence of God and the role of the church 26, we must not
assume that Bakhtin, having experienced more political, religious, and ideological
freedom, would have neglected art and literature to write solely about humanity‘s
relationship with God. In fact, Bocharov‘s conversations indicate that Dostoevsky had
become something of an example to Bakhtin of what an author should seek to do through
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See Bocharov, Sergei. Conversations with Bakhtin. PMLA 109.5 1994: 1009-10024.

76

his art, to keep searching without attempting to provide a final or conclusive word
(Bocharov 1012).
In this way, the author-hero relationship in Bakhtin‘s thought operates much like
a Christian parable, as a revealing analogy and formal constraint, keeping both the author
and his reader from having the final say (Patterson 15). The figurative particularity of the
author-hero relationship is as important as its aesthetic signification of a unified principal
of creative and participative activity27. We would do well to acknowledge that what
remains concealed in the author-hero relationship as well as what it discloses is pivotal
for understanding Bakhtin‘s entire body of work. The unity between art and life is in ―the
unity of my answerability,‖ in one‘s willingness to dialogically contend with Bakhtin as
an author, therefore uniting his word with life and transforming it into a call for original
and answerable action (A&A 1).
The subjective instability in the aesthetic categories of personality, meaning, and
truth make Christ an apt companion, or more appropriately, an author-contemplator for
heroes that suffer from ―inner-purposelessness‖ (A&H 115). In the section entitled
―Rhythm‖ in ―Author and Hero,‖ Bakhtin explores the self-consciousness of personhood,
demonstrating the essential human need to be perceived aesthetically, from outside of
one‘s own life. According to Bakhtin, ―I am not the hero of my own life,‖ meaning that
my own personhood cannot be present for me as something with distinguishable
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In Paul Ricoeur‘s Rule of Metaphor, he discusses a similar linkage between analogy and divine
signification highlighting the importance of metaphor in this relationship, as speculative philosophical
discourse is insufficient for the task of explaining how the infinitely divine relates to human reality (see pp.
322-330). The attempt of philosophical discourse to exclude the poetic as a means of understanding this
dynamic is precisely what Bakhtin works to remedy in his call for art and life to be brought together. The
problem is understood not in intellectual terms but in interpersonal discourse. As metaphors ―transfer from
the proper sense to the figurative sense,‖‖, attributes from one subject to another, so we can see how
Bakhtin works in poetic language to bridge the distance between aesthetics and theology to human reality
providing an explanation for both individual consciousness and original creative activity (Ricoeur 331).
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objective significance (A&H 112). I cannot author my own life because all of that which
is available to me, that which gives my life coherency and meaningful form is situated
outside; ―inner movement, inner directedness, and inner experience are, likewise, devoid
of valid determinateness‖ (A&H 112). The understanding of life as something whole,
valuable, and meaningful is only realized through the outside viewpoint of another
person. For any person to understand their life as meaningful, they must have an
―essential point of support in meaning outside the context of my own life-a living creative
and hence, rightful point of support‖ (A&H 113). According to Bakhtin, this outside
perspective must be of special character because it must overcome the fact that there is no
―given that is positive, no present-on-hand that is intrinsically valuable‖ to understand
life as meaningful (A&H 114). Bakhtin speaks of this value deficiency specifically in the
case of personal moral reflection, extending it to epistemological and psychological
perspectives that often serve as external viewpoints for validating inner experience.
However, the only perspective that Bakhtin acknowledges as having the power to turn
―inner purposelessness‖ into ―inner determinateness,‖ is a loving perspective, ―regardless
of meaning whatsoever‖ (A&H 115). This means that the outside viewpoint that Bakhtin
envisions must be subjective in nature, interpersonal, and answerable, or in other words,
incarnate. The eyes that see and confirm my existence must be wholly outside myself, yet
close by, because, ―I cannot love myself as I love the other, in an unmediated way‖
(A&H 48).
Bakhtin situates meaning, personhood, and truth firmly within the scope of human
interactivity, making the integration of Christ as the real personification of truth and love
a compelling proposition for how human personality can be both eternal and yet
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confirmed aesthetically in immanent interpersonal interaction. Christ as God incarnate
acts as a ―noncoinciding consciousness‖ subjectively mediating and sustaining the
tenuous field of dialogic communication. How this occurs inwardly, or with the ―inner
man‖ we must see as described by Bakhtin, ―in relation to verbal art‖ (A&H 92).
Authoring and Heroic Activity
Bakhtin utilizes the concept of rhythm to describe the experience of inward life.
Inward life is experienced not as an object of experience but as a fluid movement
indistinguishable as a series of discrete moments. 28 Inner life, in this sense, is not a series
of meaningful episodes but rather a running together of uninterrupted experience. A
person can attempt to halt this flow by ―stepping outside,‖ epistemologically,
psychologically29 and even in moral self-reflection, but Bakhtin finds that ―such temporal
outsideness with respect to experience is not enough to accomplish an aesthetically
cherishing determination and forming of that experience‖ (A&H 116). This state of inner
experience is what provokes Bakhtin to turn outwards. Not to an outside position of
objective validity, but one of subjective affection. Bakhtin finds that this perspective must
―go beyond the bounds of the whole given experience, beyond the bounds of the whole
that gives meaning to particular experiences, that is, beyond the bounds of the given
experiencing soul‖ (A&H 116).
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Thomas deZengotita has argued that media saturation has created an environment in which the
fluidity of experience inhibits our ability to distinguish significant moments in time. In light of what
Bakhtin claims here it might be said that technology does not create this circumstance but simply reveals it
as a self-evident truth about self-experience. The fluidity of self-experience prevents us from being able to
distinguish on our own what is an important moment. It is only the viewpoints of other people that give us a
framework from climbing out of ―inner purposelessness‖ into a place in which we can find direction and
pinpoint moments in a life that are both memorable and meaningful. The alternative corroborated by
deZengotita is a numbness or stupidity that verges on the insane.
29
A more likely way that we attempt to achieve this outside perspective in contemporary
American society is through technologically enhanced record keeping activities like photography, film, and
social media sites that catalogue life experience.
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The rhythmic experience of inner life carries with it the ought of future
expectation, what a person becomes rather than what a person is in a present moment of
self-experience. According to Bakhtin, the ought-to-be requires an aesthetic justification;
it must be confirmed from the outside because life always moves towards ―new meaning‖
(A&H 122). This ought-to-be is felt in the experience of self-consciousness, and is the
compelling feature of life experience relative to meaning. According to Bakhtin, the
experience of the future is ―hostility‖ towards oneself and towards the present; the future
―stands over against me, over against my whole temporality (everything that is already
present in me), is not a future in the sense of being a temporal continuation of the same
life, but in the sense of being a constant possibility, a constant need to transform my life
formally, to put new meaning into my life‖ (A&H 122).
Overcoming the uninterrupted fluidity of self-experience with something other
than loving intervention of an outside viewpoint results in self-deception. Instead of
remaining within one‘s given inner self-experience, we attempt to step outside of life and
create a holistic meaning for life independent of others. According to Bakhtin, this
debilitating pretense is so damaging that he compares it to sin 30, a damaging of the soul
signaling, not only an existential and psychological degeneration, but a spiritual one as
well (A&H 112). Ruth Coates suggests that this ―fallenness of being‖ is evident in
Bakhtin‘s earliest work, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, and in her discussion Bakhtin‘s
description of a ―damaged universe‖ represents the Christian idea of ―The Fall‖ (Coates
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In this section of ―Author and Hero,‖ (pp. 112-132) Bakhtin notes several times how the activity
of self justification is very much like sin, a fall from community with meaning and an inability to see or
understand one‘s purposeful relationship to life. Just as later Bakhtin will argue that death is a
consummating event in a person‘s life, so also the acknowledgement of one‘s own potential death works in
concert with the activity of new life which is to find meaning of one‘s life in its ―heroic‖ expression in the
life of another.
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30). Here Coate‘s alludes to Bakhtin‘s use of the word ―pretender‖ as a fallen person, one
who ignores his obligation to unify being in responsible action thereby perpetuating ―the
split between the world of endless theoretical possibility and the world of historical
reality‖ (Coates 31). We see a similar theme functioning in Bakhtin‘s discussion of the
author-hero relationship except that here his attention is focused on the unity of a
person‘s ―ought to be‖ unifying ―the temporal and spatial distance separating my interior
being from the meaning and object-to-be-achieved‖ (A&H 124). If we agree with
Bialostosky‘s suggestion that Toward a Philosophy of the Act is Bakhtin‘s rough draft for
―Author and Hero,‖ we are less than surprised to find a more developed discussion of
how the ―Fall‖ in Bakhtin‘s articulation of the author-hero relationship. The Fall in
Christianity requires that human‘s be reconciled to God through Christ, in literature the
hero reconciled to the author. Through this analogy Bakhtin clearly attempts to explicate
how a person can be reconciled with his own divided self, how the ―inner self
contradiction of being‖ can be fulfilled as a meaningful and purposive whole (A&H 124).
The problem of the divided self follows in the tradition of Augustine‘s
Confessions.31 Bakhtin accepts Augustine‘s presupposition that the unity of being
enabling purposeful and determined activity is not immediately at hand. The only selfactivity that can give a ―self-accounting‖ is the religious event of ―anticipating through
faith my justification in God,‖ but this position cannot continuously be maintained within
the experience of ordinary life (A&H 145). Besides the repentant posture of
―confessional self-accounting,‖ the givenness of a life, that which is most readily
apparent as daily experience, represents only negative evaluation; ordinary selfexperience negates the possibility of who I believe I am. Bakhtin writes, ―everything
31

A&H pp. 145
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positive in this unity belongs solely to that which is given to me as a task,‖ meaning what
I am incomplete, and the completion for which I yearn, the understanding of my life as
lived from the vantage point of a wholly unified person, is experientially unavailable as a
resource for self-understanding (A&H 127). For Bakhtin, a person can artificially
accomplish self-understanding by conceiving of their life as a task yet to be achieved, as
a future event.32 However, the future is also unavailable and not something we have at
hand. Bakhtin reaffirms this difficult truth, stating ―the real center of gravity of my own
self determination is located solely in the future‖ and compounds the uncertainty of
temporal existence by locating that which collects not only our life, but our sense of
meaning and personhood just out of reach in the moment beyond immediate self
experience (A&H 127). Bakhtin describes this striving as a kind of hopefulness, not a
hopefulness of positive expectation but one of ―rightful folly or insanity‖ (A&H 127).
Bakhtin suggests that our cognizance of this ―insanity‖ prompts two very different
responses. Out of shame, a person engages in prideful self-possession and ―believes
insanely and inexpressibly in my own non-coincidence with the ―inner givenness of
myself‖ in an attempt to ―count and add up all of myself, saying: this is all of me, there is
nothing more anywhere else or in anything else; I already exist in full‖ (A&H 127).
Alternatively, one loses all sense of unique personhood and attempts to become whole by
finding ―refuge in another and to assemble—out of the other—the scattered pieces of my
own givenness, in order to produce from them a parasitically consummated unity in the
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In letter fifteen of his book Screwtape Letters, C.S. Lewis writing as the voice of a tempting
demon describes a similar scenario in which human beings, who should instead be concerned with the
present and eternity, are encouraged to focus on the future which best produces sinful anxiety and a general
dissatisfaction with one‘s life.
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others soul using the others resources. Thus, the spirit breaks up the soul from within
itself‖ (A&H 126).33
Bakhtin finds that neither of these typical responses can be the means through
which we truly discover and enjoy whole personhood. For Bakhtin, the primary
deficiency in both of these approaches is their exclusive temporality34 because ―a
temporally consummated life is a life without hope from the standpoint of meaning‖
(A&H 127). Both of these attempts at self-collection, one an act of individualistic hubris
and the other self-negation, are bound by temporality and therefore cannot provide that
essential outside viewpoint that principally unites the meaning of my life to the
experience and activity of living it. The experience of future orientation and our inability
to situate ourselves within the infinite expanse of possibility creates this hopeful insanity.
Bakhtin reiterates this truth in the following passage, resolving that it is only from an
outside position that this problem of personality or self-dispersion finds unification. He
writes:
I cannot, axiologically, fit my whole life into time—I cannot justify it and
consummate it in full within the dimension of time. A temporally consummated
life is a life without hope from the standpoint of meaning that keeps it in motion.
From within itself, such a life is hopeless; it is only from the outside that a

33

There is an interesting parallel here between what Bakhtin describes and what Sherry Turkle
argues in her recent book, Alone Together. Turkle posits that contemporary forms of mediated
communication activity strive for connection, but not conversation. Instead we find that the words we
receive from other people are only fragments of a conversation, but do not add up to the complete
experience of interaction with others in language. What we are left with is only parts and pieces of a
person‘s speech and resort to collecting these as a means of generating a sense of selfhood and personality.
She reiterates this point by emphasizing a growing dissatisfaction with true solitude, because it is in these
moments that we are required to ―collect ourselves.‖
34
See Troup, Calvin L. Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s
Confessions. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. Print. p. 169
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cherishing justification may be bestowed on it—regardless of unattained meaning.
(A&H 127)
Here we see that it is only through the loving justification of another person that I
orient myself in the rhythmic fluidity of self-experience. Bakhtin sees this most clearly in
the deathbed confession, in which ―I turn to the outside of myself and surrender myself to
the mercy of the other‖ (A&H 128).
Bakhtin‘s best description of the event of self-consummation emerges when he
shifts his attention from the person striving for wholeness to describe how the person who
makes this a reality for another. By looking at and cherishing another I objectify the
infinite nature of another‘s self experience and see him as whole. Not only does my gaze
consider the body complete and concretely objective, I as a contemplator place the person
contemplated in a steadily present temporal context relative to his own position. I can see
the outer flesh of the other hero‘s body as an object signifying every one of his life
events, the constituent parts of his personhood (inner flesh) in perspective as a concrete
and meaningful whole. This ―cherishing contemplation‖ is the act by which the desire for
new birth, (being an active human subject rather than a passive static object) the
phenomenon that the contemplating author experiences in the hopefulness of his own
life-as-task, is temporally realized by the other. It is only in relationship with another
person, he with outside authority and I as his hero, can this also occur for myself because
the form of this aesthetic event is ―the result of the interaction between the hero and the
author‖ (A&H 84).
Bakhtin‘s emphasis on the interpersonal nature of this interaction demonstrates
his insistence that the event of consolidating one‘s person into a meaningful whole, or a
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complete personality, is not a transcendent event or an escape from temporality. A person
can attempt to voyeuristically escape reality by imagining the experience of another
person‘s life, but this is neither an answerable act nor loving contemplation. Bakhtin
argues that it is only ―in the flesh‖ that one can consummate another, because it is only
from within oneself that a person can engage in answerable action. It is only through this
relationship with others that a person can orient himself in a determined and purposeful
way. This is evident in Bakhtin‘s description of our hopeful desire for new birth. Through
the sympathetic recognition of his inability to consummate himself as whole, a person
recognizes this same ―insanity of not coinciding‖ in others (A&H 128). Only by
remaining within my own lived experience, remaining outside another and in my own
flesh can I, like an author, provide the viewpoint necessary to meaningfully objectify and
consummate another‘s inwardly experienced life (A&H 84). Bakhtin even goes so far as
to claim that ―even God had to incarnate himself in order to bestow mercy, to suffer, to
forgive- had to descend, as it were, from the abstract standpoint of justice‖ to engage
humanity interpersonally, from a particular bodily position (A&H 129).
This is a crucial passage for understanding how Bakhtin envisions incarnation as
exemplary for how aesthetic meaning provides a stable context for orienting personhood.
It is only through another‘s loving incarnate act, not through abstract theory or ideology
that we can emerge from the fluidity of our own self-experience into an articulate world
as a whole and consummate person. This is where Bakhtin‘s description of the act of
authoring emphasizes the Incarnation and Christ as important elements for understanding
the author-hero relationship.
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The very real presence of Christ as a human person demonstrates Bakhtin‘s turn
away from ideological frameworks instead emphasizing the incarnate nature of human
being. Bakhtin‘s discussion of authoring follows his primary argument in Toward a
Philosophy of the Act, where he critiques the inability of abstract ethics and aesthetics to
meaningfully answer the question of human sympathy and answerable action. Here Christ
serves as both a demonstration of Bakhtin‘s claims as well as a genuinely outside position
immediately personal in the historical reality of Christ‘s humanity. Christ‘s humiliation
signifies the humility necessary for overcoming the hopeful insanity of existence. By
placing myself at the mercy of another‘s word, because this word is another‘s word and
not my own, I am reborn, experiencing a new meaningful life as whole person. It is for
this reason that Bakhtin describes one‘s own word taking on the tone of ―prayer and
penitence‖ (A&H 145). I desperately need the gift of another person‘s word because
―pure solitary self-accounting is impossible‖ (A&H 144).
The Third Person and Authoring
Bakhtin‘s turn to Christ as the principle example of what might be described as
the self-experience of sympathetic humility, gracefully illustrates an important
simultaneity in his thinking. Bakhtin‘s historical survey of intellectual attitudes toward
the body position Christ as prime example of a seemingly impossible unity, a ―synthesis
of unique depth‖ (A&H 57). He writes:
[In Christ] the synthesis of ethical solipsism (man‘s infinite severity towards
himself, i.e. immaculately pure relationship to oneself) with ethical-aesthetic
kindness toward the other. For the first time there appeared an infinitely deepened
I-for-myself—not a cold I-for-myself, but one of boundless kindness toward the
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other; and I-for-myself that renders full justice to the other as such, disclosing and
affirming the other‘s axiological distinctiveness in all its fullness (A&H 56).
Bakhtin‘s description of Christ includes a double paradox. First, divinity relating
personally and temporally and second the willing sacrifice of the sovereign position.
Bakhtin elsewhere demonstrates that personhood exists between the abyss of selfnegation and a self-imposed ―interpersonal colonization,‖ but here we witness a synthesis
of both positions in the single person of Jesus Christ (Arnett, Fritz & Holba 124).
According to Bakhtin, Christ serves as principal example, not only as a synthesis of the
ethical dilemma (being for myself while simultaneously being for others) but also the
dilemma of preserving identity in the act of self-compromising sympathy. Even though I
submit to the mercy of others, the person of Christ offers the possibility of relationship
with an outside viewpoint dialogically preserving and stabilizing personhood both
temporally and eternally.
Michel Foucault captures this same idea in his analysis of letters between early
Christians arguing that these texts operated as an outside position that ordered the soul of
the author and reader enabling a much desired rebirth: ―a matter of dislodging the hidden
impulses from the inner recesses of the soul, thus enabling oneself to break free from
them‖ (Foucault 212). Foucault posits that the interaction with the text was akin to
speaking to a present person, provoking and promoting the reformation of both inner
spirit and outward action.
Patterson furthers this theme in Bakhtin‘s work by presenting the carnival
described in Bakhtin‘s Rabelais as the condition of the world into which the Word, Jesus
Christ, descended. The Incarnation becomes a principle pattern for authoring and
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answerable action. Patterson identifies authoring as facilitating ―rebirth.‖ Much like
writing is a formally creative act, so also answerable action makes something new by
bringing formal change to dispersive and decentered persons. Humanity‘s ability to create
in this way is not simply a matter of personal expression or spiritual inspiration. It is
substantially dependent on a ―profound belief in a higher truth‖ and a ―responsibility to
the Creator, who is the source of meaning (Patterson 28). Patterson makes an important
discovery in Bakhtin‘s early descriptions of the author in ―Author and Hero.‖ It is not
enough to understand the author-hero relationship as outlining the relationship between
self and other but must be considered in light of the presence of a third person in the
interaction. This third person is the author, ―the author as creator will help us gain insight
into the author-as-person, and only after that will the author-person‘s comments about his
creative activity acquire illuminating and complementary significance‖ (A&H 8).
The author-hero relationship is not simply a description of the self- other
dialectic. If this were the case, the ethical nature of this relationship would be realized in
Bakhtin‘s personalization of general aesthetics introducing the author-hero dynamic as a
primary point of orientation. Instead Bakhtin indicates that interaction between self and
other must be justified by a third person that objectifies and gives meaning to the
interaction of the first two persons (A&H 74-75). In the text of human utterances,
Bakhtin locates the interaction of not two, but three personalities. To speak of this
generally Bakhtin must turn to the relationship in its principle form.
Bakhtin‘s discovery of the third person appears early on in ―Author and Hero,‖
but it is not fully articulated until the appearance of the term ―super-addressee‖ in
Bakhtin‘s later essay, ―The Problem of Speech Genres,‖ published in English in the
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collection Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (Problem of the Text). What the superaddressee signifies is the substantive and constitutive role of the third person making
meaning as it relates to human discourse and the directedness of the spoken word. Instead
of the author-hero functioning dialectically in Bakhtin‘s work, we have the authorcreator, the author-person, and the hero distinguished as a community connected by
dialogic activity. Bakhtin makes it clear, however, that before we can understand the role
of the author-person, we must first understand the ―essentially necessary, comprehensive,
creative reaction of the author to the hero, only when we have understood the principle of
seeing the hero that engenders the hero as a determinate whole‖ (A&H 8).
From a purely immanent perspective, seeing the hero from outside the plane of his
own experience is to see him in relationship with his biographical or sociological
situation. Without a third person as the author-creator valuing and justifying the
interaction between two people, meaning is localized on the temporal plane. This in turn
requires some sort of intellectual or psychological abstraction because there is little else
available to understand and conceptualize a human life as a meaningful whole. Without
this wholly outside (timeless) viewpoint, we characterize personality as either a selfpossessed essential characteristic or an accumulation of coincident circumstances while
remaining ignorant of ―the form of experiencing it within the whole of life and the world‖
(A&H 9).
Immanent approaches to understanding the creative action of a person results in
―aesthetic confutation,‖ the confusion of an author with his creation, or the author as
constituent of his creation (A&H 10). From this standpoint, the author as person is
indistinguishable from the created context of their life; they are not an individual but a
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conglomerate of particular historical circumstances, circumstances with which they do
not actively interact. In order to avoid this kind of interpersonal schematization, Bakhtin
calls for a more genuine understanding of the author-hero relationship as principal for
understanding how authors might relate to heroes in particular, how a person can really
have authority over others without having the final word.
Bakhtin does not presume to fully describe the character of the author-creator
from whom all discourse is given meaning because this is akin to claiming a full
understanding of the person of God and his particular relationship with every human he
speaks to. He does, however, claim that the image of the author-creator is imprinted on
the hero, and that a study of the speech utterance of the hero is the means by which we
can discern the fundamental nature of the creative act as a distinctive feature of the
author-hero relationship. Bakhtin likens this to the act of writing or the work of an artist
when he says ―the process of creation is altogether in the product created, and the artist
has nothing left to do but to refer us to the work produced‖ and ―he put his whole
essential necessary relationship to the hero into the image of the hero‖ (A&H 7). In fact,
our best glimpse of the author‘s relationship to his hero is seen in his interaction with him
as he gains independence from him; ― in the structure of the active vision of the a hero as
a definite whole, in the structure of his image, in the rhythm disclosing him, in the
structure of intonating, and in the selection of meaning bearing features‖ (A&H 8).
Bakhtin‘s argument for scrutinizing the speech utterance functions as the way to
discern the nature of the author-hero relationship and to understand the creative and
answerable principle that underlies the act of authoring. Without a clear understanding of
this principle relationship and a principle of evaluation to bring meaningful order to the
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centrifugal and centripetal flux of discursive linguistic practice, human speech acts
cannot create personhood and or structure human interaction (A&H 8). Even though
Bakhtin‘s evasiveness in this regard has been characterized as an apophatic theology, it
can also be seen as a fundamental commitment to his vision of an incarnate Word (Poole
151). The incarnate Word intones the author-hero relationship as a highly personal one,
one that occurs on the ―plane of meaning‖ rather than in some ideal or abstract realm
(A&H 6). Bakhtin calls this an ―incarnation of meaning in existence,‖ which stands in
opposition to explanations which would prefer a transcendental or even a theologically
established connection between the divinity of the author and the humanity of his hero
(A&H 10). Rendering this relationship as one that happens in a very real and human
world reaffirms Bakhtin‘s dependence on incarnation as a pivotal principal in his
description of the author-hero relationship. By including the divine person of Christ,
Bakhtin colors the author-hero relationship as one of loving contemplation. Bakhtin
justifies a distinctly outside position for the author writing, ―the author occupies an
intently maintained position outside the hero with respect to every constituent feature of
the hero—a position outside the hero with respect to time, space, value and meaning‖
(A&H 14).
Emerson and others identify the outside position of the author as an important
feature of Bakhtin‘s aesthetics. His understanding of the author, especially the analogy
drawn between the author hero and the God man relationship bring art closer to questions
of human existence with renewed gravity. These affirmations back Bakhtin‘s work as not
only criticism, but also claims of a cosmic order. It is only from the completely outside
position, outside of time, space, meaning, and value that the author can take a holistic
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perspective towards the hero. Through this absolute outside position, the author
accomplishes three important things that Bakhtin believes are essential to creating
individual unique and stable personalities. First, the author-creator‘s position means the
author can ―collect‖ the constituent moments of a hero‘s life into a meaningful whole and
understand the hero comprehensively and completely without bias towards a particular
moment or place in the hero‘s life. In this ―collection,‖ the author is also able to ―justify
and consummate the hero independently of meaning‖ or in other words, the author is able
to interpret the life of the hero as more than the historical circumstance of his life and
imbue value to the hero‘s life regardless of ―the outcome and success of the hero‘s own
forward-directed life‖ (A&H 14). The author‘s position outside of the plane of meaning is
outside human existence but also beyond the time space continuum, in Bakhtin‘s own
words, ―the unitary and unique event of being‖ (A&H 14). This interest in a position of
timelessness is not one that is peculiar to Bakhtin‘s discussion of the author-hero
relationship, but one that runs through much his discussion of the Chronotope in the
novel and later in ―Author and Hero‖ in his critique of individualism.
Bakhtin‘s use of the author-creator‘s ―justification and consummation‖ of the hero
is important imagery that resonates with the salient theme of love characterizing the
author‘s relationship with his hero. The second important feature of the author‘s
relationship to his hero is his ability to stabilize the hero as he relates to the infinite, both
the ―inner infinity‖ of man as well as his relationship to the infinite physical universe.
The author-creator‘s stable position as one which is both constant and personal (in the
figure of Jesus Christ) means that the author provides an important point of orientation
for the hero so that the hero is ―removed from the open unitary and unique event of
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being‖ enabling the author-person to ―stand beside the author—as the author‘s partner in
the event of lived life‖ (A&H 14). This position of the author as outside yet also in
relationship with the hero means that the author has a unique power to relate to the hero
and insuring stability of existence without foreclosing the opportunity for free action. It
also signals a relationship of special significance by which the author:
…places the hero beyond mutual surety, collective liability, and solidary
responsibility and gives birth to him as a new human being on a new plane of
existence—a plane of existence where the hero himself is incapable of being born
for himself through his own power; or in other words, it invests or embodies the
hero in that new flesh which is not essential and does not exist for the hero
himself (A&H 14).
The possibility of new meaning in life is granted by the author-creator‘s position
outside the plane of meaning. The hero, as he lives with the contingencies of both time
and space is able to find a stable point of orientation that not only ensures his position
cosmically. However, the author also comes close in order to give the hero a relative
point of orientation situating him in the present without closing off the freedom of willful
life. According to Bakhtin, the distance of the outside position is not the author‘s
purposeful estrangement but instead a ―loving removal‖ of the author from the ―field of
the hero‘s life‖ (A&H 14-15).
The author-creator as a point of personal orientation is a significant feature of
Bakhtin‘s understanding of the hero‘s position not only with others or with the author,
but also his position towards himself. Bakhtin concurs with Augustine‘s description of
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inner man as an infinite abyss35, who is therefore unable to provide a point of orientation
for himself and cannot independently develop a consistent directedness of life or a
position towards others. Without the position of the author-creator that exists outside the
plane of meaning, there is the ever-present fear of insanity, an insanity that arises from
the inability of hero providing self-sufficient points of orientation for his own life (A&H
128). Bakhtin locates this insanity in the hero‘s desire to find a future point of orientation
with which to orient all present action. Even future points of orientation are unstable
because they are like the present, contingent and immanent without the assuredness that
the author-creator as an immovable yet immediate person offers the hero.
Bakhtin‘s later inquires into the phenomenon of the ―super-addressee‖ and
―loophole addressees‖ shows the human proclivity to locate artificial points of orientation
to steady the contingency of life experience and to justify a self-possessed position of
individual imperialism (PoT 126). In Bakhtin‘s description of this ―insane hope‖
exhibited in death we see the author-hero relationship achieve important clarity as an
analogy for God‘s relationship with mankind. He writes:
This insanity of faith and hope remains the last word of my life: from within
myself in relation to my own givenness—only prayer and penitence are possible,
that is, my givenness ends in a state of indigence (the last thing it can do is—
supplicate and repent; God‘s last word descending upon us is—salvation or
condemnation). My own last word is devoid of any consummating, any positively

35

―Do I then love in another man what I would hate to be myself, when I too am a man? A human
being is an immense abyss, but you, Lord, keep count even of his hairs,†58 and not one of them is lost in
you; yet even his hairs are easier to number than the affections and movements of his heart‖ (St. Augustine
Confessions Book IV)..
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founding energies; it is aesthetically unproductive. In my last word, I turn to the
outside of myself and surrender myself to the mercy of the other (A&H 128).
God, as author-creator, takes a position outside of his creation as a way for those
created to understand the meaning of interpersonal relationship dialogically. This is not
simply a theological statement but Bakhtin‘s demonstration of what the other does for us
on the immanent plane of meaning. The other hears and receives my word. It is not only
God as an omnipotent author that stands against us and assists us in achieving our own
sense of personhood. Instead, humans in God‘s authorial image do this for others.
Bakhtin writes, ―what the other rightfully negates in himself, I rightfully affirm and
preserve in him and in so doing, I give birth to his soul on a new axiological plane of
being‖ (A&H 129). What Bakhtin suggests here is that not only God, but also other
people provide the personal character to an essential outside supporting position
necessary for a stable and meaningful personhood. This is clearly demonstrated in his
description of Christ and his impact not only on history but also on our understanding of
how human discourse creates and then distinguishes us from the infinite background of
aesthetic value.
Personhood or personality is not a task to be individually undertaken. On the
contrary, personhood means relying substantially on the words of others, be they divine,
human, or both for achieving merciful consummation. Bakhtin‘s position is not one that
ensures or grants people primary ownership of who they are or who they might become.
Instead he emphasizes that it is to whom we turn outside of ourselves and to whose words
we listen that will determine the character and form of our lives.
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Self-authoring is a dubious if not self-deceptive proposition, one that Bakhtin
envisions as wholly unstable for producing the answerable action, the event of orientation
for others. We require more than ―mutual surety, collective liability, and solidary
responsibility‖ (A&H 14). We cannot truly depend on others that live similarly temporal
lives to provide the necessary constancy for coherent personhood. We must have a person
truly outside the sphere of human meaning and discourse that can preserve what is both
real and true in the heteroglossic cacophony of human diversity. Bakhtin turns to the
divine yet human person of Christ to exemplify the importance of his claim providing a
principle example of how this can actually be achieved. If God is the one who can truly
justify human beings, then the Christian belief that He seeks to provide a immediate yet
outside support of my inwardly experienced life in the person of Christ is both promising
and confirming. This demands that we inquire into our modes of interpersonal
communication, our participation with this Word among us. We must ask if the
intonation of our words conveys ―loving contemplation,‖ embracing those around us with
heroic form.
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Chapter 4: The Aesthetic Act of Authoring
The enigmatic positioning of Christ as principal in Bakhtin‘s theory of dialogue
means that temporality and the fleshly36 nature of personhood factor decisively in his
understanding of the speech utterance and human subjectivity. We have discussed the
appearance of Jesus Christ in ―Author and Hero‖ in figural and theoretical categories but
not yet temporally. The majority of Bakhtin scholars have not yet carefully responded to
the implications of Christ‘s presence in ―Author and Hero‖ as more than an ideal
metaphor. This present attempt would fail to speak a new word regarding the perplexity
of human communication if we were to proceed without specifically inquiring into the
presence of Jesus Christ in Bakhtin‘s concept of incarnate meaning, and Christ‘s special
role in establishing and supporting the graceful freedom from which human beings speak.
In ―Author and Hero‖ Christ appears as the ideal person unifying word with flesh
[both inner and outer] and truth with subjectivity (A&H 56). With several notable
exceptions37, the authoritative scholarly voices conversing about Bakhtin‘s religious
sentiments have decided either purposefully or tacitly, that the appearance of Christ is

36

Bakhtin‘s use of ―flesh‖ does not follow the common dichotomous distinction between the spirit
and the body. Although this might be construed with Pauline discussions of the flesh opposed to the spirit
Bakhtin is talking specifically about the bodily nature of human experience and that without enclosing flesh
both the inner and outer form of human personhood is unrealizable. In this case, flesh has a
phenomenological focus rather than a theological one.
37
The notable exceptions are Graham Pechey in his book Bakhtin: The Word in the World,
Malcolm V. Jones Reading Dostoevsky after Bakhtin and Ruth Coates‘s Christianity in Bakhtin: God and
the Exiled Author. All three authors give considerable weight to the to the role of Christ in Bakhtin‘s theory
identifying him as an essential and perhaps the origin of Bakhtin‘s view on language and dialogue. Further
reading see ―Philosophy and Theology‖ in Pechey‘s Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World. Jones
approach to Bakhtin is through his mutual interest in the work of Dostoevsky but believes that Bakhtin‘s
views are congruent with his own stating: “Dostoevsky clearly inclines toward the view that a realization of
the ‗true ideal‘ based on the image of Christ preserved by the Russian monasteries, was the best guarantee
of stability in human relationships and of the ability to cope emotionally and intellectually with
disturbances from external sources‖ (192). Coates project is most pointedly directed at this lack in Bakhtin
scholarship by disclosing salient themes that she believes are directly related to the broader doctrines of
Christian theology.
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primarily categorical or no more than a poetic suggestion of Bakhtin‘s personal beliefs
(Coates 21). Bakhtin favored a profoundly personalist viewpoint but this tenor of
relativity in his perspective should not be translated as ambivalence towards eternal truth
and the role Christ‘s incarnation plays in truth‘s corporal revelation. Christ‘s material and
divine subjectivity is an essential and logical support for Bakhtin‘s position. Through
Christ‘s life, death and resurrection He becomes the one person who can perfectly
incarnate aesthetic value redefining and realizing the synthesis of personality, time, truth
and reality within the speech act. The importance of Christ as the real/representative
event in which truth is revealed appears in both Toward a Philosophy of the Act and
―Author and Hero‖ even reverberating through to Bakhtin‘s discussions of the novel in
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Contending with his contemporaries, Bakhtin points
out that Dostoevsky‘s novels were never merely ideology embodied in characters but
instead incarnational, a true attempt to phenomenologically depict ―truth in itself‖
presented ―in the spirit of Christian ideology, as incarnated in Christ: that is he
[Dostoevsky] presents it [truth] as a personality entering into relationship with other
personalities (PDP 32). Truth is revealed in flesh, not in the ideal or transcendental nature
of intellection. Much like incarnation is understood as word in fleshly form, Bakhtin
models his notion of revealed truth as occurring in the utterances of living human beings,
in the interaction of the fleshly word revealing and sustaining both the boundaries of the
body and the boundaries of personality. This truthful word mercifully differentiates one
person from another. In fact, only in this unification are dialogic relations possible, ―if an
experience or a deed does not pretend to some signifying power
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(agreement/disagreement), but only to reality (evaluation) then the dialogic relationship
can be minimal‖ (TRDB Bakhtin 286).
Ruth Coates points out that for Bakhtin, incarnation is ―the incorporation of the
abstract realm of truth into the concrete ‗event of being‘ by the responsible human agent‖
(Coates 33). In Bakhtin‘s Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Coates identifies Christ as the
epitome of responsible action, action that unifies reality with truth. In this way
incarnation signifies the answerable act‘s relationship to time. In the answerable act, the
concepts of personality and time are brought together demonstrating that to have truly
individual consciousness, one must speak or dialogue from a unique place within time.
Christ offers a unique example of this harmony, in which one must be fully embedded in
the world to be seen as truly separate from it (Coates 35). Truth relates to human
existence in its subjection to the disunity of the world manifest in a particular person‘s
speech and act.
Caryl Emerson reinforces this theme in her interpretation of Bakhtin‘s concept of
sympathy filtered through the lens of his physical suffering. The truth of her
interpretation leverages the very real circumstances of Bakhtin‘s diseased bones to show
how his aesthetics were ―born of the ill and hurting body‖ (Emerson, ―Next Hundred‖ 6).
Emerson connects this suffering to Bakhtin‘s view of the human condition, a condition in
which one grapples with a hurt that originates ―from the inside‖ (Emerson, ―Next
Hundred‖ 6). These material circumstances of Bakhtin‘s own life 38 coupled with his
fundamental interest in human personality cloth his viewpoint with significant substance.
The life and body of Christ are paradigmatic for Bakhtin‘s view of dialogue as Christ
38

For much of his life Bakhtin suffered from osteomyelitis in his upper thigh, a degenerative bone disease
that left him crippled with substantial pain for a good part of his life. The further development of the
disease made it necessary to amputate his leg after which his health is reported to have improved.
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personifies the ideal acts of both authoring and heroism. Emerson, perhaps intuitively,
connects the body of Bakhtin the author to the body of his creative work. However,
Bakhtin‘s own bodily suffering is not textually imaged as a discourse on the prison of
physical pain but rather affirms the body‘s significance for the word. The parallel
between these truths of Bakhtin‘s own life and his dependence on the life of Christ as
principal analogy creates new eyes and ears for Bakhtin‘s vision in ―Author and Hero‖.
The most remarkable point of relationship in Bakhtin‘s development of human dialogue
as an event distinctly connects to the historical event of Christ‘s life. This historical event
redresses the human speech act as an event of self-sacrifice resulting in another‘s rebirth.
Speech as an incarnate act and truth coupled with an uttered word authorizes the relative
position of being wholly outside another‘s body yet is also able to penetrate this boundary
to revive the soul (A&H 129). This is principally a sacrificial act because one must first
discard concern for one‘s own corporal life in order to truly achieve this for another.
The suggestion that Christ, the person, is translated into only an emblem or
metaphor in Bakhtin‘s work undermines His role as the source of the mediatory word
stabilizing the act of self-sacrificial love against the ―I-for-myself‖ (A&H 56). Bakhtin
makes this case quite confidently writing that ―This world, the world in which the event
of Christ‘s life and death was accomplished, both in the fact and in the meaning of his life
and death—this world is fundamentally and essentially indeterminable either in
theoretical categories or in categories of historical cognition or through aesthetic
intuition‖ (TPA 16). Bakhtin quite clearly refutes the tendency to read the life of a
person, even the person of Christ, as an ideological, doctrinal, or metaphoric category
that can be wholly understood through comparisons to historical periods and/or aesthetic

100

values. This inclination reduces the depth of human personality, which according to
Bakhtin is immortal and does not die (TRDB 300). Christ is the true image of word as
personality, truth within a person, an author that is ―essentially on the same terms‖ as his
heroes and yet ―holds the reins between the ideal dialogue of the work and the actual
dialogue of reality‖ (TRDB 298).
Such explicit connections between the real living existence and personhood of
Christ with the true coherency of Bakhtin‘s claims have yet to be recognized and ratified
by most Bakhtin scholars. Ruth Coates acknowledges this opaque yet important
association and outlines in ―Author and Hero‖ the aspects of Christ‘s life that enrich our
understanding of the author-hero relationship. She states, ―Bakhtin‘s understanding of
God and Christianity form the organizing center for his phenomenological analysis of the
self/other relation‖ (Coates 39). Coates brings to light the design of Bakhtin‘s discussion
situated around the fundamental themes of sin, sacrifice and forgiveness. While sin
represents the unwillingness to recognize the interdependency and necessity of human
existence, the speech act becomes the graceful sacrifice of forgiveness (A&H 49). Here
Bakhtin works against the speech act understood as an act of self-expression, which
connotes self-authorship. Rather he asserts, ―I myself cannot be the author of my own
value; just as I cannot lift myself by my own hair‖ (A&H 55).
Bakhtin develops this notion of speech as an act of forgiveness by critiquing an
aesthetic of self-expression finding it detrimental not only to interpersonal relationship,
but also the potential of creative activity. According to Bakhtin, the primary flaws of an
expressive aesthetic are one, it does not provide a position by which to relate to an artistic
work as a whole and second, does not provide the means for applying formal qualities to
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an artistic work enabling expression of the work‘s value as a shared phenomenon
occurring between the author, hero and contemplator of the work (A&H 65-67). Both of
these deficiencies rotate around Bakhtin‘s primary concern, the unique inner life of each
participant protected and enriched by the activity of others around them.
For example, he asks how a reader might aesthetically relate to the
quintessentially tragic life of Oedipus. In a strikingly compassionate description of
Oedipus‘s life Bakhtin introduces the problem of how Oedipus can be understood as
tragic from within the story itself. Bakhtin concludes that this is impossible without
Oedipus‘s life becoming a mere facet of ―the world of my fantasies about myself or the
dream world, as I myself experience these worlds, and in which I, as their hero, am not
expressed outwardly‖ (A&H 71). As my experience of Oedipus‘s life as an expression of
sympathy becomes merely another aspect of my own self-experience my ability to
understand its tragic value is impoverished. The collapse of my ability to understand
―tragic‖ as an aesthetic value reduces Oedipus to a feeling or complex of my own life
rather than a person independent of my own inner experience with his own soul and own
inner self experience. In other words, the aesthetic value ―tragedy‖ that formerly provided
the means by which I understand the life of Oedipus and his relationship to my own life
ceases to provide that formal boundary (tragic) that mediates our interaction. Aptly,
Bakhtin shows almost more concern for Oedipus as a fictional character than for the
reader of his story, demonstrating that diminishing the aesthetically valuable nature of
our relationship means ―I cease to enrich the event of his [Oedipus‘] life by providing a
new, creative standpoint, a standpoint inaccessible to Oedipus himself from his own
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unique place. In other words, I cease to enrich the event of his life as an
author/contemplator‖ (A&H 71).
Bakhtin‘s concern for Oedipus as a vulnerable hero might strike the literary critic
as peculiar. However, this not only demonstrates Bakhtin‘s defense of the human
personality as sacred, but also shows how our disposition towards personhood influences
the creative and interpretive capacities of symbolic speech activity. This is likely why
Bakhtin wishes to marry art to life, so that they are seen as inseparable, each informing
the other in mutually encouraging relationship (A&H 71). Realizing the importance of an
authorial position that can provide meaning for the tragedy in life not only sustains
important boundaries between persons, but also opens the door for speech acts of
redemption and forgiveness. Here Bakhtin implicitly presents the question of how a man
guilty of patricide and incest can be forgiven, subtly yet poignantly undermining an
interpretation of Oedipus‘s life as marked off by fate and instead makes him the recipient
of grace by a reader who, with Sophocles, becomes a merciful author/contemplator. In
Bakhtin‘s words,
―In the whole of a tragedy as an artistic event, it is the author/contemplator
who is active, whereas the heroes are passive; they are the ones who are saved and
redeemed through aesthetic salvation. If the author/contemplator were to lose his
firm and active position outside each of the dramatis personae, if he were to
merge with them, the artistic event and the artistic whole as such, i.e., the whole
in which he, as a creative independent person, is an indispensable constituent,
would disintegrate. Oedipus would be left alone with himself, unsaved and
unredeemed aesthetically; life would not be consummated and justified on the
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axiological plan that is different from the one on which it actually unfolded for the
one who lived it…‖(A&H 71-72).
Two themes evident in this quotation further our understanding of Bakhtin‘s advocacy for
resurrecting the relationship between art and life. First, we see the essential importance of
the author‘s position outside the experiential plane of his heroes and second, that this
outside position is what confirms the possibility of a tragic and seemingly hopeless
existence being meaningfully redeemed as valuable. An expressivist theory of creative
action excludes the outside position and therefore thwarts the creative expression of
contemplating and valuing a work or a person‘s life from the outside (A&H 73). The
outside position that the reader takes towards the novel‘s hero is mercifully reformative
because it extends the possible trajectories a person‘s life can take in new directions not
subject to the intention of the author or even the structure of fateful narrative. Bakhtin
does not presume that characters are somehow mystically lifted from the page. Instead
they are given new weightiness as their life is ―co-experienced‖ by the reader, who is a
potential participant in original meaning that did not exist before in the hero‘s initial
relationship with the author or past readers (A&H 105). In other words, sustained life
―becomes imaged life only in the active and creative contemplation of a spectator (A&H
75).
The outside position that Bakhtin advocates as the only position whereby a person
has their existence re-imagined as something other than unjustified ―hopeful insanity‖ is
essential for his notion of ―sympathetic co-experiencing‖ (A&H 81). Sympathy is
aesthetic rather than an ethic. An ethical act requires that a person give up the authority
outside a person‘s life experience (inward and outward) from which they are able to
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attribute value to it and approach consolation as an intent task. This outside position is the
only position from which I can truly sympathize with another person, the only position
that ―radically alters the entire emotional-volitional structure of the hero‘s inward
experience, imparting an entirely different coloring or tonality to it (A&H 81).
Bakhtin‘s discussion of Oedipus introduces a question that reunites his discussion
of aesthetics with life, not only a life bound temporally, but a life eternal. It is difficult to
read Bakhtin‘s aesthetic claims without considering their origination in the life and
person of Christ as he asks ―What, then, are the principles of ordering, organizing and
forming the soul (the principles of rendering it whole) in active artistic vision (A&H
101)? The move from selfhood to soul is important because it reinforces the proposition
that Bakhtin is concerned with more than a system of aesthetic evaluation. It also shows
his move away from psychological descriptions of personhood into aesthetic terms that
Bakhtin argues are more apt for describing the eternal character of the soul as it relates to
the spoken word. The premise of Bakhtin‘s aesthetic claims is the same for those he
makes about human existence. Alone a person cannot achieve meaningful life, nor can
they independently establish themselves as a valuable. Bakhtin might be read as a dour
existentialist when he claims ―My own inner life, proceeding in time, is incapable of
consolidating for me into something valuable or precious, into something that should be
preserved and should abide eternally,‖ but he does not proceed without a clear and
distinct hope (A&H 101). This emptiness, this inability to provide independently a
justification and meaningful perspective towards my own life means that I am in need of
saving, aesthetically and spiritually. My soul, that representation of what remains when a
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person‘s body dies, ―descends upon me—like grace upon the sinner, like a gift that is
unmerited and unexpected‖ (A&H 101).
Bakhtin‘s term ―sympathetic co-experiencing‖ describes that activity by which I
am aesthetically saved and likewise can aesthetically save others, ―an aesthetic activity
that gives the unmerited gift of form to an otherwise unconsolidated person‖ (A&H 81).
Because formal value is not intrinsic it must be received, just as the soul receives form
and life from the outside so also my personality, who I am, must be given form by others
who love me. This value that I receive from others is inaccessible independent of this
relationship or in other words, ―sympathetic co-experiencing introduces values into the
co-experienced life that are transgredient to this life‖ (A&H 83). It is important to note
here that Bakhtin likens aesthetic activity to the ability of seeing something as whole, in
the totality of its outer form. According to Bakhtin, ―what makes a reaction specifically
aesthetic is precisely the fact that it is a reaction to the whole of the hero as a human
being, a reaction that assembles all of the cognitive-ethical determinations and valuations
of the hero and consummates them in the form of a unitary and unique whole that is a
concrete, intuitable whole, but also a whole of meaning‖ (A&H 5). This kind of form
giving action cannot be achieved cognitively because ―cognition is indifferent to value
and does not provide us with a concrete human being‖ (A&H 83).
Bakhtin‘s description of sympathetic co-experiencing sounds much different than
ethical suggestions to ―stand in another‘s shoes‖ or ―imagine what it feels like‖ in order
to truly sympathize with others. On the contrary Bakhtin asserts that a person must
maintain their position outside another, should not attempt to imagine but rather give
form to, to image a person‘s suffering and therefore render it aesthetically meaningful.
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Bakhtin rightly recognizes that in instances in which another person‘s suffering is seen by
another person, it is their expression of this suffering that makes it meaningful for a given
relationship and its role in the history of the person‘s life as an event of significance.
Much like a child is told that certain kinds of physical pain are of no consequence, so also
the hero, the one for whom the author stands outside, is in a diminutive position in
regards to the meaning of their own pain. With the authority of adulthood I can render the
pain felt by the child unimportant in the larger scope of a child‘s life: 1) as it relates to the
suffering possible incurred by a body and 2) suffering possible in their life. In this way
the person whose suffering I ―image forth‖ gives form to the meaning of the suffering
that is a result of this interaction, it is the ―result of the interaction between hero and
author‖ (A&H 84). As Bakhtin describes, the person that I give form to is in many ways
passive as I am active. Just as a person who receives a gift must actually be in the
position to receive in order for the object they receive to remain a gift. An object taken or
demanded is no longer a gift, since taking something by force constitutes theft 39 and
demand shows self-asserting activity. In order for a person‘s suffering to be given form,
for it to mean something other than that which is experienced solely by the person who
suffers it must be acknowledged and given meaning by another who observes that pain
and adds to it the weight of consequence. The hero‘s position is then quite tenuous, he is
solely dependent on the author in this regard because ―the hero‘s self activity is incapable
of being an aesthetic self activity: it may comprise (give voice to) need, repentance,
39

Theft in any instance is an individuating act because it takes something that could be offered as
a gift and breaks this bond. It is also a form of selfishness therefore constituting a breach of the inclination
to share. It is not incidental that similar actions relate to a person wanting to ―define themselves‖ without
the aid of others, without receiving the gift of personhood from others. This usually results in distinct acts
of selfishness along with speech habits that promote individuation over concert or cooperation. And yet, at
the same time, this deep need felt by those who believe they can ―author‖ their own life is seen in their
desire to be well regarded and have genuine companionship.
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petition, and even pretensions to recognition by a possible author, but in itself it is
incapable of engendering an aesthetically consummating form‖ (A&H 84).
The author-hero relationship that Bakhtin describes as the principal means by
which people interact sympathetically and give meaning and value to each other creates
difficult yet essential hierarchies for interpersonal interaction. This is a troublesome truth
except for the fact that this aesthetic activity is, according to Bakhtin, only achieved
through the mediation of contemplative love. In fact, the maintenance of the outside
position that possesses the power to give form and meaning to a person‘s suffering is in
itself a loving act. Bakhtin does not naively assume that the mutual achievement of
receiving and giving sympathy is not a struggle. On the contrary he describes this process
as a mutual conquest, a cooperative or ―co-experienced‖ event that is ―imposed as a task‖
(A&H 84). Life as an aesthetic act that lovingly gives meaningful and valuable form to
others ―must be fought for and won by conquest with the work of art by both the author
and the beholder, neither of whom invariably comes out of the struggle a winner. This
conquest can be achieved only if the author/contemplator maintains his intent and loving
position outside the hero‖ (A&H 84). It is love and only love that propels ―sympathetic
co-experiencing‖ and it is this love that preserves the aesthetic nature of this interaction
making it primarily a co-participative act, because it is in the interaction that a
transgredient value is discovered, rendering both participants as whole human beings.
Rhythm and Whole Personhood
The problem of wholeness recalls the original question spurring Bakhtin‘s project.
The discussion above regarding sympathy resonates deeply with the incarnation and the
person of Jesus Christ not only thematically but also in distinctly interpersonal tones.
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Bakhtin asks the question ―what guarantees the inner connection of the constituent
elements of a person?‖ It is clear that he is speaking of more than those common
attributes identified in the human sciences (A&A 1, A&H 4). As we have shown, Bakhtin
describes personhood as a position of tremendous need, not just biological or
psychological need but a ―meaning-related necessity‖ that requires coherent form,
―justifying and consummating‖ the purpose of existence from without (A&H 85). This
requires that we consider Bakhtin‘s understanding of personhood as much more than the
diminutive and immanent self since he presupposes that the personality is immortal
(TRDB 300). It comes as no surprise when Bakhtin begins to relate purposeful or
meaningful life to the condition of soul, an essential constituent of inner personhood. The
question of wholeness reveals Bakhtin‘s rationale for situating his discussion of
personhood within aesthetics stating that ―man, as he exists in art, is man in his totality‖
(A&H 99). Following his claim that the body itself functions as a ―aesthetically
significant moment‖ that becomes an ―plastic-pictorial value‖ Bakhtin addresses the
problem of the soul, how it can exist as similarly outer and inaccessible but formative
value for inwardly experienced life (A&H 100).
Bakhtin‘s specific discussion of the soul is brief and opaque but this is what we
should expect. Bakhtin is framing his entire discussion in aesthetics, not metaphysical or
religious terms, even as he approaches fundamental questions of human existence;
questions only formulated in a value structure transgredient to ―material-literary
contexts‖ and the immanent nature of human activity. The question of the soul is an
―aesthetic phenomenon‖ that lies ―transgredient to the hero‘s self-consciousness‖ (A&H
100). Art embraces the theological and metaphysical as an overarching architectonic, a
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system that is both encompassing and yet open to the variability of human difference
because the ―soul is spirit the way it looks from outside, in the other‖ (A&H 100).
According to Bakhtin, the soul, like the personality ―does not exist for me as an
axiological whole that is given or already present-on-hand in me. In my relationship with
myself I have nothing to do with the soul‖ (A&H 101). We see that being or becoming a
whole person is intimately associated with receiving the gift of the soul much like one
receives the gift of personhood through loving contemplation, the same kind of
contemplative charity that the author has for his hero. Bakhtin asks the same question of
the soul that he does of personality, ―what, then, are the principles of ordering, organizing
and forming the soul (the principles of rendering it whole) in active artistic vision‖ (A&H
100)?
Bakhtin answers his own question by reasserting that the principle means of
understanding the soul as coherent and whole is through the eyes of another. These are
not the eyes of the ubiquitous ―Other,‖ as is generally discussed in disciplinary ethics, but
instead the eyes of a companion who is willing to lovingly contemplate a person‘s soul,
and bestow the gift of meaningful form ―like grace upon a sinner‖ (A&H 101). Although
Bakhtin alludes to the physical dimension of this gaze in his discussion of the human
body as a ―plastic-pictorial value‖ that is also found in the ―physical outward eyes‖ of a
companion he is also speaking of ―inner eyes‖ that look upon the ―exterior of another‘s
soul (the inner flesh of the subtlest kind, as it were)‖ (A&H 100-102). The activity of
lovingly contemplating another‘s soul is what opens the possibility of personhood, makes
possible the ―individual realization and embodiment of meaning, a clothing of meaning in
inner flesh—that which can be idealized, heroicized and rythmicized (A&H 102). In
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other words, in order to be wholly human, one must be incarnate, be embedded in
temporality by and through another‘s loving gaze.
Bakhtin‘s introduction of the term rhythm reveals that time features significantly
in the aesthetic vision necessary for the development of personhood (A&H 112-132). It
also demonstrates that the movement of incarnation as a descent into corporal temporality
is paradigmatic for his theory of aesthetic value. Furthermore, it reminds the reader that
Bakhtin‘s discussion is phenomenological rather than theological. The recognition and
revelation of the importance of Christ in ―Author and Hero‖ is not to attempt to reenvision Bakhtin‘s project as primarily a religious text. On the contrary it is to show that
Bakhtin is deeply committed to the contemporary vicissitudes of lived experience, our
lives lived temporally. 40 Bakhtin does not adhere to a simple version of time but instead
views it in phenomenological and aesthetic categories rejecting the linearity of both
chronology and narrative. Bakhtin locates the importance of temporality around the
author-hero relationship, specifically in the phenomenological experience of time as
experienced by oneself and by another. According to Bakhtin the problem of personality,
and eternity are intertwined because the personality and the soul, as eternal formal
attributes of whole personhood, rely on the limits of temporality and the constraints of
corporal relationship (A&H 101). This reliance is greater than one of aesthetic value
because it presumes the problem of immortality in contrast to the inevitable death of the
body.

40

Calvin L. Troup develops a very similar argument in his interpretation of St. Augustine‘s
Confessions Book XI demonstrating that Augustine‘s use of the incarnation as paradigmatic for his theory
of discourse means that instead of engaging in ―sanctimonious prayer‖ Augustine leans on the incarnate
Word (Jesus Christ) in order to continue a conversation with God that can benefit his readers. An incarnate
disposition means that one remains very much inclined toward temporality even as its limitations are
contrasted by the phenomenological experience and reality of eternity.
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It concerns that individual and valuational whole of inner life proceeding in time
which we experience in the other, and which is described and imaged in art,
words, colors, and sounds; it concerns the soul as situated on one and the same
plane with the other‘s outer body and as indissociable from it in the moment of
death and immortality (resurrection in the flesh) (A&H 100-101).
Whereas one might presume that death functions as a limitation to the extension
of life eternally, Bakhtin posits that the temporal limitations of birth and death operate as
an important boundary, much like the ―plastic-pictorial‖ boundary of the body (A&H 28).
Bakhtin articulates this distinction by showing that the phenomenological experience of
death is different for myself than for another, and that my own death itself is not
categorically available as a formal quality of lived experience. Instead Bakhtin makes
similar claims of these temporal qualities as he does of the physical qualities of a
person‘s body. Bakhtin asserts, ―The whole of my life has no validity within the
axiological context of my own lived life. My birth, my axiological abiding in the world,
and finally, my death are events that occur neither in me nor for me (A&H 105). Bakhtin
shows here that my body, along with my birth and death are not coordinates for me in the
sense that I can use them to make meaning of my life by recognizing them as important
events significant to my own personhood. Instead, the birth of my body, the life lived in
my body, and the death of my body are altogether inaccessible to me, they are instead
―that which temporally encompasses the existence of others (A&H 105).
The language of personal sacrifice dominates Bakhtin‘s discussion of time
because connected to the problem of experiencing personhood are memory and memorial
as formal activities, ―securing and consummating of his personality in the aesthetically
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valid image. The aesthetic categories of giving a form to the inner person are generated,
in essentials, from the emotional-volitional attitude assumed in commemorating the
dead‖ (A&H 106-107). In Bakhtin‘s understanding death becomes an important
constituent of a person‘s ability to become a part of another‘s memory. For Bakhtin the
existential limits of birth and death become the way in which a person‘s life can be given
value, conceived as a whole within time, not separated into discrete events but
understood together as a life ― not in chronological time nor in mathematical time, but in
the emotionally and axiologically ponderable time of lived life that is capable of
becoming musical-rhythmic time‖ (A&H 110). Once again we see Bakhtin eschew
concise philosophical categories for the aesthetic because he is less interested in the
exacting nature of his analysis than he is the ―phenomenological experience that underlies
them‖ (A&H 110). In either case, it is striking to consider that Bakhtin believes that to
truly image someone, to provide for them the formal categories of value that consummate
their life into a meaningful whole, one‘s approach must be as towards one who is, in
essence, already dead (A&H 130-131). Bakhtin goes so far as to say that death itself
functions as an important boundary to lived life of ―inner determinateness‖ because
without it personhood, and the soul are ―not-actualized‖(A&H 111). As already stated, a
person‘s position towards the givenness of en-souled personhood is both ―passive or
receptive (from within itself, the soul can only be ashamed of itself: from without it can
be beautiful and naïve (A&H 111). What this means is that my own life, the life of inner
determinateness ―is born and dies in the world and for the world‖ (A&H 111).
Bakhtin‘s interest in death as an event insignificant for the person dying yet
substantial and important as a temporal coordinate for others further supports the claim
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that Christ‘s appearance as more than a historical figure synthesizes the quandary of
ethical action. Bakhtin‘s entire system is constructed around the truth of Christ‘s birth,
death and resurrection. In fact one might say that Christ, as both human and divine person
is the architectonic around which Bakhtin situates his claims about discourse and
personhood because it is only in the potential truth of this cosmic proposition that his
system of thought attains its oft questioned coherency. The problem of death shows that
temporal establishment of meaning, the substantiation and justification of existence from
within the world alone is insufficient as a way to attribute value to life. According to
Bakhtin, to become a hero, a person whose meaning corresponds with his existence,
requires a position of absolute need and naive passivity. This is not an obligatory
passivity as much as it is a willing subjection—volitional submission. Heroism in these
terms means subjection to the authoritative nature of another that holds the power to
value and consummate my life as it relates to meaning and value. I cannot ―strive to
acquire the significance of authoritative meaning,‖ to become the author of my own life
otherwise the soul ―disintegrates and loses itself in the spirit‖ (A&H 132). To have a soul,
that essence of human being, which Bakhtin pairs with personality, I must receive it as a
gift, and likewise ―the soul is a gift that my spirit bestows upon the other‖ (A&H 132).
According to Bakhtin, in order for the hero to receive the gift of the soul he must
assume a disposition of naiveté and passivity (A&H 136). This means that I am approach
him with the anticipation of this passivity, helplessness in being and ―the inevitable
nonrealization or failure of his entire life in respect to meaning‖ (A&H 130). This
passivity means that I must act, I must take a position of authority towards this person
that I approach so that he can be saved, so that his life can mean and receive its value.
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Bakhtin paints a penetrating picture of the tension in interpersonal relationship, disclosing
the possible power in my authority as the one who brings this gift to another person‘s life.
And yet, the only way to achieve this for another, to give the gift of wholeness, is to
sacrifice my own life and appear to him as a discrete whole completely inserted in time, a
complete life framed by temporal birth and death. In this way I become both author and
hero, author of others lives and yet also the hero of their lives subject to the influence of
their authorship.
Bakhtin concludes his discussion of rhythm by affirming that the sacrifice of life
is the context from which whole human being can be realized and the only act through
which I can experience joy. As an author I am active towards others so that they may
know a truly personal and soulful life and yet to experience that same joy I must become
a hero, I too must ―partake in the justified givenness of being, in the joyful givenness of
being‖ (A&H 136). Of course, as Bakhtin defines it, authoring with its implicit
expectation of bodily sacrifice (to live as if already dead) means that heroism may be a
much-preferred state of being because it is as a hero that I am ―most passive‖ and in ―the
most defenselessly pitiful condition of being‖ (A&H 136). Only passively can I
experience the joy of existence because it is in this state that I can receive the gift of
personhood and of inner wholeness. In other words, to show concern or have anxiety
about one‘s own happiness thwarts the very possibility of joy. It is only when I become a
sacrificial author, when I act in this role that I can also realize the heroic nature of my
own life, its frailty of its givenness and my life‘s deep necessity; ―Joy is possible for me
only in God or in the world, that is, only where I partake in being in a justified manner
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through the other and for the other, where I am passive and receive a bestowed gift‖
(A&H 136).
Bakhtin‘s description of the human condition both emphasizes and resolves the
impossible dialectic between oneself and others, but not how we might expect. We are
still posed with the questions; how can I be active towards others and yet also passive
towards their authority and who protects a person who, by eschewing self-interest,
becomes vulnerably passive? Bakhtin does attempt to provide definitive answers for
these questions instead refocusing the problem around the joy available to the person who
sacrificially lives for others, and by adopting the meekness of naïve humility. More
importantly, Bakhtin undermines the importance of mediating the power differential in
self/other relationships as a point of concern. To be occupied with one‘s own personhood
means one is attempting self-authorship, which does not exhibit the naïve passivity
necessary for wholeness and joy. Both a joyful existence and wholeness are dependent on
others and cannot be created independently, ―I can celebrate and jubilate in the world and
in God, but not within myself (A&H 137).
Bakhtin reiterates this important claim even more explicitly by characterizing
man‘s speaking relationship with God as an essential formal limit of temporal life and
creative speech activity. In a discussion of what Bakhtin calls ―confessional self
accounting‖ he outlines how the speech act, specifically communication with God, leads
to the realization of whole personhood. Bakhtin prefaces ―confessional self-accounting‖
as speech activity with its opposing type of ―pure solitary self-accounting‖ which he
argues, ―is impossible‖ (A&H 144). On the contrary, ―confessional self-accounting‖
demonstrates the limit of infinite necessity and lack of justification, which opposes
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wholeness of person. Attempting to live outside the boundary created by these existential
and cosmic limitations disables speech and self-consciousness, ―Outside God, outside the
bounds of trust in absolute otherness, self consciousness and self utterance are
impossible, and they are not impossible no because they would be senseless practically,
but because trust in God is an immanent constitutive moment of pure self consciousness
and self expression‖ (A&H 144). Speaking in the presence of God is however ―not
guaranteed, for a guarantee would reduce it to the level of preset-on-hand being‖ (A&H
144).
The lack of guarantee means that speaking life exists between the past and
becoming, in the substantial tension of Being as that essential space within which unique
personhood is realized. This is the only way that bot the ―passive activity‖ or heroism and
authority of action can be performed simultaneously. According to Bakhtin this means
adopting a disposition faith (A&H 144). The faithful position is the only one in which a
person can ―live and gain consciousness‖ (A&H 144). To live is the ―actualization of
faith; the process of life‘s gaining self consciousness is a process of gaining
consciousness of faith (that is, of need and hope, of non self-contentment and of
possibility) (A&H 144). This means that life takes on ―penitent and petitionary tones‖ in
which one looks restively beyond their own existence, outside to a voice that both
confirms and consummates the form of their body, person and soul. The lack of aesthetic
justification means that the general search for meaning is,
…transformed into a need for religious justification: confessional self-accounting
is filled with the need for forgiveness and redemption as an absolutely pure gift
(an unmerited gift), with the need for a mercy and a grace that are totally
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otherworldly in respect to their value. Such justification is not immanent to self –
accounting, but lies beyond its bounds, in the unpredetermined, risk-fraught future
of the actual event of being (A&H 143).
It should not come as a surprise that Bakhtin‘s understanding of ―aesthetic
consummation‖ and ―outside viewpoint‖ resonate with specifically religious intonations.
For Bakhtin, the fact that one is compelled to reflect on the problem of self-consciousness
at all ―testifies in itself that I am not alone in my self accounting, that someone is
interested in me, that someone wants me to be good‖ (A&H 144). The limits of absolute
immanent guarantee and the axiological void of pure self accounting leave personhood
and existence in space that must have ―a certain degree of warmth‖ so that ―my self
consciousness and self utterance could actualize themselves in it, in order that life could
commence‖ (A&H 144). The warmth of this context is utterly dependent on the character
of that outside otherness that is essentially ―axiologically transcendent‖ to my own life
and the experience of inner personhood. Bakhtin does not appear to assert that
confessional self-accounting is the only means by which ones life can be imaged with
valuable form and meaning but confessional self-accounting does present itself as a
compelling way to live with the substantial tensions surrounding naïve passivity as the
requisite position from which my speech takes on ―tones of faith and hope‖ enabling
―aesthetic moments to begin to penetrate into self-accounting‖. In other words it is only
through this passivity to the gift like nature of wholeness that my life can begin to take
form as my own life. This process does not involve even the slightest notion of selfassertion, and we see this most plainly in Bakhtin‘s description of this event as process of
cosmic justification.
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Anticipating through faith my justification in God, I change little by little from
and I-for-myself into the other for God—I become naïve in God. It is at this stage
of religious naiveté that the psalms (as well as other Christian hymns and prayers)
have their place; rhythm becomes possible, a rhythm that cherishes and elevates
the image, etc., in anticipation of the beauty of God, tranquility, concord, and
measure become possible (A&H 145).
It is important to contextualize the previous passage by recalling Bakhtin‘s
reliance on the incarnation as a new way of understanding the presence of God in the
world and the role that the word plays in revealing this presence, not only spiritually but
physically in the person of Jesus Christ. According to Bakhtin the evaluative character of
God in this case, in which he justifies the life of the penitent person, is subject to the
incarnational principle in which ―any valuation is an act of assuming and individual
position in being; even God had to incarnate himself in order to bestow mercy, to suffer,
and to forgive—had to descend as it were from the abstract standpoint of justice (A&H
128). Here we see the theological foundation for Bakhtin‘s thought regarding the
disposition of naïve passivity that he poses as crucial to the realization of human
personhood and wholeness. Also, there is the sustained emphasis on the ―individual
position‖ as the context within I can receive positive evaluation; I can receive ―cherishing
justification‖ from another that is nearby, within the scope of my own life as a present
person. Here Bakhtin is clearly showing that meaningful justification of existence, of a
person‘s being cannot occur abstractly in ideological categories or even from a general
aesthetic but only from a specific aesthetic that is intoned and developed from a particular
point of view, a point of view the contemplates me lovingly in order to provide rhythmic
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form to the ultimate limit of inward experience. As we already noted early Bakhtin
understands God through the event of the incarnation. Instead of an abstract being
representing justice and power he is a human person that approaches humankind with
mercy and love. In Bakhtin‘s words,
[God] is no longer defined essentially as the voice of my conscience, as purity of
my relationship to myself (purity of my self denial of anything given within
myself)… God is now the heavenly Father who is over me and can be merciful to
me and justify my from where I, from within myself, cannot be merciful to myself
and cannot justify myself in principle, as long as I remain pure before myself.
What I must be for the other, God is for me (A&H 56).
Bakhtin view of God as a merciful and just Father images God as personal and
familiar, as a human being that can stand outside, confirm and justify existence from a
particular point of view. Bakhtin‘s use of the incarnation and incarnational language
urges us to conclude that Christ as the Word mediates this relationship of faith and hope,
stabilizing discourse and reaffirming that hope as situated temporally and corporately
rather than purely and ideally (A&H 128). Christ is also revealed as that outside aesthetic
viewpoint that can also be interpersonal and inwardly persuasive. As the incarnate word
Himself Christ demonstrates and represents that true image of the word that both
confirms the outward bodily form as well as the inner flesh of the soul, both of which are
essential constituents of whole personhood. This is an critical connection since the
outside viewpoint that remains transgredient to immanent value systems must also be
able to penetrate the sphere of fleshly life supplying it with meaningful form and the
hope. This is a hope directly related to the ―new life‖ that pushes beyond meaning
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delimited by constraints of existence, a meaning that resituates personhood as significant
outside the immanent coordinates of a person‘s birth, life and death. Whole personhood
must in some way have access to, or be related to this kind of truth, a truth that remains
even in the event of death.
Salvific Dialogue
Bakhtin positions Christ as the person who mediates and synthesizes two
dialectics: 1) self-interest and naïve passivity, and 2) dialectic guaranteed existence and
axiological void. As mediator Christ shifts the paradigm of speech from a system of selfexpressive symbols to the material forming and valuing boundaries of human
personhood. The word is architectonic agency, the body and soul of a human person. This
makes the lines drawn between dialogic speech and the life and person of Christ vivid yet
pliable. The task of locating Christ‘s specific role in Bakhtin‘s thought has likely proven
difficult for scholars because Christ appears both particularly and ubiquitously in the
design of Bakhtin‘s aesthetics.
Bakhtin, consistent with his own design, warns against utilizing the supposed
―inner life‖ of the author as a guide for interpreting his work (A&H 65-67). This makes
the question of Bakhtin‘s personal allegiance to the divine personhood of Christ at least a
distraction and at most a betrayal of his earnest explanation of personality revealed in and
through dialogue. Suitably, Christ functions in Bakhtin‘s work not as theological maxim
but as a dialogic companion. For Bakhtin, ―givenness‖ and what can defined as ―act‖ is
an aesthetic question meaning that his answers lie transgredient or outside the norms of
culture. The outside position ―makes possible (not only physically but morally) what is
impossible for me in myself, namely: the axiological affirmation and acceptance of the
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whole present-on-hand givenness of another interior being‖ (A&H 128). The
incarnational paradigm modeled after the humanity of the divine Christ directs Bakhtin
away from self-expressive communicative activity and towards a speech act that
sacrificially accomplishes for another what every human desperately desires. Bakhtin
writes ― I know that in the other as well there is the same insanity of not coinciding (in
principle) with himself, the same unconsummatedeness of life‖ (A&H 128). Bakhtin
echoes here his description of Christ as ―a synthesis of unique depth‖ not only because in
Christ‘s person we discover the unification of truth, subjectivity, time, and space but also
a synthesis of ―ethical solipsism‖ (A&H 56). Christ is the principle of dialogic
answerability personified, ―an infinitely deepened I-for-myself—not a cold I-for-myself,
but one of boundless kindness towards the other; and I-for-myself that renders full justice
to the other, disclosing and affirming the other‘s axiological distinctiveness in all its
fullness‖ (A&H 56).
Revisiting Emerson‘s interest in the ―ill and hurting body‖ refocuses attention
towards Bakhtin‘s perspective on the inwardly experienced life. Every person must have
―a point of support in meaning outside the context‖ of their own life because ―moral self
reflection knows no given that is positive, no present-on-hand being that is intrinsically
valuable, inasmuch as—from the standpoint of which is yet to be attained (the task to be
accomplished)—and given is always unworthy, something that ought to be‖ (A&H 113114). What Bakhtin makes clear is that the value of a life is given, not as an essential
characteristic of existence, but as a gift from another life that is lived outside of my own.
Meaning that extends beyond the scope self-experience, beyond the horizon of a life‘s
story can only be secured in the activity of another person towards me. In fact, self-
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activity, that act that distinguishes a person from others, can only be ―secured,
determined, lovingly consolidated and measured by a rhythm, and that is accomplished
by the self-activity of another soul, within the encompassing meaning-and-value context
of another soul‖ (A&H 117).
Even death and the spirit of a person sustained in the memories of those who
remember them are insufficient to provide the consummating form necessary for
rendering a life wholly meaningful. A person‘s death as we have shown is what Bakhtin
believes most clearly illumines how the spoken word is not for speaker, but for whom it
is spoken. In a person‘s last word we see an honest turn ―outside of myself‖ in order to
receive either ―salvation or condemnation‖ (A&H 128). Parallel with Bakhtin‘s
invocation of the spiritual salvation one receives from God he considers how this
theological truth is incarnate in he act of ―saving‖ another, ― I enrich the other from the
outside, and he becomes aesthetically significant—becomes a hero‖ (A&H 129). The
imagery of Christ as the sacrificial offering for all humanity is sustained as Bakhtin
articulates how, I, in my answerable act can offer the grace ridden gift of personhood to
another.
I from my own unique place in the event of being, affirm and validate
axiologically the givenness of his being that he himself negates, and his very act
of negation is, for me, no more than a moment in that givenness of his being.
What the other rightfully negates in himself, I rightfully affirm and preserve in
him, and, in so doing, I give birth to his soul on a new axiological plane of being
(A&H 129)
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Bakhtin has turned the philosophical tradition of selfhood upside down. Rather
than asserting selfhood and then attempting to solve the problem of sympathy Bakhtin
questions the self -secured position of personal identity (A&H 50). Without maligning
the ego or the self-interested nature of human activity he maintains that any attempt to
formulate one‘s own selfhood, to manage ones own identity, is impossible without
graceful intervention from the outside. I empathize with others like me because I
recognize that without them, I cannot be a subject, only an object. Furthermore, I cannot
know what is true or meaningful nor understand the trajectory of being without the
fleshly coordinates provided by a companion. In a brief historical survey of attitudes
towards the body Bakhtin confirms the necessity of confessing this need and subjecting
oneself to this loving affirmation. He writes:
Finally, the idea of grace as the bestowal—from the outside—of lovingly merciful
acceptance and justification of the given, as of that which is in principle sinful
and, therefore, cannot be surmounted from within itself. This includes the
associated idea (total and utter penitence) and absolution. From within my own
penitence, there is negation of the whole of myself; from outside myself (God is
the other), there is loving mercy and restoration. In himself, a human being can
only repent; and only the other can give absolution. (A&H 57)
Here the image of the incarnation is brought fully into view presenting the
humility of attitude required to receive graceful confirmation. The impossibility of selfconstructed personhood means that I must receive from the outside that which cannot be
given to oneself, by oneself (A&H 50). In essence Bakhtin questions the foundation of
Cartesian self-sufficiency, which has retained its original assertion in the theoretical
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presumptions of identity management and self-concept. Incarnation reverses this
abstracted version of human experience. Descartes subdued the body and sense
experience in order to make his initial claim of existence. Bakhtin alternatively follows
that incarnational paradigm which infuses the body with value claiming ―even God had to
incarnate himself in order to bestow mercy, to suffer, and to forgive—had to descend as it
were, from the abstract standpoint of justice‖ (A&H 129). God becomes something other
than an abstract concept of ideality, and becomes instead the other worldly person of
Jesus Christ inhabiting the plane of meaning in order to confirm and establish earthly
position that cannot be immanently achieved. ―God is no longer defined as the voice of
conscience‖ but is instead one ―who is over me and can be merciful to me and justify me
where I, from within myself, cannot be merciful to myself and cannot justify myself in
principle‖ (A&H 56).
These passages in which Bakhtin identifies ―the pertinent components of
Christianity‖ follow his brief yet significant introduction to historical attitudes regarding
the body indicating that without flesh there is no way to understand or realize the true
constituents of personhood (A&H 56). In fact, Bakhtin suggests that our even our
interaction with God post incarnation is a fleshly relationship, one dependent on our
acknowledgement of the body‘s special qualities and limitations. Even the inward life,
the life of inward experience is understood in terms of its fleshly form. The ―inner life‖
which Bakhtin uses interchangeably with ―spirit‖ is differentiated from the human soul
(A&H 101). The soul like selfhood is not given, something that a person possesses or
lays claim to. Instead the ―soul descends upon me—like grace upon a sinner, like a gift
that is unmerited and unexpected‖ (A&H 101). Bakhtin continuously stresses the fragility
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of inner life and personhood even as he defends its existence and its importance for
understanding the meaning of human life. This tenuous nature of subjectivity would
suggest then that truth, as it relates to subjectivity and that it‘s revelation is at best
opaque. How could Bakhtin, who maintains confidence in an eternal truth, situate its
occurrence or revelation in a space between subjects who by all purposes are ―incapable
of consolidating‖ and who upon reflection of their inner life find nothing but an ―eternal
condemnation of the soul‖ (A&H 101)?
Bakhtin grapples with philosophical traditions and aesthetic disciplines that
systematically generalize the human experience of truth and in contrast correlates the
revelation of truth with particular human action (Walters 9). In ―Author and Hero‖
Bakhtin advocates ―aesthetic contemplation‖ as the means of ―giving form‖ or to
―consummate‖ the particular activity of a person as it correlates with a special
subjectivity (TPA 13-14, A&H 130-131). Truth becomes an interactive phenomenon
demonstrating that revelation, or in Bakhtin‘s terms the emergence of form, happens
between two incarnate personalities distinctly answerable and faithfully committed to
truth‘s revelation. In this interaction the ought manifests itself.
Acknowledging the feeble foundation of another‘s personhood is the primary
point of correlation between what Bakhtin understands as the principle unity in human
experience and the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Even the basic outline of the Passion
narrative provides useful context for Bakhtin‘s use of Christ, specifically His taking
bodily form as the key disposition by which self-activity becomes dialogically
answerable and properly authorial. Incarnation as an act itself is a willing subjection to
the limitations and consequent suffering of the human body, both its weaknesses and
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susceptibility to death. It is exactly these attributes that Bakhtin draws on to form his
discussion of the author-hero relationship. For Bakhtin, in light of this truly historic
change, the options for personhood are either placing oneself at the mercy of others (even
those who are unjust), or reentering a fallen and splintered existence founded on nothing
other than a lie (Jones 183). In the particular case of personhood, this lie manifests itself
as self-possession by ―selfishly exploiting my being-for-others for my own sake‖ (A&H
59). This self-possession is counteracted by the principle of incarnation and the ideal
example of Christ in two ways. Theologically we see it demonstrated in Christ‘s salvific
act for all others unifying humanity through his redemptive act. Bakhtin writes ―all
human beings divide for him into himself as the unique one—all other human beings,
into himself as bestowing loving mercy—all others receiving mercy, into himself as the
savior—and all others as the saved, into himself as the one assuming the burden of sin
and expiation—and all others as relived of this burden and redeemed‖ (A&H 56). The
simple act of self-sacrifice should not distract from the complexity of Bakhtin‘s
description here. In fact in Bakhtin‘s integration of Christ he is describing what every
other human being is incapable of because Christ‘s self sacrifice involves an
―immaculately pure relationship to oneself‖ (A&H 56). Simple human self-sacrifice is
impossible without being accompanied by a ―negation of the whole of myself‖ (A&H
57). In His own sacrifice Christ is able to also take a positively active position towards
Himself while simultaneously confirming and supporting all those he relates with.
Christ is not only an example of that prime relationship between I and the other
but also figures as that which unites the body with word, showing that the unity and
companionship between word and flesh is that which gives form and value to the inner
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and outer flesh of others. The word among people is how inner and outer flesh is formed
and valued as the boundary between persons.
Second, Bakhtin demonstrates how Christ‘s individual act in principle
substantiates the possibility of harmonizing and healing others without the natural
possession of divine power. The incarnate principle in the activity of Christ is translated
into a basic juxtaposition in which ―the I and the other are contraposed: for myself—
absolute sacrifice, for the other—loving mercy‖ (A&H 56). Bakhtin‘s example of Christ
cannot be imagined as an activity that is simply imitated. Rather this example operates
much like Auerbach‘s identification of the ―awakening of a new heart and a new spirit‖
exemplified by Peter‘s agony at the betrayal of Christ as not simply an individual
experience but ―the image of man in the highest and deepest and most tragic sense
(Auerbach 41). Auerbach‘s description of Peter is directly contrasted with Bakhtin‘s
description of Christ who becomes both the ideal but also the truest image of human
being. Where Peter represents the absolute divorce of truth, reality, word and body41,
Christ is their inseparable unity. This is how Christ is revealed as the ―immaculately
pure‖ image of ―ethical-aesthetic kindness towards the other‖ (A&H 56).
True Reality
Bakhtin‘s concern with the revelation of truth originates in his desire to locate the
ought in human activity. In Toward a Philosophy of the Act, truth is emergent in the event
of human action, ―the ought arises only in the correlating of truth (valid in itself) with our
act of cognition, and this moment of being correlated is historically a unique moment‖
(TPA 5). Truth as a value that orders human life is only present in the incarnate act, in a
person‘s actual inwardly experienced activity distinguished from simple symbolic
41

Matthew 26:69-75, Mark 15: 66-72, Luke 22: 54-63, John 18:15-18, 25-27 (NIV)
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performance. Bakhtin betrays his pre-modern presuppositions when he states explicitly ―
there are no moral norms that are determinate and valid in themselves as moral norms‖
because moral relativity is the circumstance wherein he draws his conclusion (TPA 6).
Bakhtin grounds his position in ―a moral subiectum42 with a determinate structure and it
is upon him that we have to rely: he will know what is marked by the moral ought and
when, or to be exact: the ought as such‖ (TPA 6). Whether this is particularly understood
as the person of Christ or generally as the acting human, the implications are the same. It
is in the event itself, the unity of the word with the body in correlate action that
determines the ought. In Bakhtin‘s critique of ―content‖ and ―formal‖ ethics he points to
the most common problems manifest in ethical reasoning. Theoretical ethics presumes a
generally measurable human ought and action while simultaneously imagining an
autonomous, non-contingent willfulness. Bakhtin explains:
The will-as-deed produces the law to which it submits, i.e., it dies as an individual
will in its own product. The will describes a circle, it shuts itself in, excluding the
actual-individual and historical-self activity of the performed act. We are dealing
here with the same illusion as in the case of theoretical philosophy: in the latter
we have a self-activity of reason, which my historical and individually answerable
self-activity has nothing in common, and for which this categorical self-activity is
passively obligatory, while in the former the same happens with the will. All this
distorts, at root, the actual moral ought, and does not provide any approach to the
actuality of the act performed. (TPA 26)
Bakhtin‘s primary concern is the persistent focus on the abstraction of inner
thought and theory, an emphasis on what occurs inwardly during an ethical act rather
42

human subject
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than the whole person, inward and outward, in action. According to Bakhtin, ―thinking
theoretically, contemplating aesthetically‖ is the aspect of ethical events that cannot truly
be seen or perceived from outside (TPA 28). It is for this reason that in theoretical ethics
inward particularity must be abstracted and generalized and by this abstraction and
generalization the individual unique personality of a human being is falsely finalized.
Even Kant‘s categorical imperative, which attempts to assert a universal norm through
identifying patterns in cognitive particularity, ends up deemphasizing the outward and
particular and rhythmic nature of the act itself with its inescapable contingencies.
Placing emphasis on the inner experience of the act separates the ought of the act
from its actual answerability and attempts to create a unity with truth from the outside
that re-imposes itself on the acting person. This is not to say that other people should
never impose upon a person, but that abstracted imposition from the outside results in a
person‘s particular compliance without internal agreement or compliance that corrupts
the actuality of a person‘s individual position. In other words, an act in accordance with
abstract ethical value is no longer a truly answerable act. It is for this reason that Bakhtin
articulates several concerns regarding the possibility of human action. First, Bakhtin
opposes theoretical strategies because they ignore the important constraint of outward
perception to evaluate the inner person and second, they do not take into account the
multiplicity of factors that are a constituent of every human act.
Bakhtin believes the ethical nature of an act may be determined but that
philosophical ethics is insufficient for the task. Bakhtin finds little support for his position
in theoretical philosophy and ethics writing, ―we have identified as unfounded and as
essentially hopeless all attempts to orient a first philosophy in relation to the
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content/sense aspect or the objectified product taken in abstraction from the onceoccurrent actual act/deed and its author‖ (TPA 27). It is in this statement that we begin to
see Bakhtin turn from the traditional categories and language of the western philosophical
tradition. In his effort to demonstrate the peculiarity of the ethical act Bakhtin finds that
the approach most commonly adopted in philosophical ethics does not provide the
necessary language or context and is in his own words ―hopeless‖ (TPA 27).
Instead Bakhtin envisions interaction with a ―moral subiectum‖ as the means by
which our actions are deemed answerable and yet retain a radically free character (TPA
6). This is an essential freedom that must be preserved if the ought of human action is to
be preserved. The preservation of the ought means it cannot be segmented into the
cognitive and ethical spheres but must remain surround by aesthetics because of its
inimitable kindness and mercifulness (CMF 279). Bakhtin is clear that the life of the soul,
that outward inner life that forms the actual individuality and responsibility of
personhood depends on this freedom, ―it is a whole that is individual, valuational and
free‖ (A&H 100). The truthful spoken word as a living and on hand person is the primary
means of preserving this freedom facilitating the very real consummation of human
personality.
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Chapter 5: Speaking without Fear
There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear. For fear has to do with
punishment, and whoever fears has not been perfected in love. —1 John 4:18

The triangulated interpersonal arrangement of Bakhtin‘s ―dialogism‖ is essential
for accepting the claim that linguistic interaction with an internally persuasive authority
promotes the freedom of individual consciousness. Bakhtin‘s later texts collected in
Speech Genre and other Late Essays demonstrate the importance of Bakhtin‘s term
―dialogic relations,‖ for elaborating on the author-hero relationship characteristically
sustained by loving contemplation. Specifically, Bakhtin‘s discussion of dialogue in
―Problems of the Text‖ further extend his ideas of authority and personhood for
interpersonal communication scholarship (PoT 127). Bakhtin‘s conception of ―dialogic
relations‖ is an essential precursor to ―dialogic understanding‖ which he describes as,
―the transposition of another‘s experience to an entirely different axiological plane, into a
entirely new category of valuation and forming‖ (A&H 102). The comparison made
between ―dialogic relations‖ and the covenantal nature of understanding proposed by
Bakhtin in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, will help reveal the intersubjective character
of this event. In this early essay we see Bakhtin invoke marital love as the finest
descriptor of the ―emotional–volitional tone‖ necessary to prompt dialogic understanding
(TPA 36).
Being One in the Flesh
Bakhtin‘s discussion of human differentiation emphasizes absolute uniqueness
asserting that no two consciousnesses can synchronously occupy the same plane of
experience unless one of them is sacrificed. At the same time, Bakhtin rejects solipsistic
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alienation as a possible description of reality. In contrast, Bakhtin‘s dialogue shows how
dissimilar people can reach understanding about what is truly real. Distinguishing
between ―unity‖ (as conceptual intelligibility) and ―uniqueness‖ (the common feature of
human experience) Bakhtin argues for an essential disposition necessary for achieving
understanding in the communicative event. According to Bakhtin, faithfulness is the
requisite disposition through which understanding occurs in discursive activity (TPA 38).
Bakhtin differentiates his position from the proposition that perspectival unity is mutual
understanding of value itself stating:
―It is not the content of an obligation that obligates me, but my signature below
it—the fact that at one time I acknowledged or undersigned the given
acknowledgment. And what compelled me to sign at the moment of undersigning
was not the content of the given performed act or deed—to undersignacknowledge it, but only in correlation with my decision to undertake an
obligation—by performing the act of undersigning-acknowledging (TPA 38).
Bakhtin‘s combined ―undersigning-acknowledgment‖ points to an important
relationship. ―Undersigning,‖ indicates an association between my name and the act, a
personal commitment to the answerable nature of speech activity. This concept should
not be mistaken for Hobbes ―social contract.‖43 Instead, Bakhtin argues that,
Such views are radically unsound for the reason we have already adduced when
we discussed the ought. The emotional-volitional tone and the actual valuation
does not relate at all to content as such in its isolation, but relates to it in its
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Bakhtin actually refers to Hobbes in Toward a Philosophy of the Act providing a basic critique
of Hobbes notion of pre social man and the leviathan on pages 35. Also see note 107.
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correlation with me within the once-occurrent event of Being encompassing us
(TPA 35).
Bakhtin emphasizes the act of affirming one‘s own position relative to others rather than
striving to uphold a particular right of contract because of its contentual validity 44. True
action, instead of being an obligatory response to the self-contained validity of a
particular law or ethic, occurs outside any set of reasonable obligations perceived by a
rational cognizing being.
For Bakhtin the ought of commitment is in relative position to others (Holquist
19). This commitment follows an acknowledgement of our dependence on others acting
around us. Bakhtin describes dialogic relationship as preemptive yet simultaneously
revealed in the act of speech. The tone of dialogic relations is not universal nor is it akin
to what some have identified as a primordial echo to care for the Other. It is a tone
distinctly tied to the event of human being resonant in each gesture and every spoken
word. Bakhtin writes:
The word that would more accurately characterize this is faithfulness [being true
to], the way it is used in reference to love or marriage, except that love should not
be understood from the standpoint of the passive consciousness of psychology.
The emotional-volitional tone of a once-occurent actual consciousness is
conveyed more aptly by the word faithfulness [being true to] (TPA 38).
Bakhtin‘s conception of faithfulness is the active commitment found in marital
vows. Covenant love as constitutive of ―dialogic relations‖ presents a significant
proposition as it suggests a preexisting interpersonal relationship disclosed, rather than
44

―Contentual validity‖ in this sense means the actual validity of the principle claim. In this sense
it means the pragmatic reasonability would compel a person to commit to civilized behavior because of
self-interest and the value in organizing against possible threats, which is the basis of Hobbes position.
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determined by the event of dialogue. Contemporary perspectives on marital relationship
classify covenant as private, yet civilly ratified. Currently, continuance of said covenants
is often contingent only per the agreement of consenting persons. We must assume that
these relationships are not the kind Bakhtin is describing simply because his emphasis on
the eternal word exhibits a greater interest in the phenomenological character of vows as
they intone interpersonal discourse,45 the soundness of a non-contingent oath.
Covenantal relationship suggests an interpersonal interactivity between persons
who experience ―common revelation,‖ not egalitarianism. 46 Bakhtin describes this state
of relationship as agreement (PoT 125). Agreements presuppose intentionality; they have
a specific ―emotional-volitional tone‖ from their outset. Covenants unlike contracts are
un-finalized, already in place, confirmed and confirming, reified and reifying speech
activity. 47 In ―Author and Hero‖ Bakhtin reiterates, there are no ―universally valid
criteria‖ for identifying this intonation and instead ―we must vividly feel the presence of
that possible human consciousness to which these moments are transgredient and which
they cherish and bring consummation‖ (A&H 200).

45

Bakhtin‘s use of covenantal relationship to describe the grounds of dialogue is most likely
influenced by the work of Martin Buber who used similar language to describe dialogic encounter in his
book I and Thou. Ronald C. Arnett has more recently extended the notion of covenant as the ground for
dialogue in his discussion of Robert Bellah‘s sociological study of religion in the United States. Arnett
claims that one of the primary problems confronting contemporary communication study is ―broken
covenants‖ and the loss of ―existential trust,‖ a promise to trust others before securing evidence of their
trustworthiness. For further reading see Arnett, Ronald C. ―Religious Communication Scholarship: Going
Nowhere Correctly‖ Journal of Communication and Religion. 33.2 pp. 221-246 and Arnett, Ronald C. and
Pat Arneson. Dialogic Civility in a Cynical Age: Community, Hope and Interpersonal Relationships.
Albany: State University of New York Press. 1999. Pp. 15-17.
46
Cornelius Van Til develops the idea of ―common revelation‖ in his discussions of covenantal
theology as they relate to how covenants are equal in agreement but not in development.
47
This is true at least in the Western ideal of marriage in which the intention to marry happens
prior to the actual statements of vows, and of course we assume that in this case, the marriage is both
indicative but also a verbal confirmation of a preexisting condition of love which has already united the two
persons in bond.
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This covenantal relationship necessary for dialogue is as non-negotiable as our
―non-alibi in Being‖ (TPA 49). However, the working out of the covenant is personal,
participative and unique. Dialogic relations, much like covenant vows are actualized
quite variously depending on participants. As marital relationships are renegotiated the
activity within the relationship is perpetually revitalized by the past yet present intonation
of the vow. A contract is static and suffers from semantic rigor requiring resurrection
through new interpretation. Covenants are constant but responsive to contemporary
constraints of life, negotiated and formalized by dialogue.
In Bakhtin‘s description of covenant love we see an emphasis placed on fidelity
as well as the need for faithfulness to truth. Bakhtin‘s commitment to dialogic
relationship informing human communication means a commitment to truth revealed in
relationship. Subjectively revealed truth does not ―diminish or distort autonomous truth‖
but instead makes truth ―compellently valid‖ demanding a person to ―live from within
oneself‖ and ―affirm one‘s compellent, actual non-alibi in Being‖ (TPA 49).
The compellent quality of dialogic relationship is loving directedness. According
to Bakhtin, loving contemplation of another person is an aesthetic act, an event in which
a person receives value. In other words, a person becomes valuable only when loved, ―I
love him not because he is good, but he is good because I love him‖ (TPA 64). This love
is active and not ―a passive psychological‖ love (TPA 64). In love a person is dialogically
articulated and in this articulation becomes valuable. Covenant love is not a general love
for the Other. It is a particular and subjective love, the only love ―capable of holding and
making fast all multiformity and diversity without losing and dissipating it, without
leaving behind a mere skeleton of basic lines and sense moments‖ and ―is capable of
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generating a sufficiently intent power to encompass and retain the concrete manifoldness
of Being, without impoverishing and schematizing it‖ (TPA 64). The love that intones
Bakhtin‘s description of true acknowledgment is penetratingly personal and cannot be
reduced to an ethic, a commandment, or code. This agreement must be personal,
particular, and various like the intimacy found in marital covenant.
The keeping of covenants agreements is not contingent on reciprocity. A spoken
vow establishes the conditions for further dialogue, a promise of future physical presence
intoning and stabilizing immediately occurring discourse. A covenant has both eternal
(outside) and temporal elements (PoT 109). Covenant vows exclude reciprocity as
grounds for ―being true to‖ because the vow is spoken to, and yet beyond the immediate
addressee (PoT 126). Contract is derivative of covenant but a highly depersonalized form,
not requiring dialogic interaction to retain its temporal validity.48 Contracts are negotiated
and then signed so that an offending party can be held accountable to the contracts
―contentual‖ validity. A contract‘s efficacy is its impersonality making it markedly
different from covenant agreement. Temporal authority adjudicates a contract; a true
covenant vow is witnessed both by an immediate addressee but also by an transgredient
authority. 49 In Bakhtin‘s description of ―aesthetic seeing‖ a third addressee witnesses the
taking of a vow and is an important constituent of the understanding generated in
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In fact, Bakhtin believes that as soon as a word is written down, in essence, it is already dead. In
his notes made between 1970 and 1971 he refers to textual analysis as the dissection of cadavers which has
its own necessity but is at some point is unhelpful for understanding the workings of a living body, or in
this case, the action of the spoken word. See ―From Note Made in 1970-71‖ in Speech Genres and Other
Late Essays. Trans. Vern W. McGee. Eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1986.
49
As religious authority diminishes in its relationship to marriage covenants we see a slow change
in the way these covenants are understood and lived out. The origins of the Anglican Church are a
testament to this shift from church authority in establishing marriage covenants to legal authority. This
dynamic has only increased in recent history making marriage covenants primarily legal agreements rather
than agreements of a covenantal nature that are first and foremost condoned by divine authority.
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agreement (PoT 125). The third person is especially important for covenant agreements
because he witnesses and affirms from outside the interaction. The character of this third
person and his relationship to the agreeing partners is vastly significant for the tone and
nature of the covenant. Bakhtin‘s conception of covenant introduces an interpersonal
vitality through its emphasis on the promise (undersigning) subjectively understood by a
third participant (PoT 125).
In ―Author and Hero‖ Bakhtin describes this understanding as the author‘s role
towards his hero and also the activity of God towards humankind. The love in Bakhtin‘s
description of God as author intends towards humans in graceful, merciful and personal
tones (A&H 56-57). What Bakhtin calls ―sympathetic co-experiencing‖ has significant
power to alter, not only the context of relationship but also the inner life of each
participant. Bakhtin writes, ―This lovelike sympathy radically alters the entire emotionalvolitional structure of the hero‘s inward experience, imparting an entirely different
coloring or tonality to it‖ (A&H 81).
The event of Christ‘s incarnation functions as a principal sign of God‘s love for
humankind. Christ, as God, descends into time and personally relates to humans not out
of necessity, but out of desire.50 Bakhtin employs this principal identifying Jesus Christ
as the ideal sign of incarnate action. First, as an example of how truth descends and is
disseminated by people in speech and second, how someone can absolutely love others
and be positively disinterested in themselves (TPA 64, A&H 56). The principle of marital
covenant realizes even greater meaning when we consider the Biblical metaphor of God‘s
communication with human beings as a groom with his bride, ―as the bridegroom rejoices
over the bride, so shall your God rejoice over you‖ (Isaiah 62:5). God‘s relationship to
50

John 3:16 (ESV)

138

mankind as covenantal is extended in the New Testament where Christ describes the
church as his bride. 51
The covenant in the Biblical description of Christ‘s relationship to humankind and
in Bakhtin‘s recognition of Christ‘s unique attribute of ―un-self interested love‖ reveals
the kind of relationship needed for truly dialogic communication (TPA 64). Bakhtin even
implicates the doctrine of the divine Trinity by identifying a minimum of three
participants in the utterance. Bakhtin strengthens the association between person and
word by locating meaning in the ally/witness of an utterance. Demonstrating this third
person phenomenon in speech activity is the task Bakhtin works to articulate in ―Author
and Hero.‖ He achieves this by moving this articulation of dialogue out of theoretical
experience and into the aesthetic and phenomenological context of the author-hero
relationship.
When Bakhtin writes, ―understanding is always dialogic to some degree‖ he is
making a clear distinction between understanding and comprehension (PoT 121). Bakhtin
suggests that understanding requires more than comprehension because it requires a third
person contemplator. He writes ―[in] explanation there is only one consciousness, one
subject; with comprehension there are two consciousness and two subjects‖ (PoT 111). In
understanding there is a third person outside the communicative interaction generating an
aesthetic context for the utterance. Bakhtin articulates this relationship in ―Author and
Hero‖ through his discussion of the author‘s text and his relationship to the heroes of the
text. A hero‘s interaction with other characters is rendered meaningful and
understandable by the fact that the author observes the particular utterances of the hero in
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the outer aesthetic context.52 Bakhtin writes, ―the author must see all of him in fullness of
the present and admire him as such‖ in order for the hero‘s verbal expressions to have
meaning for himself and within the world of his life‖ (A&H 86). Bakhtin offsets this
differentiation in several ways, highlighting the importance of spatial context as well as
the distinction between the regularity of existential rhythm and the deviation in
intonation. In these instances the particular meaning of verbal expression is understood in
its position towards, against, or along the background of the author‘s vision. It is not
always clear that Bakhtin is highlighting the real presence of a person except that, for
Bakhtin, the word is never separate from voice (PoT 124).
For Bakhtin, the third person viewpoint and the contextualizing nature of their
word on verbal discourse is demonstrated by the fact that all verbal expression is assumed
by the speaker to ―make sense‖ even if misunderstood by the immediate addressee. This
is both a loophole and a superposition. In either case, whenever an utterance is perceived
to be immediately and completely understood (finalized) the more enduring meaning of
the word is impoverished (PoT 126). The possibility of continued understanding beyond
an utterance‘s immediate context invigorates a speech utterance, making the word more
than simply self-expression. This reality places important weight on the character of
whom an utterance is directed towards and how the personality of this appeal intones a
speaker‘s communicative activity. Although Bakhtin views all human communication as
dialogic, he suggests that appeals to certain persons or ideologies can diminish or
52

In fact, a story only has coherency because we are able to see the lives of the characters from the
author‘s point of view. As readers, if we were unable to participate in the author‘s perspective, we would
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the idiosyncratic and often random activities of a child are set against such things as their age or the
psychological, emotional or even normative description of general stages in a child‘s life i.e. ―the terrible
two‘s.‖
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enhance the inherently free activity of human speech. Bakhtin‘s discussion of dialectical
forms of communication such as ―argument, polemics or parody.‖ as ―crude forms‖ of
dialogized speech pinpoints this diminishment because these types emphasize bipartite
discourse without clearly identifying the third voice towards which the speech activity
aesthetically appeals (PoT 121).
The number of persons present in ―dialogic relations‖ should be considered
incalculable because a spoken word projects through the immediate conversation
collecting both speakers historically into the possibility of future relationship, personal
and semantic. The utterance of a single word presents multiple persons because for
Bakhtin ―personality does not require extensive disclosure, -it can be articulated in a
single word, precisely voices (PoT 121). The character of the utterance is simultaneously
common and unique because every person is located on a different experiential plane, a
particular body and voice. Bakhtin suggests understanding is participation in speech
itself, the common yet wholly personal experience of a spoken word. Bakhtin redesigns
the problem of understanding by situating it within the utterance. For Bakhtin the
assumption that the intellectual or psychological meeting of two consciousnesses is the
achievement of understanding is the privation of dialogue and closure to conversation.
Bakhtin‘s descriptions of dialogue prefer subjective versus objective agreement.
Consistent with the claims that understanding is dialogic and requires the presence of as
few as three persons, we see shared meaning in conversation not simply in the words
spoken, or even between the two speaking. Understanding is made possible and
confirmed by the relationship of a third person to the first and second conversant. This
relational subjectivity infuses Bakhtin‘s articulation of dialogue with a generous
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unpredictability regarding the number of persons actually implicated in a conversation.
When Bakhtin claims, ―the word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is not
a duet, but a trio)‖ he makes it clear that both the semantic and relational meaning of a
communicative event is understood by and through the personality of the third person
(PoT 122).
The ramifications of Bakhtin‘s position for the ethics of interpersonal
relationship are difficult to overlook. The supremacy of subjectivity in Bakhtin‘s thought
is not, however, an advocacy for relational or ethical relativism (TPA 9). Ethical
relativism would be contrary to Bakhtin‘s deepest concern regarding the true
answerability of human action, even if this truth differs from the ―objective‖ truth of
empirical science, it is a truth with ―extra-temporal absoluteness‖ (TPA 71). Michael
Holquist interprets Bakhtin‘s understanding of subjectivity through Albert Einstein‘s
notion of relativity writing that Bakhtin‘s view of dialogue overcomes the traditional
limitations of subjectivity (Holquist 19). As Einstein uses the position of the observer to
understand the relativity of time, Bakhtin demonstrates that the position of the third
person in a dialogic event is the point of reference for understanding the value and
meaning between people in conversation. The difference between observing orbiting
bodies and contemplating the interaction of people in conversation is it‘s moral
intonation. Bakhtin notes that ―every utterance is a claim to justice, sincerity, beauty and
truthfulness‖ implicating the role of the third person as the judge of aesthetic value (PoT
123).
Holquist‘s emphasis on the relativity of perspective highlights Bakhtin‘s
differentiation between the objective indifferent observer and an observer who is
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relationally intended towards what he observes with a particular ―emotional-volitional
tone.‖ According to Bakhtin in every work of art we ―feel‖ the presence of the author, the
author‘s tone towards the work and the way he created his work. Of the author he writes,
―we feel him in everything as a pure depicting origin (depicting subject), but not as a
depicted (visible) image (PoT 109). In other words the author‘s intention towards the
work is felt in a person‘s experience of it and how the author is felt as a value-origin
operates as an important constituent when experiencing his work. Likewise, our view of
the author and our feeling of his intention attribute distinctly different values to the event
of human communication as artistic event.
For Bakhtin, the author‘s emotional-volitional approach is a significant precursor
to understanding the work, the speech act itself. In dialogue, understanding is subject to
how the participants understand the disposition of the observer towards their own and
another‘s utterances. Bakhtin is not describing the author as visibly present, but as a
sensed observer, one who is an assumed participant in every person‘s discourse tonally
present to each person conversing. Bakhtin‘s description of common conversation alludes
to a very common occurrence in legal trial, the negotiation of judge and locale.
Advocates, often search for sympathetic third parties, judges or places that sympathize
with their argument thereby enhancing its reasonableness for the jury.
Recalling Bakhtin‘s claim that true dialogue involves a trio helps explain why
intonation, as an important constituent aspect of utterance, should be measured. Bakhtin‘s
critiques of rhetoric display his distaste for the polemics of dialectic. Such forms of
human communication foster constrictive attitudes that according to Bakhtin, are
diminutive to dialogue and destructive to ―the dialogic sphere where the word lives‖
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(Notes 150). Bakhtin suggests that the dialogic sphere created and inhabited by persons in
conversation is preserved by the intonation of each participant. If the presumed purpose
of conversation is identifying hypocrisy (the divorce of word and body) in the other
person, the likelihood of understanding is impossible. This might seem an obvious
conclusion but Bakhtin pushes beyond simple ethical platitude to a point at which we are
answerable not just for the words we speak, but also the tonality with which they are
uttered.
The reasons for Bakhtin‘s stress on the importance of ―dialogic relations‖ as an
important part of both dialogue and understanding are clear. His claim is more substantial
than a call to reach a common understanding. Instead it appears that Bakhtin asks us to
preemptively and particularly love those to whom we speak. Bakhtin does not encourage
us to love in the ―passive psychological sense‖ but instead love actively, intending
towards others with uncommon persistence and faithfulness. Bakhtin calls this act
―benevolent demarcation‖ whereby a person positively sets others apart in order to create
space for them to speak (Notes 137).
Because Bakhtin differentiates between ―passive psychological‖ love and actively
intoned love we should assume that the love he has in mind is specially and personally
intoned. This loving intonation is derived from the presumed personality of the third
person observer in the speech event. The third person supports and sustains the enduring
significance of the speech act beyond any knowledge or understanding occurent in the
conversation. History and narrative also function as the origin of utterance intonation but
even value systems such as these enter dialogue as an assumed sympathetic observer,
personified in the third position of the dialogic event. According to Bakhtin the intonation
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of an utterance reveals its intention, not only towards whom a word is addressed but also
its relationship to what is valuable. Bakhtin‘s evidence for this phenomenon is the
personification of value into what he calls the ―superaddressee‖ (PoT 126).
Bakhtin‘s claim that ―the nature of the word, which always wants to be heard,
always seeks responsive understanding, and does not stop at immediate understanding but
presses on further and further (indefinitely)‖ means each speech act appeals to a personal
respondent standing outside of time (PoT 127). The personification of value in the
superaddressee is the assumption by a speaker that his utterances, when misunderstood
by his immediate addressee, will be received by an atemporal addressee with ―truly
responsive understanding‖ (PoT 126). The felt presence of the superaddressee as a
constituent of the utterance is evidence for how we achieve knowledge relative to our
conception of interpersonal relationship and comprehension as subject to the
contextualizing presence of other persons.
In many ways the ―superaddressee‖ is the culmination of Bakhtin‘s argument
regarding ―dialogic relations‖ and his claim that understanding is primarily dialogic. The
superaddressee phenomenon reveals as fact that everyday speech is intoned by appeal to
an interpersonal relationship wherein we are always sympathetically understood. The
interpersonal context created by the presumed sympathy of the superaddressee intones
utterances with positive and hopeful affirmation rather than disputation or objection. This
―benevolent demarcation‖ is more than a general benevolence because the
superaddressee is a particular addressee who responds affirmatively to my utterance and
not only to the logical coherency or the contentual validity of my statements. Every
speaking person presumes that the superaddressee, in whatever form, knows them
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intimately and from a supra-special perspective confirms his utterances and
contextualizes them spatially, chronologically, and aesthetically. Bakhtin‘s articulation of
the superaddressee suggests that this person/personification is experienced as a promise,
because the expected response is always faithful even when responses from immediate
addressees are not.
There is an important correlation between the superaddressee and Bakhtin‘s
description of ―dialogic relations‖ as faithfulness. Non-contingent faithfulness is the
intonation-creating context for dialogic speech, which fosters dialogic understanding. In
other words, the shared meaning of two persons happens within the promise of
responsive voice and presence. Bakhtin‘s superaddressee is not incompatible with ideas
such as higher power, universal value, or even common narrative except that as
ideological systems they lack the material personality and intonation crucial for
facilitating dialogic relationship. Interpersonal relationship with abstract power or
ideology is impossible. A person must be interactive personally and lovingly to dialogue,
especially if this dialogue should produce understanding of what is good and true.
Understanding is consequently defined as interlocutors having clarity of their relational
position with immediate and super addressees. Understanding is thereby subjective;
realizing truth ideologically or conceptually is directly correlative to our relationship with
another person(s). Bakhtin makes this claim most definitively when he writes, ―the world
is arranged around a concrete value-center, which is seen and loved and thought. What
constitutes this center is the human being: everything in this world acquires significance,
meaning and value only in correlation with man—as that which is human‖ (TPA 61). In
this way, all understanding is a personification of value vocalized as a third person
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sympathetically relating to the speaker and addressee. We speak what is true subjectively
because; ―only love is capable of being aesthetically productive; only in correlation with
the loved is fullness of the manifold possible‖ (TPA 64).
Freedom and Answerability
After ―Author and Hero,‖ Bakhtin‘s translates his studies of subjectivity from
discussions of the novel text into an inquiry about the complexity and diversity of voice.
Bakhtin‘s philosophical queries congregate around interpersonal differentiation,
differentiation as a speech event that articulates unique and valuable persons. Bakhtin
writes, ―Each text (as an utterance) is an individual, unique, and unrepeatable, and herein
lies its entire significance (its plan, its purpose for which it was created). This is the
aspect of it that pertains to honesty, truth, goodness, beauty, history‖ (PoT 106). For
Bakhtin, the unique and unrepeatable is the foundation of value, answerability,
understanding, and freedom.
Bakhtin focuses his attention on the nature of human action as answerable
because original acts are responsive and free. The creative liability 53 in Bakhtin‘s
perception of action reveals his desire to reconcile the infinite horizon of aesthetic value
with the particular nature of interpersonal interaction. He does not contest the fact that
humans are free because freedom is the origin of creativity in speech. He writes ―any
truly creative text is always to some extent free revelation of the personality, not
predetermined by empirical necessity‖ (PoT 107). Everyday speech acts are primary
evidence in Bakhtin‘s argument because within every utterance lies a speakers
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intentionality, disposition, values, and ideas. Therefore, human acts speech or otherwise
are always valuating and interactive, always attributing value and revealing the company
of a sympathetic supra position.
Evaluative speaking in the company of other people does not assume a simplistic
ethic of reciprocity. Instead, the responsibility of being with other people means that
speech utterances are actually and already in relationship with the utterances of others,
―the utterance as a whole is shaped as such by extralinguistic (dialogic) aspects, and it is
also related to other utterances. These extralinguistic (dialogic) aspects also pervade the
utterance from within‖ (PoT 109). The speech act is a revelation of unique freedom and
signification of mutual interdependence.
We uniquely and specifically assign value with our speech acts and are
consequently saddled with the ought of answerability. Intonation means we are uniquely
positioned to answer for what we have said in the world. Speech is not simply an
expression of personality because each utterance connects to other speech acts resonating
and harmonizing with different vocal intonations. Our words are events in the infinite
horizon of aesthetic value moving out of the past into the future. This interrelation means
that the uttered word is fundamentally common, belonging to no one and yet to everyone.
Bakhtin characterizes speech activity as dialogic because every utterance is
simultaneously for someone and by someone. This aspect of speech forms interpersonal
association and reveals relational position, ―the semantic ties between utterances become
dialogic. The ideas are distributed among various voices. The exceptional importance of
the voice, the personality‖ (PoT 114). In this way we must personally give account for
how we have tonally formed value in the world using the common material of the word.
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This infinite character of the utterance is the rhythmic underscore to
differentiation, the eternal depth of the word gestures towards vocal
independence/dependence simultaneously demonstrating the utterance‘s historicity, it‘s
lineage of meaning multiplied in creative speech acts. The utterance informs both axis of
human life. The horizontal axis (history) of our life lived generationally from birth until
death and the vertical axis relative to those things that are above and outside simple
existence, ―honesty, truth, goodness, and beauty‖ (PoT 106). These two axes intersect in
the human body, the image of the word.
Infinity—the extension of human history— and eternity—the indefatigable nature
of aesthetic value—opens a broad field for articulating human difference and multiplies
the possible coordinates of human interconnectivity. This aspect of Bakhtin‘s theory
might trouble philosophical ethicists and aestheticians because this expansive field infers
a landscape of untethered social liberality. Julia Kristeva has argued for such liberality
but finds difficulty explaining its relationship to coherent theory of personality (Kristeva
236). Failing to reconcile distinct personality within a horizon of infinite value means
placing faith in an absolutely free yet equally terrifying expanse of aesthetic relativity.
Bakhtin interprets this infinite-eternal through the locale of incarnate personality literally
bringing aesthetics back down to earth. The irresponsiveness of the vast and open
aesthetic space without bodies for establishing interpersonal relationship provides few
coordinates for evaluation or differentiation. For the radical freedom of aesthetic value to
inform human utterance it must be answerable to life. Bakhtin utilizes religious language
to understand the relationship of human life to the infinity of value and the eternity of the
aesthetic. The answerable act of ―incarnating‖ value makes the ideal real, relating human
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being to eternity. The word in flesh joins the infinite with the personal, aesthetic value
enters time as a unique unrepeatable and unrecoverable act. This unrepeatability affords
us the freedom of truly independent action without problematizing the reality of relational
liability. However, if an act is catastrophic it cannot be expunged, its evaluative moment
escapes into time past. This reality focuses Bakhtin‘s attention on the restorative
responsiveness of the speech act.
Free Responsiveness
The intonation of an utterance and the intention of the speaker are directly linked
to the presence of a respondent and cannot be understood outside of this context. Bakhtin
writes ―the second voice enters only in the combination of the words, which becomes an
utterance (i.e. it acquires a speech subject, without which there can be no second voice)
(PoT 108). The double-voiced nature of the utterance is inherently responsive, and the
generation of the utterance is always intoned by the personality of the one addressed. The
revelatory nature of the utterance is not only informational but also incarnational,
involving the speaker‘s addressivity. The expectation of the tonality in response is
implicit in an utterance‘s intonation.
Once spoken there is no alibi for the revelation of intention towards the addressee
even when the responsiveness of the utterance is vocally diminished. Alternatives to
undersigning the speech act are lying and or ambivalently claiming an ―alibi in
Being‖(TPA 42). Bakhtin sees the first as a fear of responsiveness, withdrawing from the
meaningfulness of the word and it‘s resonance. The second approaches the speech act
with indifference, as if meaning in an utterance is dubious, pure self-expression and
nothing more. Bakhtin calls this ―non-incarnated action, ―which ―falls away into
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indifferent Being that is not rooted in anything‖ (TPA 43). The speech act is therefore
indistinguishable from infinite value and is inert, without direction and purposeless.
Dishonesty and ambivalence are common, but Bakhtin is unwilling to cede that a
person might actually desire no response stating ―nothing [is] more terrible than a lack of
response‖ (PoT 127).54 Approaching ought-to-be responsiveness with ambivalence is
possible but no person truly desires that others regard their utterances with the same
disposition. Speech acts are inherently responsive and intonation discloses this intention
towards acknowledgment and understanding. Even a liar attempts to justify deceit
thinking ―anyone in my position would have lied, too‖ (PoT 127). The inclination to
assume that one‘s position warrants sympathy reveals a loophole addressivity that desires
understanding with no account for immediate responsiveness.
Attempting to avoid the immediacy of responsibility by looking beyond
immediate addressees to broader more generalized addressees realizes both the strength
and deficiency of cognitively biased ideology. Theory and/or ideology transcend the
constraints of material contexts reducing tangible constraints and enhancing the ideal
justifications of an utterance. According to Bakhtin, a speaking person ―always
presupposes (with a greater or lesser degrees of awareness) some higher instancing of
responsive understanding that can distance itself in various directions‖ (PoT 126). This
presupposition does not imply directing the utterance toward a particular immediate
addressee. The immediate addressee may hear the speaker but he is not the person
actually addressed. Bakhtin‘s description of the utterance reveals the common occurrence
and likelihood of unresponsively speaking through the immediate addressee. The
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speaker‘s utterance is not to an immediate addressee (representing bodily constraint) but
to an ―absolutely just responsive‖ addressee (PoT 126). This ―loophole addressee‖ is the
real constituent voice of the utterances intonation and is the actual addressee towards
whom the utterance is directed. The speaker‘s distancing of the addressee either in time,
space, or intelligibility promotes a generalization by the speaker of the addressee and
their anticipated response. The constraint of the immediate addressee is surpassed by an
appeal ―either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time‖ (PoT 126).
Bakhtin‘s description of generalized responsiveness is important for our
understanding of the utterance‘s intonation. We might say that the generalized addressee
or the ―loophole addressee‖ affords the speaker freedom from the constraints of the
immediate addressee who may disagree or misunderstand the speaker (PoT 126). This
loophole in one way frees the utterance from the possibility of false finalization in
misunderstanding or dismissal. Even Bakhtin admits, ―the author can never turn over his
whole self and his speech work to the complete and final will of the addressees who are
on hand or nearby‖ (PoT 126).
The loophole addressee does, however, pose a dilemma when we recall Bakhtin‘s
desire for speech acts to have responsive intonation. Generalization liberates the utterance
but also, depending on the speaker‘s awareness, directs the speaker away from immediate
responsiveness and towards an addressee at sufficient distance to sympathetically validate
impoverished, irresponsive, and monologic speech. The projection of the utterance
beyond the immediate situation diminishes the responsiveness of the speaker‘s utterance
shifting attention to future people, places, and time and or the abysmal depth of unincarnated aesthetic value.
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Presuming the terribly free tonality of the utterance in the loophole addressee,
how can a speaker in the same word be responsive to the immediacy of present context
and maintain a coherent personality? This is the original question posed by Bakhtin‘s
notion of artistic liability. The distance between art and life is highly problematic for
understanding both ethics and aesthetics. Appeals to what is honest, true, and beautiful
are well and good, but if this appeal fails to realize value in life, fails to ―incarnate‖ them;
they are meaningless because they do not question the ambivalent utterance.
This creates a context for absolute aesthetic freedom without responsibility for
life. Common expressions about artists such as ―he was ahead of his time‖ or ―tragically
misunderstood‖ in which the speaker‘s vision is always situated beyond the horizon of
his present context in order the justify the artist‘s product highlight this problem. This
freedom is one that separates the subject from his own place in time, and justifies his
action anachronistically. This kind of freedom is in many regards another form of tragic
solitude, not intoned positively in the way free speech is understood.
We can also see this untethered freedom in the speech utterances of what are
called ―visionaries‖ whose utterances are always directed towards an addressee of a
future moment as a means of propelling human action in a particularly intended direction.
Speakers of this kind must also be able to incarnate the espoused ideal both in their
person and in those who respond positively to their utterances. It is difficult to deny the
relative unpredictability in speech acts of this intonation. A prophetic speech act may
overthrow current constraints for a purportedly more liberal social order, but the opposite
is also true. A speech act irresponsive to the present constraint of immediate addressees
and appealing only to imaginary general future addressees can and has had distressing
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consequences. This is a truth that Bakhtin lived, personally suffering exile under a
political regime irresponsive to his creative acts.
Bakhtin‘s life underscores an important aspect of utterances intoned towards a
generalized addressee or abstract ideology. An utterance responsive to an immediate
addressee and sympathetic to their situation will place constraints on the freedom in a
speaker‘s utterance. However, an utterance intoned toward the present addressee is
inherently more answerable to reality. The possibility of rejoinder, interjection, objection
or correction function as constitutive elements of the utterance requiring a different
intonation than one directed towards a general addressee, or in Bakhtin‘s words the
―loophole addressee‖ (PoT 126).
The ―superaddressee‖ and ―loophole addressee‖ open radically different aesthetic
landscapes as the speaker‘s appeal assumes greater likelihood of affirming
responsiveness through extension. This provokes an important question not only for the
present case, but also for Bakhtin‘s articulation of human personality. What mediates a
speaker‘s responsiveness to the immediate addressee when he must ―never turn over his
whole self and his speech work to the complete and final will of the addressees who are
on hand or nearby (after all, even the closest descendants can be mistaken)‖ (PoT 126)?
Bakhtin does not structurally constrain the freedom of the word as it passes
between and through people. Bakhtin strongly supports the freedom realized in the
speech utterance even as he argues for speech constrained by an immediate addressivity.
The purposeful opacity of Bakhtin‘s position leaves the dynamic between freedom and
answerability posed as question. However, Bakhtin does defend the importance of
answerability as an essential constituent of true human action, including the speech act.
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Instead of outlining an ethic or rule (the loophole addressee) Bakhtin turns to the
incarnate person of the superaddressee, a position that mediates between the absolute
―freedom‖ in a generalized loophole addressee and the influential constraint of the
immediate addressee. Bakhtin‘s attention is focused on the promise of a personal, on
hand, and immediate superaddressee that can marry the realm of eternal aesthetic value
with the constraints of incarnate reality and immediately present addressees, while
judiciously guarding the fragility of the speaker‘s own personality.
A Divinely Personal Superaddressee
Bakhtin‘s interest in the relationship between ethics and aesthetics originates with
his concern that an ―alibi in Being‖ generates purposeless, self-negating, unanswerable
personalities (TPA 42). Bakhtin is not satisfied to blithely encourage his readers to pursue
what is good, true, and beautiful. If this were the case, his critique of Neo Platonic
attitudes towards the body would be disingenuous. Instead Bakhtin pursues Plato‘s
quandaries with a distinctly personalist viewpoint, one undeniably influenced by the
incarnate action of Christ. Bakhtin does not accept theories of human life that devalue the
body presenting bodily existence as a fundamental constituent of human communication.
In Neo-Platonism Bakhtin finds a debilitating impersonality undervaluing the importance
of the body as real signification of human individuality and personality (A&H 54).
Bakhtin‘s critiques of Neo-Platonism provide insight into his understanding of the
superaddressee (and or loophole addressee) position, not only as constituent of an
utterance‘s responsiveness in its relationship to honesty, truth, beauty etc., but also as a
marker of intentionality towards an immediate addressee.
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Speech as an incarnate act locates human communication in the immediacy of
interpersonal interaction. The superaddressee as an essential constituent of the utterance
indicates that value personification, as communicative act, is an important feature in
Bakhtin‘s philosophy of communication. He is deeply concerned with how truth is
brought into reality; the ideal must become material to have value for interpersonal
relationship. Appeals to pure ideal (loophole) are impoverishing both to speech, the
speaker, and his relationship to the immediate addressee. The superaddressee present in
speech activity is Bakhtin‘s articulation of necessary mediation between aesthetic
abstraction and the acutely incarnate context of the utterance.
Bakhtin‘s identification of the superaddressee is typically characterized as a
―generalized Other,‖ personal memory, or an analytic concept. In all of these
characterizations the superaddressee operates much like a loophole addressee blockading
a speaker‘s self determined personhood from the social constraints of temporality
(Garvey 2000, Midgley 2011, Staragina 2009, Bryzzheva 2006, 2008). The most
personalized appropriation conceives of the superaddressee as the memory of a mentor.
The superaddressee-as-mentor suffers from the same insufficiencies as the loophole
addressee even if it retains some constraints of real existence and freedoms in relation to
personal aesthetic value. The voice of the mentor is immediate in the speaker‘s memory
and personal in relation to aesthetic value. The presence of the mentor as a present
intoning memory responsively constrains, albeit distantly, the present utterance of the
speaker. The superaddressee-as-mentor in part offers an authoritative and timelessness in
tone and guiding voice in reference to what is valuable 55, and as a distinct personality
informs the responsiveness of the speaker‘s utterance. However, in memory, the mentor55

To what is honest, true and beautiful
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superaddressee‘s influence on the speaker‘s utterance is contingent on spatial and
temporal distance. This means that the evaluative function of the mentor‘s voice as both
constraint and sympathetic response is subject to immanent limitations. This means that
the memory of the mentor-addressee could in fact inhibit the immediate responsiveness
of the speaker‘s utterance functioning more as a loophole addressee. The superaddresseeas-mentor also fails to overcome the difficulty of preserving dialogic interaction by
sustaining the position of each participant‘s personality.
The superaddressee-as-mentor nominally captures the way Bakhtin‘s
superaddressee functions as a responsive incarnate constraining person by which a speech
utterance is sympathetically understood fulfilling the promise of freedom in temporal and
metaphysical distance. The memory of the speaker incarnates a voice of mentor by
generalizing its particularity into a present moment. In order to do so the speaker must
de-personalize his mentor imagining ―this is what he would say in this circumstance.‖
Bakhtin argues that these generalizations have variant function in a speaker‘s utterance
(affirmation, injunction, ambivalence) and without mediation will likely result in a
clouding of either person‘s free subjectivity. The superaddressee-as-mentor poses the
same dilemma regarding the freedom in the distance of aesthetic value and nearness of
responsibility towards an immediate addressee.
Frank Farmer identifies this dilemma in post-modern pragmatism with its utopian
call for new kind of theory, or a ―new Eden‖ (Farmer 87). Farmer‘s proposed alternative
to the polemic between theory and pragmatics is Bakhtin‘s superaddressee concluding
that this conceptual person mediates the dialectical tension between theoria and pragma
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by introducing a third position that is inherently personal, a perspective that is weighted
with its intentional character.
Farmer confirms that the superaddressee does not transcend the speech event
citing Bakhtin‘s claim that the superaddressee is not ―any mystical or metaphysical
being‖ (PoT 126). Bakhtin‘s superaddressee is both outside of the speech event yet also
an inner constituent of intonation. The activity of the superaddressee is responsive to the
speaker because sympathetic understanding is intoned within the utterance. Bakhtin
emphasizes this several times stating the third party in the speech utterance is not just a
third person ―in the literal, arithmetical sense‖ (PoT 126).
The way the superaddressee functions in the speech utterance is not an analytical
device even if the superaddressee is discovered within a text. The superaddressee though
outside descends into and penetrates the speech utterance adding depth and value to
intonation and content, the depth of honesty, truth and beauty. The superaddressee relates
the utterance to transgredient value because he is present and participates tonally. Bakhtin
posits that personification can be of abstract ideals (―absolute truth, the court of
dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science‖) but these are
only significations of personhood. The superaddressee as a person that can be addressed
particularly and personally is God (PoT 126).
Farmer identifies this nuance of the superaddressee as being a particularly
important one for Bakhtin‘s idea of the third position in human discourse (Farmer 95).
The difference between abstract theory and personhood is understood in terms of
addressivity. A speech utterance, when addressing an ideal cannot produce the intentional
responsiveness addressed to a person. An addressed person has a particular disposition
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towards a speaker, and likewise the speaker has a particular disposition toward the
addressed. According to Bakhtin, the disposition of the superaddressee towards the
speaker in the communication event is assumed or presupposed to be ―absolutely just
responsive understanding‖ (PoT 126). A person with a positive and particular disposition
towards the speaker is different from abstract forms of addressivity, which by nature do
not exhibit intention. Bakhtin argues that abstract types of addressivity take on a naïve
tone since ―an utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees
of proximity, concreteness, awareness and so forth)‖ because the irresponsiveness of the
ideal requires a speaker to incarnate a second imaginary personality that sympathetically
responds to their utterance (PoT 126).
The sympathetic and loving responsiveness of abstract addressivity naively
presupposed by a speaker surfaces in Bakhtin‘s recognition of the responsive fear
towards the eternal word which presses ―on further and further (indefinitely)‖ (PoT 127).
A person afraid of the eternal word intuitively senses the lack of sufficient depth in their
speech and therefore seeks ―temporary recognition (responsive understanding of limited
depth) from immediate addressees‖ (PoT 127). Even the liar suffers from this naiveté,
―always presupposes an instance that will understand and justify it, even if in the form:
―anyone in my same position would have lied too‖ (PoT 127). Likewise, the
superaddressee incarnate as ―absolute just responsiveness‖ resounds with a tone of
judgment because the speaker‘s appeal to the superaddressee‘s sympathetic confirmation
requires commitment. In other words, ―because a superaddressee embodies‖ an ―integral
attitude toward a value that I regard as ultimate, the superaddressee always requires
something from me‖ (Farmer 97).
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The addressivity of the superaddressee is inherently connected to the possible
responsiveness of a real or imagined personality and an utterance‘s durability and
stability relative to the depth of aesthetic value. Coupled in the promise of the
superaddressee‘s personality is the immediate responsiveness and solidity of eternity.
This means that the personality of the superaddressee presupposed by a speaker intones
his speech differently as it relates to freedom and judgment.
Freedom From, Freedom Through, Freedom In
The superaddressee‘s relationship to the utterance is resonant with Bakhtin‘s
discussions regarding authority, personality and answerability. Bakhtin writes ―in various
ages and with various understandings of the world this superaddressee and this ideally
responsive understanding assumes various ideological expressions (God, absolute truth,
the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the course of history, science
and so forth)‖ (PoT 126). Read through Bakhtin‘s formulation of the author-hero
relationship basic conclusions can be drawn from these different personifications of the
superaddressee.
Even a brief consideration of Bakhtin‘s parenthetical list reveals ideological
positions he himself critiqued. Every ideal position signifies a philosophical paradigm
that Bakhtin directly confronts in the work of Plato, Kant, Marx and Hobbes, each of
which creates discourse irresponsive to the responsibility in authority and fragility of
personality. Bakhtin even contests science as a loophole addressee for its appeal to a
radically immanent view of personality, the deficiency being the scientific assumption
that ―everything that has been given, already at hand and ready-made before the work
existed‖ (PoT 120). Appealing to science for ―absolute just responsiveness‖ reveals a
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solitary concern for material existence, not the new, unique and unrepeatable action
manifest in human speech.
God56 as a superaddressee exhibits two characteristics that the others do not. In
Christianity, God is understood as whole consciousness, eternal, and lovingly inclined
towards his creation. God is the cosmic presence affirming the existential value of
honesty, truth and beauty. These distinctions separate God from the critique of other
superaddressee classifications that only become tenable when God is understood as an
inaccessible and abstract higher power. Bakhtin finds a ―unique depth‖ in the Christian
view of God that translates general and suppositional characteristics into significantly
stark differences separating Go-as-superaddressee from other superaddressee forms.
In Christianity, God is an eternal person with clear intentionality. God-assuperaddressee is distinctly suited for mediating the dynamic between human freedom
and responsive constraint that Bakhtin grapples with in his discussion of the author-hero
relationship. The mediating person of God in Christianity is particularly the person of
Christ who is also the Word. In ―Author and Hero‖ Bakhtin describes God and his
relationship to humankind as gracious mediation. As we have already argued the
Incarnation and ―incarnating‖ features significantly in particularly intonated personality
and answerability. For Bakhtin, God defies abstraction embracing the body as the special
material wherein sympathetic intonation is realized. He writes,
―God is no longer essentially the voice of my conscience, as purity of my
relationship to myself (purity of my penitent self- denial of anything given within
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Of course there are multiple permutations of whom and what God is in world religions but
Bakhtin does not address these in his work. Although there is an argument to be made regarding the God of
,ianity and its relationship to superaddressee incarnations promoting idolatry/idolatry this is outside the
scope of present study.
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myself), as the one into whose hands it is a fearful thing to fall and to see whom
means to die. God is now the heavenly father who is over me and can be merciful
to me and justify me where I, from within myself, cannot be merciful to myself
and cannot justify myself in principle, as long as I remain pure before myself.
What I must be for the other, God is for me. What the other surmounts and
repudiates within himself as an unworthy given, I accept in him and that loving
mercy as the other‘s cherished flesh (A&H 56).
In Bakhtin‘s description God provides significant depth for God-as-person whom
humans can address and also be constituent of an utterance‘s immediately responsive
intonation. Likewise, God-as Word becomes the mediation between persons and value,
the influence of authority and necessity of personality. Instead of abstract ideal as
―absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the course of
history or science‖ God-as-Word is revealed in distinct personality distant temporally yet
near eternally. God-as-superaddressee is immediately present yet outside as a divine
word/voice with purity in relationship to himself and to what is purely honest, true,
beautiful.
God-as-Word is Christ, a superaddressee uniquely loving and sympathetically
inclined towards the speaker simultaneously modeling an unparalleled self-abdicating
responsiveness towards the immediate addressee. Bakhtin writes of Christ as truly unique
person of history who unifies in his person both ―ethical solipsism‖ with ―ethicalaesthetic kindness‖ (A&H 56). Christ-as-superaddressee is pure relationship between
word and body uniting the freedom of unique personhood with absolutely answerability,
constrained by history yet eternally present in the utterance. Bakhtin considers Christ‘s
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incarnation as a unique act demonstrating the personal intonation of God towards man
that ―renders full justice to the other as such, disclosing and affirming the other‘s
axiological distinctiveness in all its fullness‖ (A&H 56).
Christ as incarnate word represents in this instance the best possible unity
between the eternal word and an immediately responsive speech act. God‘s descent into
time confirms the importance of temporality and the body as the form and material for
the revelation of truth, refuting the self-negation of asceticism and the self-assertion in
the abstract addressivity of ideology. God is personal and relative, a real sovereign
authority confirming and valuing unique human personality. Christ represents in
Bakhtin‘s ―Author and Hero‖ an unmatched responsive addressee with a preference for
particularly free and creative speech action. Christ-as-superaddressee is the word of
harmony for responsively free personality.
Conclusion
The dilemma in the infinite extension of aesthetic value as background to
personhood recalls the original question of freely spoken utterances constrained by
temporal existence. For an utterance to be free it must originate from recognizably free
person, someone who is distinct and distinguishable from a social, aesthetic, physical,
and linguistic background. Infinity and eternity as background are inarticulate horizons
creating difficulties in locating original word from context or in other words, a hero from
his author. Bakhtin‘s concept of the superaddressee gives us new insight into the
generation of the utterance, its individual intonation, the revelation of intention in
addressivity. The superaddressee reveals an utterance‘s responsiveness to human
personality and action.
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Bakhtin counsels against understanding human utterance as merely the symbolic
manifestation of immanent context. A speaker, seeking to be heard and understood only
by immediate addressees reveals too great a concern for speaking a contemporary word,
rather than one with eternal value, a word that is honest, true, and beautiful. An abstract
superaddressee is akin to seeking an alibi-in-Being because normative value is embedded
in time, with the evaluative standards of role, effectiveness, and appropriate context.
These evaluative criteria impoverish the answerability of unique action with the potential
to ―give birth to being on a new axiological plane of the world‖ (A&H 191). Abstract,
immanent superaddressees are principally limited to intone an utterance with the
necessary responsiveness for faithful communication with real unique personalities.
Bakhtin‘s encourages his readers to become less naïve of this intuitively felt truth.
The superaddressee is directly correlated to an utterance‘s responsiveness to
immediate addressees. An honest acknowledgement of the superaddressee as a real
communication phenomenon will inform how responsible we are for our utterances as
they enter communities dependent on honest, true, and beautiful discourse. The
superaddressee is an important mediating position, both as a sympathetic contemplator of
dialogues and an intoning constituent of utterances. The superaddressee as a presumed
witness confirming value correlates directly with how our words are intoned and, how we
intend toward the person we are speaking to. In the speech act, we assume meaning that
is supported by a superaddressee who is a faithful and affirming respondent.
Bakhtin‘s discussion of the superaddressee demonstrates that the acutely personal
character of a third-personified addressee is a significant constituent of speech that
continues to move and create rather than delimit or diminish the immediate addressee and
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the relationship between participating interlocutors. To speak freely means to speak a
word that is truly responsive, responsive to the specific person addressed, responded to
by a third person addressee, and responsive to truth because a true word wants to move
freely, ―wants to be heard, understood, responded to, and again to respond to the response
and so forth ad infinitum‖ (PoT 127).
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Chapter 6: Authority and Heroism
―The author and hero meet in life; they enter into cognitive-ethical lived relations with each other, contend
with each other (even if they meet in one human being). And this even the event of their life, the event of
their intensely serious relations and contention, crystallizes in an artistic whole into an architectonically
stable yet dynamically living relationship between author and hero which is essential for understanding the
life of a work‖ (A&H 230).

The superaddressee is the essential third in Bakhtin‘s understanding of dialogic
speech, the personified mediator between the spheres of ethics and aesthetics. Without
this third, we are compelled theoretically to either ethics or aesthetics as the value basis
for our speech acts. Scholars, noting this dialectical dilemma, often argue implicitly for
the former as the fundamental ground upon which semiotic coherency and stable
subjectivity are constituted while indirectly neglecting the latter. Bakhtin‘s
superaddressee is the realization of a personal and actively present mediator between
these two spheres yet at the same time, if the superaddressee is understood simply as an
immanent voice, his personage lacks the necessary strength to truly resolve the polemical
predicament. In Bakhtin‘s essay ―The Problem of the Text‖ the third addressee is
translated as ―superaddressee,‖ and herein may lie some of the resilient obfuscation
regarding Bakhtin‘s reliance on a triadic semiotic to form his claims (PoT 126). The
prefix ―super‖ in both English and Russian implies only above, highly or other rather
than the outside positioning consistent with Bakhtin‘s recurring discussion of the author
in both ―The Problem of the Text‖ and ―Author and Hero.‖ The author and
superaddressee are not only ―above‖ and in possession of great constitutive and
consummatory power but are also positioned outside the existential plane of human/hero
experience. This truth brings together the eternal character of the Word with the immortal
nature of the unique human soul. Bakhtin‘s discussion of the superaddressee position in
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―The Problem of the Text‖ echoes his original work in ―Author and Hero‖ reiterating the
claim that ―the writer is a person who is able to work in language while standing outside
language, who has the gift of indirect speech (PoT 109). This means that nadadresat
[над-адресат] could be just as readily translated supra-addressee to better indicate that
the position of the recipient and mediator of the speech act exists in a personal position
not only outside but around the event of the speech utterance 57. It is from this position
that the ―author of a literary work (a novel) creates a unified and whole speech work (an
utterance). But he creates it from heterogeneous, as it were, alien utterances‖ (PoT 115).
The author as the creator, or the posited supra-addressee as divine mediator, both
consummate the spoken word acting as constituents of utterance as well as creating an
embracing context wherein the value of an utterance and its vividly referential
relationship to the speaker are confirmed.
The instantiation of the supra-addressee as an essential constitutive member of the
utterance introduces a new paradigm, not only for understanding semiotic association but
also subjectivity and interpersonal understanding. Understanding is the situation where
this triadic paradigm becomes most phenomenologically rich and substantive. Bakhtin
views understanding as primarily a dialogic event, which in his terms means the event of
personal interrelationship. Cognitivist versions of understanding such as explanation and
comprehension involve only one or two consciousnesses, understanding in Bakhtin‘s
terms requires a third, the same as dialogue (PoT 111). In this sense understanding
becomes more than an event of semiotic coherence or ideological agreement, it is a
57

This translation adjustment is confirmed by personal correspondence with Caryl Emerson, one of
the original editors of the volume Speech Genres and Other Late Essays translated by Vern W McGee
published in 1986 by University of Texas Press. This volume has been the object of much scholarly
appropriation even before Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability were translated and
released in English.
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tripartite relational event resultant of understanding as a felt attitude. In Bakhtin‘s own
words ―Understanding is a very important attitude (understanding is never a tautology or
duplication, for it always involves two and a potential third) (PoT 115). Bakhtin‘s view of
understanding correlates directly with his view of the speech utterance and each is intent
on revealing the subjectivity of every circumstance. The utterance itself is a revelation of
the three-person interrelationship occurent in all human interactions with the word, ―the
word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is not a duet but a trio) (PoT
122). The supra-addressee position is confirmation of this truth as he enters into each
speech act evidenced by double-voiced intonation (―Discourse‖ 9). Veracity and value
are born of the third person position because the supra-addressee‘s position around the
plane of human subjectivity confirms an utterances contemporary assertion, its ―claim to
justice, sincerity, beauty and truthfulness‖ (PoT 123).
The emergence of these themes in Bakhtin‘s later essay ―Problem of the Text‖
transposes the authority of the author‘s influence to the supra-addressee with a greater
focus on the possible role permutations the third person position intoned in a speech act.
This may be in part due to the authorship crisis that Bakhtin highlights earlier on in
―Author and Hero.‖ Bakhtin‘s narrower focus on textual analysis in ―Problem of the
Text‖ demonstrates that the text itself can mean nothing without the subjective position
of an author, and that any possible understanding of a text requires the reader to at least
recognize the author-as-person.58 However, recognition alone is not sufficient to produce
understanding since the author of the text and the reader remain on the same plane of
experience, especially so if the author is not actually present with the reader but is imaged

58

It is important to recall that for Bakhtin the addressed person receives even the immediate
speech utterance as text.
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by the reader in a conversation with the author‘s words. Intuitively the reader imagines
the ―spirit of the author‖ as a participant in his reading and yet, as we have seen, Bakhtin
views this intuitive gesture as dangerously presumptive and potentially parasitic of the
author‘s personality. The readers attempt to vivify and validate his understanding of the
text by using the ―spirit of the author‖ also endangers his own soul because it signals an
abdication of his own individual position towards the text or alternatively a conquest of
the author‘s creative spirit with his own. The reader may in his interpretation take either
an aesthetic or ethical approach but these abstractions (truth, beauty, equality, and justice)
are subsequently personified into a third persona that purportedly mediates the reader‘s
hermeneutic disposition. In all interactions with the artistic object ―the sheen of
subjectification‖ is seen on even the most ideal of interpretive attitudes (PoT 113). In
other words, incarnation is not simply an historical event; it is the existential condition of
human being (A&H 10). Not only do we struggle with achieving the union of sign and
referent linguistically we experience this subjectively in our desire to commune with
what we see as most valuable, to enclose it in flesh. According to Bakhtin, this is what
Dostoevsky achieved artistically, the imaging of idea (Emerson 127). This notion
originates in the author-hero relationship because as the author creates an image of the
idea he also ―enters into the image‖ and is ― a constitutive aspect of the image‖ (PoT
115). What the author considers heroic appears in novel flesh, the ideal becomes human
and only then through its incarnate subjection to the human form can it truly be a
consciousness interacting with other consciousnesses. It is here where ethics must be
coupled with aesthetics.
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In ―Author and Hero,‖ Bakhtin‘s turn to the divine phenomenon of Christ‘s
incarnation to demonstrate this aspect of aesthetic activity presumes only the true
proposition of this event can explain this movement theoretically in artistic acts (A&H
56-57, 113, 129, 144-145). The ubiquitous appeal to divine presence in immediate human
experience becomes the third that mediates the dialectical poles of aesthetics and ethics.
For Bakhtin, ―Life (and consciousness) from within itself, is nothing but the actualization
of faith (that is, of need and hope, of non-self-contentment and of possibility)‖; a life
lived otherwise is lived naively (A&H 144). The life that Bakhtin is describing is textured
by and tied to, the profundity of religious experience. In order to view Bakhtin‘s work as
less, a scholar must contend with the fact that for Bakhtin, confessional self-accounting
(prayer) is the closest a person comes to adopting the necessary life tones of true faith and
hope. Only from this disposition can ―anticipation of beauty in God, tranquility, concord,
and measure become possible‖ (A&H 145). Finally, in a detailed discussion of a saint‘s
dialogue with God, Bakhtin describes the result of supplicatory prayer as that exact
process whereby a person is reborn, and assured of eternal life. He writes, ―the organizing
force of the I is replaced by the organizing force of God; my earthly determinateness, my
earthly name, is surmounted, and I gain a clear understanding of the name written in
heaven in the Book of Life—the memory of the future‖ (A&H 145). This constitutes
Bakhtin‘s most explicit invocation of the Christian doctrine of resurrection, a doctrine
founded on the premise of Christ‘s own incarnation and resurrection.
The divine proposition made in the incarnation is that Christ, in the flesh becomes
the perfect unity of the ideal and the carnal. Yet this is more than a theoretical solution to
the problem of creative activity. By example, Bakhtin furthers the claim that to be
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incarnate requires a subordination of the will so that one can adequately become an object
of orientation, another for others. As Bakhtin notes, ―even God had to incarnate himself
in order to bestow mercy, to suffer and to forgive‖ (A&H 129). In Bakhtin‘s thought this
means the formation of a community between aesthetics, ethics, and a divine voice
condescending to be a contemporary and intimately responsive voice for truth, beauty
and justice. In final notes taken before his death Bakhtin, not uncharacteristically,
gestures esoterically towards the profound opportunity in the promise of Christ, ―The
word as something personal, Christ as truth, I ask him‖ (Notes 148). The possibility of
truth as a person who can be inquired of, can serve as a mediator between the sphere of
aesthetic value and the contingency of ethical action is at least compelling if not in many
ways comforting. When ethics are in concert with aesthetics and interpersonally mediated
by the active, present, incarnate Word the potential for responsive communicative
practice becomes tangibly coherent and reassuringly constant.
Heroic Mediation
Jeffrey Stout, in his book Ethics after Babel concurs that the possibility of ethical
judgment is inextricably linked to particular communicative practice. The revelation of an
act as good is made possible through in its articulation by one who sees the act and names
it as such. Stout, rightly identifying the problems with the ethical and cultural plurality of
our present age encourages readers to identify figures like Thomas Aquinas, Thomas
Jefferson and Martin Luther King Jr., men who were ―moral bricoleurs‖ and therefore
constitute authority in the practice of discursive ethics (Stout 292). The admirable
attribute of these men is their ability to marry multiple external and internal goods into a
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unified image of moral action, to synthesize heterogeneous viewpoints of a given era into
a coherent philosophy of ethical acumen.
Stout‘s attempt to reclaim primarily immanent processes of value plotting requires
an appeal to personalized versions of his ideal, the ―moral bricoleur‖. We cannot slight
Stout for naming his heroes and borrowing their authority as evidence for his own
position. This inclination is exactly what we have tried to articulate in earlier chapters,
the common response-anticipating appeal by any such person attempting to find stability
in existence, in relationship to Being. However, Stout differs on a crucial point that
places his own philosophy in contrast to the position I have taken above, even if he
admits the possibility available in the divine proposition. He writes,
Systematic problems can arise when the pursuit of good of one kind conflict or
interferes with the pursuit of goods of another kind. Such problems can be vexing.
To be certain about how to resolve them, we would have to know more truths than
we know now about what sort of God, if any exists, what people are like, and
what long-range consequences would result from changing the current
configuration of practices and institutions (285-86).
Stout‘s honest location of the problem in ethical relativity that only finds
absolution outside of ethics itself makes his resoundingly aesthetic turn to bricolage
momentarily plausible, if still problematic. In other words, ethics as a problem of
aesthetic discernment requires a relationship with the author of the work. Stout implicitly
affirms this perspective by likening the activity of ethical discernment to the practice of a
bricoleur, asserting that the pragmatism of ―cost benefit calculation and human rights‖
needs to be artfully balanced by the good practices of ―medical care, baseball, humanistic
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inquiry [and] family life,‖ activities that can only be ordered by personal values found
outside the scope of ethics (Stout 286). How these values can be articulated is the chief
problem for Stout‘s bricoleur. The complicating factor is that these practices can only be
revealed as valuable, timely and tenable in the performance of the act itself. The
phenomenological immediacy in this view of ethics poses an important question of how
values can be carried out of particular instances and translated into different
circumstances, adopted by different people, living on different planes of experience, in
different times? In other words, how can aesthetic value be made incarnate in the present,
not theoretically in the tracts of philosophical ethics but personally, in the everyday
speech act? Stout‘s revelation of personal models in the popular touch points of Aquinas,
Jefferson and King cannot overcome the dilemma of ―exclusive temporality‖ (Troup169).
Time intangibly stretches away from present contingency into past and future and unless
men like those identified are resurrected, able to immediately answer questions and
respond to the problematic of contemporary personal action, they are only artistic heroes
of a past age, distant relatives, codified characters in contemporary philosophical
narrative. The possibility of a past voice speaking into present context infers what is often
presumed in the identification of authoritative voices. The implicit relationship that exists
between contemporary ―bricoleurs‖ and chosen thinkers from the past means that the
question is primarily one of space, the distance temporally, spatially and or
metaphysically means that this given person serves prototypically in reference to the
good, and positively disposed towards its present proposition. The writer justifies his or
her contemporary conclusions by establishing intimacy with the absent author of a text. 59

59

Charles Palmer catalogues this shift in his historiography of hermeneutics in which early
scholars like Schleiermacher attempt to establish an objective outcome through methods faithful to a given
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The situation of the problem in aesthetic relationship reveals the centrality of the
living body as a coordinate for understanding the event of human being. The body as a
constraining reality reorients the problem spatially, uniting ethics with aesthetics in inner
life of conscious existence. ―Author and Hero‖ stands as Bakhtin‘s work to develop this
profound truth; bodies do not simply exist within value spheres because without the
human being as person, these structures no longer exist as meaningful; ―all relations
(spatial, temporal relations, and relations of meaning) gain the validity of artistic objects
and relations around the human being‖ (A&H 187). The particularity in the true reality of
human being is demonstrated by the fact that to identify temporal goods, we intuitively
locate them in the active scope of a living person. The existence of human being is what
constitutes aesthetic reality, the essential situation for ethics and theory (A&H 187).
This is where Bakhtin‘s claim that no psychological self or human being can
derive meaning from within self-consciousness finds tremendous poignancy. This is an
evident truth in the continual look outward as a means of verifying subjective positioning.
The question is not whether this outward look is invalid, but rather how this ―outlooking‖ translates into an inner phenomenological experience that can become formative
in relationship to human being, promoting a coherent and stable subjectivity. According
to Bakhtin, the speech act alone demonstrates this intuiting in human being. The fact that
the author of a work is felt to be present aesthetically in relationship to a person and to
their own task of creation means that speaking is more than an expressive act of simple

text. Gadamer, following Heidegger shifts hermeneutics away from the text itself, proposing that the
interpretive activity is in fact the situation that encompasses human being. Gadamer does turn to
incarnation as a principle that aids in developing his position but does not commit to the possibility that
this principle is in fact derived from a real experience of human being lived out by Jesus Christ. Further
reading on this topic can be found in John Arthos‘s The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics. Notre
Dame. University of Notre Dame Press 2009.
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cognition. The body, as the central locale of this event means that another person‘s word
as coordinate for aesthetic discernment is felt personally in the speech event (A&H 309).
Aesthetics and their formative energy are found in ―the position assumed by the acting
person‖ (A&H 311). Within ethics, this is understood as the problem of authentic action,
coherence between the particularity of human deeds and the person as a distinct whole,
not disparate in space and time but complete in every instance as that person for which
the body is referent. Posed as a question, what formalizes the particular deed into its
general category of good making it akin to what is judged as right and just, even as it
responds to particular instances within a unique time and relationship? The formative
qualities of the aesthetic may be conceived as that relationship between the ideal and the
real, but the human person as a constituent of the speech event means that the original
point from which aesthetic form directs human subjectivity is never pure ideology or
even pure self-expression but another person‘s word penetrating inwardly. In the same
way we ask where such intuiting originates. It is imperative to pursue why this
inclination resolves in situating the good within a ―heroic‖ figure.
The intuition to identify heroes as carriers of value—that which is good, true, and
beautiful—reinforces Bakhtin‘s original critique of the self-sufficient purely expressive
person because such a person cannot ―be active in the aesthetically valid and consolidated
in space time‖ and because as this ―I am not present for myself axiologically in that space
time‖ (A&H 188). Stout demonstrates the inclination to identify such heroes deferring to
historical figures that embody an image of the valuable man, a person capable of creating
moral bricolage through discursive practice. Stout unifies valuable traits by localizing
them in several different heroic bricoleurs, but does not persist to answer the question of
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how this is done by a living person, a person who must somehow achieve consolidation
of particular acts into a coherent subjectivity faithfully exhibiting values through the
vicissitudes of time. According to Bakhtin, the possibility and power in this consolidation
is essential for personhood and ethical action because ―axiological orientation and
consolidation around a given human being creates its aesthetic reality (the reality of
performed actions, the ethical reality of the unitary and unique event of being) (A&H
187). Stout‘s proposition is exemplary of the problematic suffered by contemporary
ethicists of all stripes. Solutions to this problem, how ethics interacts with aesthetics,
often neglects what Bakhtin positions as essential to their interrelationship, the living
situation of the human person. The human body as focal point and also locale poses the
problem of ethics not simply as an individual task, ―the task of artistic forming and
consummating,‖ but as a tripartite relationship between the speaker, his immediate
addressee and a supra-addressee. Bakhtin considers the recognition of this reality
―aesthetic vision‖ a ―special aesthetics‖ because it does not ―detach itself from the
fundamental aesthetic task, detach itself from the fundamental creative relationship of the
author to the hero that determines, in fact, the artistic task in all its essentials‖ (A&H
189).
This task, which Stout identifies as moral bricolage, is similar to what Bakhtin
describes as the artistic event of human being, the act of consolidating and unifying value
into the image of an individual personality. The question that Stout does not answer is
how this can be achieved temporally, within the artistic event. The human act as
principally creative means that the paradigmatic descriptor of human being is the novel
hero. Human being as a creative activity does not, however, equate the human hero with
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the divinity in authorship. In fact, Bakhtin makes a crucial if often indistinguishable
separation between the author and his heroes. If, as Bakhtin claims a person cannot
author their own life, a hero requires an author, a voice that acts authoritatively towards
the inner person providing stable coordinates for his own position and action. No person
can be the hero of his or her own life but requires authorship to experience human being.
According to Bakhtin ―what renders the other an authoritative and inwardly intelligible
author of my life is the fact that this other is not fabricated by me for self-serving
purposes, but represents an axiological force which I confirm in reality and which
actually determines my life‖ (A&H 153). In other words, the attempt to author my own
life requires that I experience a schism of personality generating a secondary person that
purportedly lives outside and objective to the sphere of my own self-consciousness.
Bakhtin likens the role of the author to a mother who in childhood serves as an
―axiological force‖ that ―determines me‖ (A&H 153). Bakhtin‘s example of the author as
mother provides some insight into the kind of relationship he believes must exist between
the author and hero in order for the relationship to have the unique personality forming
power. The primary position Bakhtin identifies as crucial for tapping this vital force is to
realize ones own powerlessness because ―the one who governs me internally is the
lovingly authoritative other within me, and not myself‖ (A&H 153). The analogy is
provocative because a mother literally gives birth to the life of an infant, with her own
flesh and blood and her initial caress she forms the image of a unique and new life.
Bakhtin‘s discussion of how others act authoritatively in relationship toward inner
personhood focuses on different ideas regarding biography as literary form. Literary art
remains for Bakhtin a principle way to explicate the complexity of the author-hero
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relationship and how this relationship is determinative of a life heroic, while avoiding the
pitfalls of ethical prescription. For Bakhtin, autobiography and biography represent
efforts to justify life as self sufficient through self-negation and parasitism (A&H 154). In
the first case, life must proceed ―in indissoluble unity with the collective of others‖ and
the other in a state of ―naïve individualism‖ (A&H 153-156). Either case is an attempt at
self ―heroization,‖ the creation of meaning around a person‘s life rendering that life
whole and understandable against the particular parts and episodes of their experience.
How this is done not only reveals attitudes about the assumptive author‘s position in
relationship with the hero, but also articulates what Bakhtin calls the ―heroic value,‖ in
other words those aesthetic values which are believed to constitute a meaningful life
(A&H 157). The ―heroic value,‖ according to Bakhtin, ―determines the basic constituents
and events of personal-social, personal-cultural, and personal historical life, the basic
volitional directedness of life‖ (A&H 157). It is not pure value that drives and forms a
life but a relationship with those who have ben recognized to embody those values that in
observing a heroes life named as good and beautiful. The heroic value demonstrated in
biography results in the confusion of the author-hero positions and their relationship. In
both cases, the author becomes an immanent participant in the world of the hero and does
not exist transgredient to the hero‘s life (A&H 163). The author‘s position outside of the
hero‘s life is essential to Bakhtin‘s understanding of this interaction because the hero is
always on a course towards death, an event that potentially renders a hero‘s life
meaningless. To be saved from this meaningless end a hero must have a relationship with
a person that can remember his eventful life and ―heroize‖ him by consolidating the
individual events and aspects of his life into an aestheticized whole (A&H 173). 60 In the
60
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event of a person‘s death, this is easily achieved and unlike what occurs for a living
person. A living person in active position always moves in unique ways, which upset his
or her outwardly given character [istics].
The primary pitfall that Bakhtin locates in personal biography as a mediating
value for the author-hero relationship is its syncretism, the combining of the author and
the hero on the same plane of experience. This means that ―for the author, the hero does
not suffer any fundamental and essential failure with respect to meaning and,
consequently, he does not have to be saved by way of an entirely different axiological
course of action, an axiological course of action that is transgredient to his own life‖
(A&H 163). In this case, death is at most a complicating factor in the biographical
relationship between the author and the hero but does not constitute ― an essentially
necessary support for a meaning-independent justification of his life; his life in spite of
death, does not require any new value‖ (A&H 163).
Bakhtin‘s significant consideration of death within his thought lends importance
to the body as the location of the event of human being, because in death the physical
body perishes. 61 The word, a person‘s personality, their soul and spirit though immortal
cannot take form and live with others unless imaged by the body. The body is the
essential boundary between the void of formless and weightless existence and the
presence of tangibly meaningful reality. Without the body, the true separation of
positions cannot occur, in other words, the positions of the author and the hero are
61

Caryl Emerson argues differently in The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin stating that
death does not figure heavily in Bakhtin‘s discussion of Dostoevsky‘s works in Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics. I concur that Bakhtin does not consider death to be the end of personality, but read through the lens
of Christ‘s incarnation and the meaning of his eventual sacrifice situates death as an important event, not
for life as meaningful, but as a passing into, a gateway into eternal dialogue with God. Death is then not to
be feared, and therefore of less consequence than those who might situate the meaning of existence
internally against a selfhood that considered to be demarcated by the body alone and not by the word that
extends life beyond time into eternity. See The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin pp. 136-137.
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indistinguishable making the saving of the hero from the meaninglessness of his
immanent death impossible. For Bakhtin, the author and hero positions are essential
constituents of personhood, the experience of human being. Without the minimum of
these two positions, one who lives and the other who lovingly contemplates, the
possibility of individual personhood is without potential, ―individualism can determine
itself positively and feel no shame about its own determinateness only in an atmosphere
of trust, love and possible choral support‖ (A&H 172).
The position of the hero is tenuous existing only in concert with an outside author.
The ―heroic value‖ manifest in human speech activity is indicative, not of author type,
but the character of the author-hero relationship by which the nature of both persons is
understood. The primary characteristic of the author that Bakhtin identifies as essential
for the existence of the hero is his otherworldliness. The author, in order to save the hero
from death must exist outside the plane of the hero‘s self experience. Bakhtin proposes
―character‖ itself as the form of the author-hero relationship taking into account both the
saving power of the author that the hero so desperately needs and the hero maintaining
his positional distinctiveness. Acknowledging the saving power of the author as essential
for the activity and position of the hero does not mean falling once again into the problem
of identifying distinctive personhood. In fact, the author-hero relationship is the
relationship by which the hero‘s character becomes vivid, taking on substantial value. For
Bakhtin, ―Character is sharply and essentially differentiated from all forms of expression
of the hero that we have examined up to now. Neither in confessional self accounting, nor
in biography, nor in lyric does the whole of the hero constitute the fundamental artistic
task, the axiological center in artistic vision‖ (A&H 173). The difference here between a
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biographical vision of the hero and an aesthetical characteristic one is the difference
between viewing his life as a series of events, the trajectory of his life versus the whole of
the hero, the complete coherent image of his personality. According to Bakhtin ―In
biography, the fundamental task is a life as biographical value, that is, the life of a hero is
the fundamental goal, not a finished image of his personality. What is important is not
who he is, but what he has lived through and what he has done‖ (A&H 173). The
problem identified in this approach is its bias toward ethicality and history, what has
transpired in a person‘s life through a series of causes and effects, a person‘s action or
inaction. This posits life as a series of instances that can never fully explain the existence
of a whole person who is an individually unique and whole personality. Bakhtin reorients
his perspective away from the historical linearity of biography toward and more spatial
understanding of human being. Instead of a focus on what occurred before and what will
happen after in the sequence of a person‘s life he encourages a viewpoint that
demonstrates more concern with ―the inner and outer determinateness of the hero‖ (A&H
173). The activeness and quality of a person is not solely judged on the external impact of
his act but also on the shaping and forming of his inner person, that which is inner to the
external boundary of his body. For Bakhtin, the inner person is integrated with the bodies
outer vitality, united they form the distinguishable boundary between characters. Inner
life is not, of course, self sufficient, it is utterly dependent on the hero‘s relationship to
his or her author, the outside person who ―at each moment of his creative activity uses all
the privileges of his all-round position outside the hero‖ (A&H 174).
This form of interrelationship creates ―character‖ which is ―the task of producing
the whole of a hero as a determinate personality‖ (A&H 174). Bakhtin likens the

181

phenomenological experience of this relationship between the author and hero as a fateful
relationship because the whole reason, the whole meaning of existence and its
relationship to life is aesthetically and phenomenologically unavailable as a part of self
determinateness, ―Fate is not the I-for-myself of the hero, but the existence of the hero,
i.e., that which is given to him, that which he turned out to be; it is form he has as a
given, and not as a task-to-be-fulfilled (A&H 176). Bakhtin‘s account of this
phenomenological experience is wholly dependent on the author-hero structuring of
personhood because one cannot describe the experience in theoretical terms. As he says,
―It is possible to love one‘s fate in absentia, or without actually seeing it, but we cannot
contemplate fate as a necessary, internally unified and fully consummated artistic whole,
the way we contemplate the fate of a hero‖ (A&H 176).
We must note that Bakhtin differentiates our aesthetic certainty regarding the fate
of the hero from the belief ―in the logic of God‘s providence‖ (A&H 176). Bakhtin
doggedly defends the experience of faith itself, the actual relationship between man and
God as idiosyncratic, an inner/outer experience easily petrified by abstract structuring and
postulation. He is however committed to how the author-hero relationship reveals the
transition in general aesthetics away from a clear understanding of the author and how he
relates to the hero, how God relates to humankind. He follows this theme quite
powerfully by refusing to discard the constraints of ―guilt and responsibility‖ as real
limitations for heroic typologies (classical, romantic, sentimental, realistic) (A&H 179).
Each one of these aesthetic types creates different constraints on the hero and the author
confusing their relationship and restricting the freedom available in their
interrelationship. What Bakhtin highlights in his description of different aesthetic theories
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of the author-hero relationship is that there adoption into art mimics the
phenomenological experience of human being. If as he says, ―man is the organizing
form-and- content center of artistic vision,‖ then art provides an exemplary object by
which we begin to understand the vicissitudes of subjectivity and how aesthetic authority
informs that experience (A&H 187).
Bakhtin‘s contribution extends much further than the truth that art echoes with the
tones of real human experience. Bakhtin‘s careful attention to the author-hero
relationship presents the important dynamic between author and hero as demonstrative of
a person‘s relationship to authority. In each case, in which Bakhtin provides multiple
derivations and qualifications, the confusion of this relational dynamic blurs the hero‘s
distinctiveness from the author, the other position wholly necessary for a person to be
―upbuilt and shaped,‖ to become ―aesthetically valid and consolidated in time‖ (A&H
188). The formation of personality is not only the point of the author‘s artistic vision but
also it‘s fundamental task. Without proper delineation of these ―fundamental valuecategories‖ no ―actual valuation‖ is possible, impeding conscious life experience and
even ―the simplest sensation‖ (A&H 187).
Authorial Intonation
Bakhtin‘s is especially interested in verbal art, the artistic activity of speech
making interpersonal differentiation possible. Other art forms are by no means excluded
but the spoken word presents itself as specially suited for Bakhtin‘s discussion of artistic
action because in ―Author and Hero‖ Christ serves as the principle example of the Word
in bodily form as well as being the unification of ethical responsibility, selfdisinterestedness, and pure otherness. Christ signifies person and word undetached ―from
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the fundamental creative relationship of the author to the hero that determines, in fact, the
artistic task in all of its essentials‖ (A&H 189). In other words, Christ is a living
demonstration of creatively self-active other orientation, not only by intention but also
through incarnation. He is both self determinedly towards all others and yet acts always
as another for all others.
In Bakhtin‘s aesthetic terms ―the organizing power of all aesthetic forms is the
axiological category of the other, the relationship to the other, enriched by the axiological
‗excess‘ of seeing for the purpose of achieving transgredient consummation‖ (A&H 189).
Christ is the author-hero dynamic incarnate because even though he possesses divine
authority, he relinquishes the power of his word for the hero‘s life as task. As he submits
to the power of the authorial word he is distinguished as a person of unique historical
significance, and simultaneously becomes the other capable of timeless interpersonal
authority. Christ incarnates the inner/outer Word as a word that divinely corresponds to
the particular life of any respondent. For Bakhtin ―the supreme outsideness‖ of the author
is where he exhibits divinity (A&H 191). This divinity, ―this situatedness of the artist
outside the world of this life is, of course, a special and justified kind of participation in
the event of being‖ which means the outsideness of the artist is purposely maintained to
participate in the hero‘s life (A&H 191). By submitting to the authority of the outside
word the hero‘s life is given form and purpose that cannot be independently generated. A
humble response to the outside word of authority is the only situation by which the author
comes close to the hero, and so communicates his excessive aesthetic vision as a formgiving act. In Bakhtin‘s words,
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―The author comes close to the hero only where there is no purity of axiological
self consciousness, where self consciousness is possessed by the consciousness of
another (where it becomes axiologically conscious of itself in an authoritative
other—in the latters love and interest), and where the ―excess‖ (the sum total of
transgredient moments) is reduced to a minimum and is not principled and intense
in character. In this case, the artistic event is actualized between two souls (almost
within the bounds of a single possible axiological consciousness) and not between
a soul and a spirit. (A&H 189).
In this case, to become a hero means something much different than commonly identified
hero types. To be ―heroized,‖ means relinquishing the last word regarding one‘s own
selfhood, the final formation of one‘s individual personality. The truly creative
construction in the author-hero relationship begins and is realized in a person‘s
confession of impure and unconsolidated selfhood. At the same time, a hero takes as his
primary task the position of other for others. This claim appears functionally untenable
and yet Bakhtin‘s tone is convincingly earnest when he concludes that this preliminary
act is the sure support of responsible human being, ―it is only in the event of being that
any kind of creation whatsoever can have weight, can be serious, significant, responsible
(A&H 190).
Bakhtin‘s key decision to situate his discussion around conceptions of heroism
actively focuses his argument against the horizon of literary criticism and philosophical
preponderance, resulting in a pointedly ―down to earth‖ notion. The value trait of ―hero‖
is certainly transient while at the same time ubiquitous in human culture. The hero is in
simple terms the one who brings the ideal qualities of personhood into specific time,
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place, and person. A hero is also recognized for pushing beyond personal boundaries,
becoming more than the equal result of normative socialization. Within Western
traditions, a hero is often one who faces injury and death for the sake of others, is willing
to lay aside concern for his own person for others. This kind of hero is cherished and
loved. As the actions of his life are observed and noted, he receives affirmation of his
work, work that often creates further opportunity where before there was despair or even
death.
These attributes of the western hero type are congruent with Bakhtin‘s own
argument regarding the life of the hero. However, Bakhtin is saying much more than
cultural hero types are the materialization of socially normative value systems in a single
acting person. In fact, he is saying that for the idea of the hero to even exist there must be
an associated outside author because within the scope of relative sociality there is nothing
to confirm that social value will and can consolidate into a coherent and valued
subjectivity. 62 Bakhtin‘s entire discussion results in the conclusion that different the
proposal of cultural hero types reveal fundamental assumptions about the author-hero
relationship, and most importantly that heroic activity is diminished, indistinguishable or
does not even exist within certain author-hero couplings.
The confusion or collapse of the author and hero positions, or the dismissal of the
author entirely prohibits any hero from truly exhibiting real human being. Within the
novel this results in an inartistic product inadequately shaped for heroes to freely speak
62

This conclusion takes to task the fundamental presuppositions of social constructionism. Social
constructionism attempts to resolve the relativity of social structure by placing the inner person, the self, as
the primary mediator between available social values. These are then construed into biology, sociology,
psychology and other human sciences, which theorize about the primary consolidating pole of personhood.
Arriving upon a singular motivation, all human action is then organized around that pole that explains
whole personhood. Freud among others is an excellent example of this kind of reasoning placing his focus
on the observably unavailable sub-conscious in order to explain the dissipate nature of human personality.
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and interact together. In reality this means a discursive environment bordering on the
precipice of aesthetic and axiological relativism. The result is heroes without time or
place, heroes that must attempt to live both outside and inside of themselves because
there is no author outside serving as a verbally evaluative constant. 63 In either case, these
are heroes who are incapable of action, much less heroism.
In later work regarding the formation of speech genres, Bakhtin furthers these
claims by pointing out that the true condition of human language is heteroglossic 64, it is
without universal normative patterns that establish and maintain value structures.
Ordinary human speech is infinitely various, which is it‘s beauty and it‘s bane. Within
language there is no stable foundation from which to construct the necessary order for
distinguishing which values, incarnate in a person, are either heroic or morally heinous.
Appealing to a moral bricoleur is an option for temporally solidifying a set of values that
govern social speech norms but even these traditional structures are subject to generic
deterioration and even purposeful dissection.
Traditional linguistic structures like common moral narratives or institutionalized
ethical codes cannot sustain themselves as mere corporately organized expressions of a
human experience. The heroic type reveals this truth because a hero from one perspective
is the oppressor from another; one person‘s victor is another‘s war criminal. For Bakhtin
this means that an outside authorial word must provide the axiological boundaries of a
hero‘s life, must in some way vivify and affirm that life independent of the social and
63
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cultural meaning used to establish the validity of the hero‘s act. This means that the
hero‘s life and act must receive their consummation from his relationship with the author.
It is in the ―incontestability and confidence of the position of being situated outside that
life‖ that a hero understands the weight of his life, the significance of his act, the purpose
of his existence (A&H 202). The position of the author approaches the hero ―not from the
standpoint of a lived life but from a different standpoint—from a standpoint that is active
outside a lived life‖ (A&H 190). The author engages in ―aesthetic activity‖ which,
Collects the world and condenses it into a finished and self-contained image.
Aesthetic activity finds an emotional equivalent for what is transient in the world,
an emotional equivalent that give life to this transient being and safeguards it; that
is, it finds an axiological position from which the transient in the world acquires
axiological weight of an event, acquires validity and stable determinateness. The
aesthetic act gives birth to being on a new axiological plane of the world: a new
human being is born and a new axiological context—a new plane of thinking
about the human world (A&H 191).
The hero‘s dependence on the author means that the I/other positions link each hero‘s act
to his felt experience of the author‘s presence. For Bakhtin the author-hero relationship is
the principle signification of the I/other distinctiveness, the basis for all artistic activity
demonstrative of unique personhood. This is an intuitive condition of human being,
―besides our own creative or co-creative consciousness, we must vividly feel another
consciousness—the consciousness upon which our creative self-activity is directed upon
an other consciousness‖ (A&H 200). According to Bakhtin, this is the feeling of human
being, the condition for active existence is the ability to ―feel the form‖ given in the
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outward appeal, ―feel its saving power, it axiological weight—to feel its beauty (A&H
200). To feel the beauty of this weight is the condition of human freedom.
C.S. Lewis has argued that this feeling is the memory of our eternal nature, to be
―noticed by God,‖ in other words, to be acknowledged by God not only as an object of
creation but also as a unique subject of his contemplation (Lewis 41). This is a feeling is
not uncommon in the experience of human personality. Bakhtin translates this experience
into the attitude of faith, ―I live by eternal faith and hope in the constant possibility of the
inner miracle of a new birth‖ (A&H 127). However, constant attention to the possible
glory in the gaze of eternal Being often produces fallacious self-possession and an
inability to live within oneself, the only position by which we can be outside of others. In
other words, a person situated against a backdrop of the infinite cannot serve as a
coordinate for others, as a stable subjectivity that is responsive to the unique needs of
another. Only by living from within can we bear this weight for others and become
rhythmic context from which for inner and outer form can be distinguished (A&H 120).
The givenness of this glory is the foundation of freedom for it is only in humble
acceptance of the gift that a person can withstand the active temptation of inwardly
generated self-image. Bakhtin characterizes independent free action as ―style‖ which is
the ―unity of two kinds of devices: the devices of giving form to and consummating the
hero and his world, and the devices determined by the former, the devices of working and
adapting the material‖ (A&H 202). The formation of style, the expression of unique
personality, is built by intuitively feeling constancy in the promise of the eternally
responsive other.
Potential Authority

189

Bakhtin‘s repeated claim that ―I can only be the bearer of the task of artistic
forming and consummating, not its object—not the hero‖ leads us necessarily to the
essential nature of the author‘s position. To become a hero, to be actively positioned with
―respect to values,‖ a person must relate to an author (A&H 188). The hero must
approach the author humbly, without presuming self-sufficiency and recognize the
author‘s role in supplying the ―artistic vision‖ and axiological context wherein the hero‘s
life is deemed valuable, ―independently of meaning‖ (A&H 187). Before providing
textual evidence for his claims in Pushkin‘s lyrical poem ―Parting,‖ Bakhtin recapitulates
his discussion of the author-hero relationship with a strengthened focus on the nature of
the author, and what the author-hero relationship reveals about the author‘s aesthetic
character. The author is a person of divine presence and power, ―someone who knows
how to be active outside of life, someone who partakes in life from within (practical,
social, political, moral, religious life) and understands life from within, but someone who
also loves it from without—loves life where it does not exist for itself and is in need of
self activity that is located outside it and is active independently of meaning‖ (A&H 191).
For Bakhtin, the ability to be active outside of life is evidential of the author‘s
divinity. His divinity does not, however, mean that the author is an alien to human
experience. On the contrary, he participates in the world of the hero precisely because his
active presence is essential for sustaining the hero‘s life. Not only does the author
descend into the life of the hero but he also remains actively external or in Bakhtin‘s
terms, ―internally external‖ meaning that the immediate presence of the author is always
a part of a person‘s ―emotional thinking about the world and life‖ (A&H 191). For
Bakhtin, whether or not the author‘s active position towards the world and his

190

interpenetrating presence is actually felt determines the character and potential of human
personality. This feeling determines,
―...whether or not a whole, transgredient image of outward appearance is
presented; to what extent boundaries are alive, essential and persistent; to what
extent the hero is woven into his surrounding world; to what extent the resolution
and consummation are full, sincere and emotionally intense; to what extent the
action is calm and plastic; to what extent the souls of the heroes are alive (as
opposed to being no more than the misguided exertions of the spirit to convert
itself into a soul through its own resources) (A&H 191-192).
Bakhtin concludes that it is one‘s understanding 65 of the author himself and his
relationship to the lived life, which determines the existence and viability of wholly
coherent personality. His description is of a robust yet responsive person. He depicts a
person who is able to present himself purposefully without becoming disassociated, a
person who is present and active temporally, but exhibits the soulful depth of an
individual who understands and accepts his existential limitations. The axiological
position of the body as the marker of, and for human being is the primary boundary
through which the inner person illuminates the significance of being as more than a selfimaged spirit. In living on this vivid boundary, the author‘s position relative to the hero is
understood phenomenologically in the experience of human being through the persistent
felt presence of a unique, active and responsive human person, a person who‘s action and
speech demonstrates stable subjectivity exhibiting values transgredient to the
decisiveness of human mortality. Substantive subjectivity occurs in the realization of the
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author‘s position on the boundary of human being and through living faith in the promise
of the author‘s charitable word.
The author gives form to particular subjectivity by ―using a particular material for
this purpose (verbal material in our case) and by subordinating this material to his artistic
task (A&H 192). The nature of the author and his relationship to the hero is understood
by his adopting verbal material, words, as the means by which he establishes the
parameters of the hero‘s existence and mediates the hero‘s axiological relationship to the
author himself. Bakhtin makes it clear that that author-artist never approaches his artistic
material objectively, because his initiate relationship to the material is constituent of both
its form and content. Bakhtin‘s view of verbal material is not simple words but the Word
(Jesus Christ), by and through which the author conveys the shape and quality of a
distinct and valuable life. According to Bakhtin, ―Verbal style (the author‘s relationship
to language and the methods of operating with language as determined by that
relationship) is a reflection of the given nature of the material of the author‘s artistic style
(of his relationship to a life and the world of that life, and of the method of shaping a
human being and his world as determined by that relationship)‖ (A&H 195). In other
words, the hero receives the reason and purpose of his life through the author‘s verbal
approach. This is a Word that shapes the hero‘s life and also saves him from his
incoherence towards meaning. However, this Word that gives unique form and provides
particular direction to the inner life of the hero is also evidence for the possibility of style
itself, the individuation possible in the utilization of verbal material by the hero. For
Bakhtin, this is the necessary reality for the existence of the hero, for the hero to act
creatively, to live willfully and purposefully. There are no viable alternatives that provide
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the same rich and generous context in which a person can freely speak, can act, can be
heroic.
The inner independence of the hero can only be understood and sustained within
the loving gaze of an author, a divine authority with the saving grace to speak value into
the hero‘s life regardless of his circumstance, his insufficiencies, and his naturally selfnegating disposition. This is Bakhtin‘s most commanding claim. The style of the author
makes possible a heroic style, a style that constructively separates itself, is generative and
unique. This type of heroism is only possible ―in the incontestability and confidence of
the position of being situated outside that life‖ (A&H 202). The reassurance in the
author‘s outside position confirms the hero‘s position and creates ―a confident unity of
style (the great and powerful style)‖ which purposefully approaches ―life‘s cognitiveethical tension‖ (A&H 202). A hero‘s lack of confidence in the surety of the author‘s
position inevitably means ― a crisis in authorship‖ in which ―it is impossible to be an
artist‖ or in other words, to be creative, to uniquely contribute to the sphere of human
society and culture. In this state the hero‘s position becomes passive, emphasis is placed
on aesthetic experience of life and not on the effort of individual contribution. The crisis
of authorship also means the dissolution of necessary boundaries, between I and other,
between one‘s self and society and between contemporary task and tradition. The
dissolution of these boundaries is the beginning of a general suspicion towards the
―formal power‖ of the outside voice, the authorial Word (A&H 201). Instead ―lived life
tends to recoil and hide deep inside itself, tends to withdraw into its own inner infinitude,
is afraid of boundaries, strives to dissolve them, for it has no faith in the essentialness
and kindness of the power that give form from outside‖ (A&H 203).
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The suspicion of what is outside is an important and powerful theme in current
discourse on personality and communicative practice. The colloquialisms ―be true‖ or ―be
real‖ draw interesting parallels between what is a good and beautiful person and what it is
that corrupts or distorts the possibility of achieving a holistic conception of who and what
one is. Bakhtin is pointing not only towards a long legacy in the history of psychological
thought but also a fundamental human desire to retain control of one‘s self, to have the
final word regarding the importance of my person and its place in the world (A&H 120).
Contemporary interpersonal communication scholarship has identified this phenomenon
as central promoting research focused on issues of power and identity. Social
constructionism as a paradigm has provided productive analysis of how cultural and
social influences have created or closed off certain expressions of identity and
personhood but problematically pivots between dialectics of power as the primary
motivator for the interaction between persons interpersonally and societally. These
categories do not conflict with Bakhtin‘s own design but instead reveal the residue of the
individualistic ideologies he critiques. These are the same problems that Stout attempts to
answer by casting the negotiation of multiple goods as a dialectic between ethics and
aesthetics mediated by personal biography.
Naming cultural or social heroes is a way to negotiate the phenomenological
tension felt when one‘s own understanding of human experience is dismissed by a larger
socio-cultural order, but it is clear that these tensions result in a general suspicion of what
is considered outside to the true inner person. In fact, the damage that can be inflicted on
a person within different socio-cultural value structures often results in the attempt to
control that which Bakhtin says provides the formal vitality and validity of personhood,
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the spoken word. And yet, Bakhtin dismisses the notion that it is the ―authoritative‖ word
that actually has the kind of formative power he believes is possessed by the author.
Authoritative socio-cultural values systems are most certainly influential but do not exact
the same kind of authority that the inner penetrating word has. This word is the author‘s
word, that word which is personified into a supra-addressee, a person who stands outside
the temporal reality and validates subjectivity in spite of conflicting narratives and
normative ethics. This does not mean that the author/authority cannot work in concert
with the socio-cultural order, only that it is the presumed author to whom the personal
appeal is made, not conflicting ideologies or exclusive systems of thought.
Bakhtin‘s emphasis on the inner and outer aspects of human personhood reveals
an important dynamic in discursive practice, evident even at the level of current
American socio-political discourse. The outer voice, politically powerful or not, is
presumed to possess a particularly clear and exceeding vision of the inner structures of
available identities and or versions of complete personhood in both in-groups and outgroups. Attempts to sort out the validity of each perspective ethically, inevitably leads to
a conflictual conversation and aesthetic reevaluation, but even this transcendence cannot
escape the dialectic posed between ethics and aesthetics in the act of human being. In
fact, contemporary socio-political discourse regarding identity and authority gravitates
towards the experience of personality created by certain social orderings rather than what
kind of social structure is created by a disparate or ―heteroglossic‖ view of whole
personhood.
This intuitive realization of the authority in the outside voice reinforces Bakhtin‘s
claim that ―a temporally consummated life is a life without hope from the standpoint of
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meaning that keeps it in motion. From within itself such a life is hopeless; it is only from
outside that a cherishing justification can be bestowed upon it—regardless of unattained
meaning‖ (A&H 127). The hero‘s word in regard to his life does not possess the vital
power necessary for invigorating that life; provide him with active purpose, nor to
consummate his understanding of personhood. This confirming voice must be positioned
outside the axiological context of meaning, whether customary, cultural, ideological or
legal. All immanent categories of confirmation are truly subject to the human dissipation
in language, which proves too deep for any ethical mooring let alone a stationary canvas
for the bricoleur. According to Bakhtin, in order to possess a stable ―naïve and
immediate‖ subjectivity that actually experiences life one must have ― a support of
meaning outside the context of my own life—a living creative and, hence, rightful point
of support—in order to be able to remove the act of experiencing from the unitary and
unique event of my own life and to apprehend its present-on-hand determinateness as a
characteristic, as a trait the whole inner life, as a lineament of inner countenance‖ (A&H
113).
So far attempts to understand these aspects of Bakhtin‘s thought have failed to
address the fact that the location of the outside authoritative voice in a social order, in
intimate partnership, or even in the ―true self,‖ for Bakhtin, is an ―insanity of faith and
hope‖ (A&H 128). To live insanely hopeful of the possibility of personal consummation
through the affirmative speech acts of immanent voices means not only that I will
experience a diminished version of human being, but also that I will be unable to
understand the nature and character of the inner life in others (A&H 128). I cannot be
responsive, nor be answerable for another person without the surety of my own person
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located in a relational position outside the heteroglossic world of human language. This is
not to say that human authorities in their infinite variety cannot provide some sense of
stability that converts into a feeling of coherent subjectivity. This is a common response
to the ―rightful folly or insanity of not coinciding—of not coinciding in principle with me
myself as a given‖ (A&H 127). For Bakhtin, this fact and the phenomenological truth that
― I live by eternal faith and hope in the constant possibility of the inner miracle of new
birth‖ means that the final word about my life must be spoken by someone who actually
has the capacity to save, to redeem me from a future beyond temporal meaning.
Bakhtin‘s claims for some might ironically represent both the depths of existential
pessimism and the windy heights of radical idealism. These are fair characterizations
only if the reader neglects to acknowledge that the paradigm for Bakhtin‘s perspective
relies substantially on the incarnate Christ. Without this primary aesthetic principle it is
difficult to resolve the distance between the poles of heteroglossic language and his
original question regarding the possibility of coherent subjectivity. The incarnate
principle is also how Bakhtin deftly dodges accusations of transcendentalism by insisting
that the outside position is where the potential of whole personhood exists. Without a
face, without the incarnate image of Christ, the outside position becomes nothing more
than another abstract theory in aesthetics, a move that Bakhtin critiques throughout his
entire body of scholarship.
Christ‘s incarnation as the mediating principle between ethics and aesthetics
means that Bakhtin can be concerned with both the creation and encouragement of
individual identity paralleled with an infinite concern not for myself, but for others. The
principle reality in Christ‘s incarnation ―makes possible (not only physically but morally)
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what is impossible for me in myself, namely: the axiological affirmation and acceptance
of the whole present-on-hand givenness of another‘s interior being‖ (A&H 128). The
realization of this dynamic is the unmasking of the psychologically self-sufficient
individual made evident in what Bakhtin calls a relationship of ―mutual contradiction‖
where ―the other, from within himself negates himself, negates his own being-as-a-given,
at that point I from my own unique place in the event of being, affirm and validate
axiologically the givenness of his being that he himself negates‖ (A&H 128-29). And yet,
one cannot achieve this stable position of affirmation outside another unless he possesses
a supportive position transgredient to the communicative event.
If I am prideful and try to find for myself affirmation within the one I
immediately address, and if I presume to address him as a person who already exists
wholly outside, rather than one who is in need of the same rebirth I also need and
experience, ―The only thing left for me to do is to find refuge in the other and to
assemble out of the other—the scattered pieces of my own givenness‖ (A&H 126). In
other words, a person can never ―be himself‖ but can only receive himself, from another
(A&H 111). This receptive position is the beginning of concern and active care for
another person because it means the realization that every person I approach experiences
the same ―unconsummatedeness of life‖ and that the final word regarding his life is in
me, ―the last, consummating word belongs‖ to me (A&H 128). Bakhtin‘s emphasis on the
vulnerability of the inner person carries with it an imperative of great importance.
Bakhtin considers this position the aesthetic form of heroism, a position of extreme
―naiveté and immediacy‖ receptive to the positive consummation of personhood that I
can only receive when it is humbly received as a gift from another (A&H 129).
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Conclusion
It is a fearful thing to surrender oneself to the speech of another, to approach
others in ―penitential‖ tones (A&H 114). In fact, is more likely that our most common
speech acts are efforts at self-defense, to preserve that image that we have so ―hopefully‖
constructed. And yet, we find in Bakhtin the weighty claim that as a human, I cannot be
an author, only a hero. To be truly heroic I cannot claim the title, nor assume that my
actions will warrant such recognition. My attention to this problem only draws me farther
away from the possibility of achieving ―aesthetic significance‖ (A&H 129).
I must be naïve and immediate, present for others and not for myself, even to the
point of my own death. Bakhtin does not abandon his readers to this fear instead positing
a reassuring alternative, living without the fear of death, physically, social, or emotionally
means becoming an aesthetic coordinate for another, I can ―rightly affirm and preserve‖
him, and ―give birth to his soul on a new axiological plane of being‖ (A&H 129). The
language here is hard to understand if we do not remember that Bakhtin is working
paradigmatically from the perspective of Christ‘s own incarnation which was itself, a
humiliation in order to provide new life and produce a new kind of freedom,
demonstrated in the unity of human personality with the eternal Word.
Practically, Bakhtin‘s discovery provides a helpful lens for identifying the type of
supra-addressee informing a given speech act and the implications of this particular
authority. At the same time, the supra-addressee as a demonstrated constituent of the
speech act reveals a stark difference between an ―authoritative‖ word and what
constitutes authority as it relates to individual personality. To be free, and to speak freely
our appeals must be to a personal authority that lives both beyond temporal meaning but
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yet close enough to hear the penitential tone of a prayer, to answer the most timid
question, and encourage the shaken heart of a hero.
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